Agnès Festré

Theory and evidence in psychology and economics about motivation crowding out: A possible convergence?

The empirical relevance of motivation crowding out is a controversial issue in economics and psychology. As already pointed out by Frey and Jegen (2001), this is partly due to the historical development of two distinct and parallel strands of literature that stem from different theoretical traditions, have radically different tenets and therefore, are difficult to reconcile. In this survey, we go back to the details of the debates that took place independently among psychologists and economists, and sketch an integrative interdisciplinary approach likely to favor a more fruitful collaboration between economics and psychology. From this perspective, experimental economics (both field and laboratory) is viewed as a major research field shedding new light on the conditions of relevance of motivation crowding out.

Rationality, behavior, institutional, and economic change in Schumpeter

In 1940 Schumpeter wrote a paper entitled: ‘The Meaning of Rationality in the Social Sciences’, which was intended as a contribution to one of the meetings of a seminar including Talcott Parsons, Wassily Leontief, Paul Sweezy and other Harvard scholars, that he initiated. In this paper Schumpeter develops thoroughly his own conception of rationality in economics. First, this paper is interesting in itself because it relates to contemporary methodological debates on rationality in the social sciences. Second Schumpeter’s conception of rationality is linked to his methodological background (both individualistic and holistic), which is rooted in his economic sociology and explains the relationships he stresses between individual behavior and collective entities. In this contribution we present the arguments developed by Schumpeter in his 1940 paper and analyze the reason why his notion of rationality can be seen as a key component of his conception of economic and institutional change.

Schumpeter on money, banking and finance: an institutionalist perspective

Abstract In this paper we provide an institutional interpretation of Schumpeters analysis of money, banking and finance. We justify this interpretation by considering first Schumpeters overall methodological perspective, in particular the role played by economic sociology in his approach, and second by showing that the way Schumpeter describes the successive steps of economic development – circular flow, steady state and development – provides a good illustration of how institutional change is progressively introduced into his analytical framework and of the leading role of the banking system in the overall evolution of the financial system.

Handbook of Knowledge and Economics

Why do societies benefit differently from knowledge? How exactly does social interaction interfere with knowledge acquisition and diffusion? This original Handbook brings together a wide range of differing approaches to shed light on these questions and others relating to the role and relevance of knowledge in economic analysis. By illuminating the philosophical roots of the various notions of knowledge employed by economists, this Handbook helps to disentangle conceptual and typological issues surrounding the debate on knowledge amongst economists. Wide-ranging in scope, it explores fundamental aspects of the relationship between knowledge and economics - such as the nature of knowledge, knowledge acquisition and knowledge diffusion. This important compendium embraces various fields and traditions of economic analysis and discusses the role of knowledge in 21 papers from outstanding international scholars. Advanced scholars and PhD students interested in cross-fertilization between different fields of economic analysis will find this Handbook of considerable importance.

Knowledge and individual behaviour in the Austrian tradition of business cycles: von Mises vs. Hayek

In this paper, we reconsider Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek’s theories of business cycles in the light of their methodological approach. In the Wrst part, we clarify Mises and Hayek’s methodological frameworks in order to provide a better understanding of their programmatic approach of business cycles. The second part is dedicated to their respective theoretical framework, as applied to capital, interest and monetary theory. Finally, in the last part, we investigate the mechanisms at work in Mises and Hayek’s explanations of the diVerent phases of the trade cycle, by underlying the role played by knowledge and individual behaviour within market adjustments.

Knowledge, Beliefs and Economics

This book surveys how economists engage with knowledge and beliefs in various fields of economic analysis, such as general equilibrium theory, decision theory, game theory, experimental economics, evolutionary theory of the firm, financial markets and the history of economic thought.

Knowledge and beliefs in economics: the case of the Austrian tradition

The contribution focuses on the problem of the influence of individual knowledge and beliefs on the working of economic activity, within the Austrian tradition of economic thought. More specifically, the contributions of von Mises, Hayek and Schumpeter are investigated. These contributions show a large variety of answers concerning the relation between individual and social beliefs. This variety is not exhaustive but it substantially contributes to a better understanding of contemporary theoretical debates.

Macroeconomic Analysis and Individual Economic Rationality: Some Lessons from Wicksell, von Mises and Schumpeter

The purpose of this contribution is to investigate the problem of the room attributed to individual economic rationality by circulation approaches. The expression ‘circulation approaches’ here refers to an analytical framework in which income distribution, production and exchange activities cannot be simultaneously implemented on interdependent markets but are organized according to a given logical and chronological order which implies the preeminence of the production of commodities and of the existence of the means of payment that permit the circulation of these commodities (Arena, 1985, p. 47; see also Deleplace and Nell, 1996). Our investigation will not privilege however the modern versions of these approaches (see Graziani 2003a, ch.1). We will instead utilise the works of some economists of the past, namely, Knut Wicksell, Josef Schumpeter and Ludwig von Mises. The reason of the choice of these three authors is that their respective contributions to economic analysis belong to what Leijonhufvud called the ‘Wicksell Connection theories’ (Leijonhufvud, 1981, p. 132). In this context, Schumpeter’s and von Mises’s theories of money and economic progress appear to be two possible extensions of Wicksell’s original work. Our view is that, by contrast with Wicksell’s economic theory, they both give an essential role to individual economic rationality.

THEORY AND EVIDENCE IN PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS ABOUT MOTIVATION CROWDING OUT: A POSSIBLE CONVERGENCE?: RELEVANCE OF MOTIVATION CROWDING OUT

The empirical relevance of motivation crowding out is a controversial issue in economics and psychology. As already pointed out by Frey and Jegen (2001), this is partly due to the historical development of two distinct and parallel strands of literature that stem from different theoretical traditions, have radically different tenets and therefore, are difficult to reconcile. In this survey, we go back to the details of the debates that took place independently among psychologists and economists, and sketch an integrative interdisciplinary approach likely to favor a more fruitful collaboration between economics and psychology. From this perspective, experimental economics (both field and laboratory) is viewed as a major research field shedding new light on the conditions of relevance of motivation crowding out.

The Respective Effects of Being Observed and Sanctioned in Modified Dictator and Ultimatum Games

We experiment within a laboratory the respective effects of being observed and sanctioned in both a dictator and an ultimatum game. We obtain the classical results that individuals do not play the subgame perfect equilibria. We also show that being observed increases the offers made by the proposer in the dictator game but this effect is difficult to identify in the ultimatum game. We also find that in the dictator game, the more the individuals are sensitive to observation the less they are to sanction.