Agustin Vicente

Current Physics and ‘the Physical’

Physicalism is the claim that that there is nothing in the world but the physical. Philosophers who defend physicalism have to confront a well-known dilemma, known as Hempel’s dilemma, concerning the definition of ‘the physical’: if ‘the physical’ is whatever current physics says there is, then physicalism is most probably false; but if ‘the physical’ is whatever the true theory of physics would say that there is, we have that physicalism is vacuous and runs the risk of becoming trivial. This article has two parts. The first, negative, part is devoted to developing a criticism of the so-called via negativa response to Hempel’s dilemma. In the second, more substantial, part, I propose to take the first horn of Hempel’s dilemma. However, I argue for a broad construal of ‘current physics’ and characterize ‘the physical’ accordingly. The virtues of the broad characterization of ‘the physical’ are: first, it makes physicalism less likely to be false; and second, it ties our understanding of ‘the physical’ to the reasons we have for believing in physicalism. That is, it fulfills the desideratum of construing our theses according to the reasons we have to believe in them. 1 Introduction 2 The via negativa 3 On Current Physics 4 Current Physics: First Construal 5 The Causal Closure Principle 6 Current Physics: Second Construal 7 The Continuity Demand 1 Introduction 2 The via negativa 3 On Current Physics 4 Current Physics: First Construal 5 The Causal Closure Principle 6 Current Physics: Second Construal 7 The Continuity Demand

The activity view of inner speech

We distinguish two general approaches to inner speech (IS)—the “format” and the “activity” views—and defend the activity view. The format view grounds the utility of IS on features of the representational format of language, and is related to the thesis that the proper function of IS is to make conscious thinking possible. IS appears typically as a product constituted by representations of phonological features. The view also has implications for the idea that passivity phenomena in cognition may be misattributed IS. The activity view sees IS as a speaking activity that does not have a proper function in cognition. It simply inherits the array of functions of outer speech. We argue that it is methodologically advisable to start from this variety of uses, which suggests commonalities between internal and external activities. The format view has several problems; it has to deny “unsymbolized thinking”; it cannot easily explain how IS makes thoughts available to consciousness, and it cannot explain those uses of IS where its format features apparently play no role. The activity view not only lacks these problems but also has explanatory advantages: construing IS as an activity allows it to be integrally constituted by its content; the view is able to construe unsymbolized thinking as part of a continuum of phenomena that exploit the same mechanisms, and it offers a simple explanation for the variety of uses of IS.

The Big Concepts Paper: A Defence of Hybridism

The renewed interest in concepts and their role in psychological theorizing is partially motivated by Machery’s claim that concepts are so heterogeneous that they have no explanatory role. Against this, pluralism argues that there is multiplicity of different concepts for any given category, while hybridism argues that a concept is constituted by a rich common representation. This article aims to advance the understanding of the hybrid view of concepts. First, we examine the main arguments against hybrid concepts and conclude that, even if not successful, they challenge hybridism to find a robust criterion for concept individuation and to show an explanatory advantage for hybrid concepts. Then we propose such a criterion of individuation, which we will call ‘functional stable coactivation’. Finally, we examine the prospects of hybridism to understand what is involved in recent approaches to categorization and meaning extraction. 1   The Heterogeneity of Conceptual Representations 2   Two Challenges for Hybrid Concepts: Individuation and Explanation    2.1   The coordination criterion    2.2   Concepts as constituents of thoughts 3   Individuating Hybrids: Functional Stable Coactivation 4   The Explanatory Power of Hybrid Concepts    4.1   Categorization    4.2   Meaning extraction       4.2.1   Linguistic comprehension and rich lexical entries       4.2.2   Polysemy and hybrid concepts 5   Conclusion 1   The Heterogeneity of Conceptual Representations 2   Two Challenges for Hybrid Concepts: Individuation and Explanation    2.1   The coordination criterion    2.2   Concepts as constituents of thoughts    2.1   The coordination criterion    2.2   Concepts as constituents of thoughts 3   Individuating Hybrids: Functional Stable Coactivation 4   The Explanatory Power of Hybrid Concepts    4.1   Categorization    4.2   Meaning extraction       4.2.1   Linguistic comprehension and rich lexical entries       4.2.2   Polysemy and hybrid concepts    4.1   Categorization    4.2   Meaning extraction       4.2.1   Linguistic comprehension and rich lexical entries       4.2.2   Polysemy and hybrid concepts       4.2.1   Linguistic comprehension and rich lexical entries       4.2.2   Polysemy and hybrid concepts 5   Conclusion

The nature of unsymbolized thinking

Using the method of Descriptive Experience Sampling, some subjects report experiences of thinking that do not involve words or any other symbols [Hurlburt, R. T., and C. L. Heavey. 2006. Exploring Inner Experience. Amsterdam: John Benjamins; Hurlburt, R. T., and S. A. Akhter. 2008. “Unsymbolized Thinking.” Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4): 1364–1374]. Even though the possibility of this unsymbolized thinking has consequences for the debate on the phenomenological status of cognitive states, the phenomenon is still insufficiently examined. This paper analyzes the main properties of unsymbolized thinking (UT) and advances an explanation of its origin. According to our analysis, unsymbolized thoughts appear as propositional states, that is, they are experienced as compositional conceptual phenomena, with semantic and syntactic features analogous to those of the contents of utterances. Based on this characterization, we hypothesize that UT is continuous with the activity of inner speech, in particular, it is a form of inner speech where the speech action is aborted even before the intention to talk is implemented by motor commands. We contend that this account provides the best explanation of the distinctive features of the phenomenon, and it helps to understand the sense of agency and ownership associated with it. Finally, we consider a possible objection arising from the experience of unworded inner speech, and we show how our account should inform the debate about cognitive phenomenology.

1: On the Psychological Reality of Minimal Propositions

One of the issues at stake in the dispute between minimalism and contextualism regarding the psychological reality of their proposals is whether there is something that corresponds to a minimal proposition at some stage of utterance processing. This chapter addresses the question of the psychological reality of the minimal proposition in the light of several problems that arise concerning its empirical testability. It briefs about two (alleged) sources of empirical evidence. One comes from Borgs considerations in favour of the modularity of a semantic system, which would lend support to the strongest commitment to the reality of the minimal proposition. The second arises from experiments by Bezuidenhout and Cutting that purportedly support the idea that minimal propositions are processed in parallel with nonliteral meanings, thus favouring a moderate commitment. Keywords: Bezuidenhout; Borgs considerations; contextualism; minimal proposition; psychological reality; semantic system

Where to Look for Emergent Properties

Recent years have seen renewed interest in the emergence issue. The contemporary debate, in contrast with that of past times, has to do not so much with the mind–body problem as with the relationship between the physical and other domains; mostly with the biological domain. One of the main sources of this renewed interest is the study of complex and, in general, far-from-equilibrium self-preserving systems, which seem to fulfil one of the necessary conditions for an entity to be emergent; namely, that its causal powers are not predictable from the causal powers of basic physical properties. However, I argue that much of the current emergentism debate has misfired by focusing on the interpretation of self-maintaining systems. In contrast, I claim that if we want to find emergent properties, we should look not at complex systems, but at selection (natural selection, in particular). I argue that selection processes make the causal world ‘exuberant’ by making non-physical functional and relational properties enter the causal web of the world.