Ahmed Saber Mahmud

Sanctions in networks: “The Most Unkindest Cut of All”

The extensive literature on sanctions has mainly focused on a dyadic interaction between sender and target. In contrast, this paper examines sanctions when the sender and target are embedded in a network of linkages to other agents. The sender can assemble a sanctioning coalition of neighbors to sever their links (execute multi-link cuts) to the target and her allies. Efficacy of sanctions is now crucially dependent on the network architecture. We characterize the structural properties of networks in which a sender can effectively sanction a target in the short run (when links can only be deleted) and the long run (when links can be both deleted and added).

Who’s the Boss? Household Distribution of Power in a Non‐Cooperative Framework

When labour market participation influences bargaining power in a household, the male and the female labour supplies can be either positively or negatively related. If negatively related, possibilities include: ‘balance of power’, the complete dominance of one member, and circumstances where inequity persists with incomplete dominance. If effort levels are positively sloped, it is possible to have equilibrium at either high or low effort levels leading to equity. The effects of economic development and wage discrimination are also discussed.

Coalition Formation with Learning from Predecessors: A Case of Dynamic Positive Externality

We consider a simple multi-period model where the entry cost varies with respect to the number of firms that have entered previously. In the non-cooperative outcome, there is clustered entry among the firms in the last period; hence, the full potential of learning is not expropriated. When firms are allowed to form coalitions, the non-cooperative outcome is dominated; thus, there is a gain in efficiency. We also find that full efficiency is obtained when a grand coalition is formed. The implications of policies on coalitions as well as on individual firms are also discussed.