Aidan Feeney

Inductive reasoning : experimental, developmental, and computational approaches

Preface Aidan Feeney and Evan Heit 1. What is induction and why study it? Evan Heit 2. The development of inductive reasoning Brett K. Hayes 3. Interpreting asymmetries of projection in childrens inductive reasoning Douglas Medin and Sandra Waxman 4. Property generalization as causal reasoning Bob Rehder 5. Availability in category-based induction Patrick Shafto, John Coley and Anna Vitkin 6. From similarity to chance Sergey Blok, Daniel Osherson and Douglas Medin 7. Theory-based Bayesian models of inductive reasoning Joshua Tenenbaum, Charles Spence and Patrick Shafto 8. Use of single or multiple categories in category-based induction Gregory Murphy and Brian Ross 9. Abductive inference: From philosophical analysis to neutral mechanisms Paul Thagard 10. Mathematical induction and induction in mathematics Lance Rips and Jennifer Asmuth 11. Induction, deduction, and argument strength in human reasoning and argumentation Mike Oaksford and Ulrike Hahn 12. Individual differences, dual processes, and induction Aidan Feeney 13. Taxonomising induction Steve Sloman.

The Risk of Polite Misunderstandings

We review evidence showing that politeness taxes mental resources and creates confusion about what is truly meant during interactions. While this confusion can be useful in low-stakes situations, it can have negative, even dangerous consequences in high-stakes situations such as flying a plane in an emergency or helping a patient decide on a course of treatment. Unfortunately, high-stakes situations are especially conducive to politeness-based misunderstandings. Although policies that discourage politeness in high-stakes situations are undergoing empirical assessment, we suggest that research is needed on the nonverbal cues that help people disambiguate polite statements.

The development of regret

In two experiments, 4- to 9-year-olds played a game in which they selected one of two boxes to win a prize. On regret trials the unchosen box contained a better prize than the prize children actually won, and on baseline trials the other box contained a prize of the same value. Children rated their feelings about their prize before and after seeing what they could have won if they had chosen the other box and were asked to provide an explanation if their feelings had changed. Patterns of responding suggested that regret was experienced by 6 or 7 years of age; children of this age could also explain why they felt worse in regret trials by referring to the counterfactual situation in which the prize was better. No evidence of regret was found in 4- and 5-year-olds. Additional findings suggested that by 6 or 7 years, childrens emotions were determined by a consideration of two different counterfactual scenarios.

The time course of conflict on the Cognitive Reflection Test

Reasoning that is deliberative and reflective often requires the inhibition of intuitive responses. The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is designed to assess peoples ability to suppress incorrect heuristic responses in favour of deliberation. Correct responding on the CRT predicts performance on a range of tasks in which intuitive processes lead to incorrect responses, suggesting indirectly that CRT performance is related to cognitive control. Yet little is known about the cognitive processes underlying performance on the CRT. In the current research, we employed a novel mouse tracking methodology to capture the time-course of reasoning on the CRT. Analysis of mouse cursor trajectories revealed that participants were initially drawn towards the incorrect (i.e., intuitive) option even when the correct (deliberative) option was ultimately chosen. Conversely, participants were not attracted to the correct option when they ultimately chose the incorrect intuitive one. We conclude that intuitive processes are activated automatically on the CRT and must be inhibited in order to respond correctly. When participants responded intuitively, there was no evidence that deliberative reasoning had become engaged.

Relations between premise similarity and inductive strength

According to the diversity principle, diverse evidence is strong evidence. There has been considerable evidence that people respect this principle in inductive reasoning. However, exceptions may be particularly informative. Medin, Coley, Storms, and Hayes (2003) introduced a relevance theory of inductive reasoning and used this theory to predict exceptions, including the nondiversity-by-propertyreinforcement effect. A new experiment in which this phenomenon was investigated is reported here. Subjects made inductive strength judgments and similarity judgments for stimuli from Medin et al. (2003). The inductive strength judgments showed the same pattern as that in Medin et al. (2003); however, the similarity judgments suggested that the pattern should be interpreted as a diversity effect, rather than as a nondiversity effect. It is concluded that the evidence regarding the predicted nondiversity-byproperty-reinforcement effect does not give distinctive support for relevance theory, although this theory does address other results.

The suppression of q card selections : Evidence for deductive inference in Wason's Selection Task

The results of three experiments investigating the role of deductive inference in Wasons selection task are reported. In Experiment 1, participants received either a standard one-rule problem or a task containing a second rule, which specified an alternative antecedent. Both groups of participants were asked to select those cards that they considered were necessary to test whether the rule common to both problems was true or false. The results showed a significant suppression of q card selections in the two-rule condition. In addition there was weak evidence for both decreased p selection and increased not-q selection. In Experiment 2 we again manipulated number of rules and found suppression of q card selections only. Finally, in Experiment 3 we compared one- and two-rule conditions with a two-rule condition where the second rule specified two alternative antecedents in the form of a disjunction. The q card selections were suppressed in both of the two-rule conditions but there was no effect of whether the second rule contained one or two alternative antecedents. We argue that our results support the claim that people make inferences about the unseen side of the cards when engaging with the indicative selection task.

How many processes underlie category-based induction? Effects of conclusion specificity and cognitive ability

Two studies investigated participants’ sensitivity to the amount and diversity of the evidence when reasoning inductively about categories. Both showed that participants are more sensitive to characteristics of the evidence for arguments with general rather than specific conclusions. Both showed an association between cognitive ability and sensitivity to these evidence characteristics, particularly when the conclusion category was general. These results suggest that a simple associative process may not be sufficient to capture some key phenomena of category-based induction. They also support the claim that the need to generate a superordinate category is a complicating factor in category-based reasoning and that adults’ tendency to generate such categories while reasoning has been overestimated.

Do development and learning really decrease memory? On similarity and category-based induction in adults and children

In a recently published study, Sloutsky and Fisher [Sloutsky, V. M., & Fisher, A.V. (2004a). When development and learning decrease memory: Evidence against category-based induction in children. Psychological Science, 15, 553-558; Sloutsky, V. M., & Fisher, A. V. (2004b). Induction and categorization in young children: A similarity-based model. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133, 166-188.] demonstrated that children have better memory for the items that they generalise to than do adults. On the basis of this finding, they claim that children and adults use different mechanisms for inductive generalisations; whereas adults focus on shared category membership, children project properties on the basis of perceptual similarity. Sloutsky & Fisher attribute childrens enhanced recognition memory to the more detailed processing required by this similarity-based mechanism. In Experiment 1 we show that children look at the stimulus items for longer than adults. In Experiment 2 we demonstrate that although when given just 250ms to inspect the items children remain capable of making accurate inferences, their subsequent memory for those items decreases significantly. These findings suggest that there are no necessary conclusions to be drawn from Sloutsky & Fishers results about developmental differences in generalisation strategy.

Comparisons, mental models, and the action effect in judgments of regret

People tend to attribute more regret to a character who has decided to take action and experienced a negative outcome than to one who has decided not to act and experienced a negative outcome. For some decisions, however, this finding is not observed in a between-participants design and thus appears to rely on comparisons between people’s representations of action and their representations of inaction. In this article, we outline a mental models account that explains findings from studies that have used within- and between-participants designs, and we suggest that, for decisions with uncertain counterfactual outcomes, information about the consequences of a decision to act causes people to flesh out their representation of the counterfactual states of affairs for inaction. In three experiments, we confirm our predictions about participants’ fleshing out of representations, demonstrating that an action effect occurs only when information about the consequences of action is available to participants as they rate the nonactor and when this information about action is informative with respect to judgments about inaction. It is important to note that the action effect always occurs when the decision scenario specifies certain counterfactual outcomes. These results suggest that people sometimes base their attributions of regret on comparisons among different sets of mental models.

Implicit and explicit processes in a hypothesis testing task.

We present the results of two experiments investigating the factors that determine responding on the pseudo-diagnosticity task. In Expt 1 we manipulated peoples beliefs about the degree to which an initial piece of evidence supported a focal hypothesis and found decreased pseudo-diagnostic (PD) responding when the evidence offered low support for the focal hypothesis. In Expt 2 we manipulated the instructions given to participants. We found that instructions to select evidence to help decide between the focal and the complementary hypotheses produced fewer PD responses than both instructions to decide whether the focal hypothesis was the case and instructions to decide whether its complement was the case. The results are interpreted within the framework of recent dual process theories of reasoning.