Ajay Khorana

An Examination of Herd Behavior in Equity Markets: An International Perspective

We examine the investment behavior of market participants within diAerent international markets (i.e., US, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan), specifically with regard to their tendency to exhibit herd behavior. We find no evidence of herding on the part of market participants in the US and Hong Kong and partial evidence of herding in Japan. However, for South Korea and Taiwan, the two emerging markets in our sample, we document significant evidence of herding. The results are robust across various size-based portfolios and over time. Furthermore, macroeconomic information rather than firm-specific information tends to have a more significant impact on investor behavior in markets which exhibit herding. In all five markets, the rate of increase in security return dispersion as a function of the aggregate market return is higher in up market, relative to down market days. This is consistent with the directional asymmetry documented by McQueen et al. (1996) (McQueen, G., Pinegar, M.A., Thorley, S., 1996.

Top management turnover An empirical investigation of mutual fund managers

Abstract This paper examines the relation between the replacement of mutual fund managers and their prior performance. Using the growth rate in a funds asset base and its portfolio returns as two separate measures of performance, I document an inverse relation between the probability of managerial replacement and fund performance. The sample of departing fund managers exhibits higher portfolio turnover rates and higher expenses relative to an objective-matched sample of nonreplaced fund managers. The overall evidence is consistent with the presence of well-functioning internal and external market mechanisms for mutual fund managers.

Mutual Fund Fees Around the World

Using a new database, we study fees charged by 46,580 mutual fund classes offered for sale in 18 countries, which account for about 86% of the world fund industry in 2002. We examine management fees, total expense ratios, and total shareholder costs (including load charges). Fees vary substantially across funds and from country to country. To explain these differences, we consider fund, sponsor, and national characteristics. Fees differ by investment objectives: larger funds and fund complexes charge lower fees; fees are higher for funds distributed in more countries and funds domiciled in certain offshore locations (especially when selling into countries levying higher taxes). Substantial cross-country differences persist even after controlling for these variables. These remaining differences can be explained by a variety of factors, the most robust of which is that fund fees are lower in countries with stronger investor protection.

CEO founder status and firm financial performance

Founders create their organizations, yet are often expected to eventually become liabilities to these same organizations. Past empirical research on the relationship between CEO founder status (i.e., is the CEO also the founder?) and firm performance has yielded inconsistent results. This study of 94 founder‐ and nonfounder‐managed firms finds that founder management has no main effect on stock returns over a 3‐year holding period, but that firm size and firm age moderate the CEO founder status–firm performance relationship. Copyright

The Determinants of Mutual Fund Starts

For a sample of 1163 mutual funds started over the period 1979-1992, we find that fund initiations are positively related to the level of assets invested in and the capital gains embedded in other funds with the same objective, the fund familys prior performance, the fraction of funds in the family in the low range of fees, and the decision by large families to open similar funds in the prior year. In addition, consistent with the presence of scale and scope economies in fund openings, we find that large families and families that have more experience in opening funds in the past are more likely to open new funds. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

Performance Changes following Top Management Turnover: Evidence from Open-End Mutual Funds

I examine the impact of mutual fund manager replacement on subsequent fund performance. Using a sample of 393 domestic equity and bond fund managers that were replaced over the 1979–1991 period, for the underperformers, I document significant improvements in post-replacement performance relative to the past performance of the fund. On the other hand, the replacement of overperforming managers results in deterioration in post-replacement performance. I find evidence supporting the presence of strategic risk shifting in the fund portfolios prior to replacement. Futhermore, consistent with the notion of window dressing, I document that the level of portfolio turnover activity decreases significantly in the post-replacement period. Lastly, the replacement of poor performers is preceded by significant decreases in net new inflows in the fund.

An Analysis of the Determinants and Shareholder Wealth Effects of Mutual Fund Mergers

This study examines the determinants of mutual fund mergers and their subsequent wealth impact on shareholders of target and acquiring funds. Results indicate significant improvements in postmerger performance and a reduction in expense ratios for target fund shareholders. In contrast, acquiring fund shareholders experience a significant deterioration in postmerger performance. The net asset flows continue to remain negative for the combined fund in the year following the merger. The likelihood of a fund merger is inversely related to fund size for both within- and across-family mutual fund mergers. However, poor past performance is a significant determinant for only within-family mergers. Copyright The American Finance Association 2002.

Conflicts of Interest and Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry

Mutual fund investors generally desire high risk-adjusted performance at low cost, which is not necessarily the objective of fund families. Fund families generally want to maximize assets under management (i.e., their market share) and the resulting management fees. This paper examines how these conflicting objectives affect competition and investor behavior in the mutual fund industry for the universe of U.S. mutual fund families over the period 1979-1998. Over this period, industry assets increased by a factor of twenty, the number of active fund families tripled, and the average market share of a family declined by two thirds. We find that price competition is important in the industry. Families that charge lower fees than the competition gain market share, but only if these fees are above average to begin with. Low-cost families do not lose market share by charging higher fees. In addition, fees charged explicitly for marketing and distribution (12b-1 fees) have a positive impact on market share. We find no evidence that investors derive any benefit from 12b-1 fees. Product differentiation strategies are also effective in obtaining market share. Families that perform better, and start more funds relative to the competition (a measure of innovation) have a higher market share. Innovation is rewarded more if the new fund is more differentiated from existing offerings and is in a less crowded objective. Finally, market share within an investment objective is driven primarily by a familys policies within that objective, but there are important performance spillover effects from other funds in the family. Our findings are robust to various tests for endogeneity of the explanatory variables. Overall, this paper highlights a number of conflicts between fund families and investors.

The Determinants and Predictive Ability of Mutual Fund Ratings

he dramatic increase in new mutual funds in the U.S. in recent years has led to a corresponding T increase in the demand for information on these funds. In 1980, investors could choose &om among 564 mutual funds. In recent years, the number of funds has increased to over 7,000, more than the number of stocks that trade on the NYSE. Like the Value Line Investment Survey, which provides investment advisory services on inlvidual stocks, several rating agencies provide investment advice for mutual funds. One of the more prominent sources of such information is Morningstar, which ranks all open-end mutual funds that have existed for at least three years. Morningstar’s “star ratings” have received increased attention since their inception in 1984. Indeed, the attention given to the ratings has increased so much that many funds that receive the highest rating of five stars include that information in their advertisements. We examine the determinants and prelctive abhty of the Morningstar mutual fund rating system in order to better understand the extent to which ratings are related to various fund characteristics. We also examine the degree of persistence in fund ratings, to see whether successful funds tend to remain highly rated in the future. These issues are relevant for both individual and institutional investors who use the ratings in their investment decisions. We find that funds with hgher ratings tend to have higher risk-adjusted performance, lower systematic risk, a greater degree of &versification, a larger asset base, managers with longer tenures, and lower fi-ont-load charges and expense ratios. Persistence tests on fund ratings indicate statistically significant persistence in fund performance over a short-term time horizon. We find that highly rated funds perform substantially better than lower-rated funds in the period after the ratings are issued. Overall, the results suggest that the Morningstar rating system does indeed provide useful information to investors in their mutual fund selection process.

Executive Compensation of Large Acquirors in the 1980s

To examine the role of executive compensation in corporate acquisition decisions, we compare the compensation of top executives in two groups of firms: firms undertaking large acquisitions and a control sample of non-acquirors. Before the acquisition, we find a positive relation between firm size and compensation for executives of acquirors. However, we do not find such a relation for non-acquirors. This result suggests an ex ante expectation that larger firm size for the acquirors will result in larger managerial compensation. Ex post, however, the increase in total compensation is not attributable to the size increase resulting from the acquisition. In separating good from bad acqusitions, we find that good acquisitions increase compensation. However, bad acquisitions do not have a material impact on executive compensation.