Al Wilhite

Union PAC contributions and legislative voting

Are union PACs able to affect legislative voting patterns with campaign contributions? Unlike previous studies addressing this question, this work measures the likelihood of a legislator supporting union (AFL-CIO) issues instead of isolating specific bills for study. Furthermore, the influence of union PAC money in both congressional chambers is examined. The results are mixed: apparently, organized labor has been able to influence labor legislation with campaign money in some election cycles, but in others, they are less effective.

Rent-seeking, rent-defending, and rent dissipation

Summary and conclusionsIn the preceding analyses of rent-defending, the Posner model yielded welfare losses in excess of the combined areas of the Tullock rectangle and the Harberger triangle in only one instance. Furthermore, this particular circumstance necessitated voluntary participation in a game with a negative expected value.13 For the Tullock-Rogerson model, the explicit addition of rent-defenders had no impact on aggregate dissipation.In addition, this paper introduced two implications of nested games on rent-seeking theory. First, in cases where the Posner expected value bid applies, coalitions will not form. Second, coalitions arise as a result of wealth-maximizing behavior in the Tullock-Rogerson strategic game, but contrary to previous authors this model suggests, rent-seeking expenditures fall. However, the organizational and enforcement costs of coalitions reduces the welfare gain and under some circumstances may negate the gains to coalition formation.There seem to be two common pitfalls in the analysis of welfare costs of rent-seeking activities. First, the rent at stake is often incorrectly identified. Second, the method used to allocate rents, or the structure of the game, is not explicitly formulated. Viewing rent as claims to property rights should help alleviate the problems arising from the former, and continuing research into alternative rent-seeking models represents a movement toward the latter.14

Differences in campaign funds: A racial explanation

Black candidates for the U. S. House of Representatives receive substantially lower levels of campaign contributions than non-black candidates. This article investigates the reason for this discrepancy. Are blacks discriminated against or do they receive less money because they are riskier candidates? The results suggest that blacks do receive less money because of their race and that the source of the funds is important. Political action committees and political parties tend to discriminate but individual contributors do not.

Political parties, campaign contributions and discrimination

ConclusionsPolitical parties can enhance their clout in Congress by adding to the seats under their control, or by increasing party loyalty. Interestingly, the latter option seems to play a very small role in the two elections studied. The Democratic Party altered their funding decisions based on loyalty during the 1980 election cycle, but not in 1982. Republicans did not base party contributions on party loyalty in either election, although there is less reason to expect them to do so because of their minority status. On the other hand, both parties reacted to the possibility of additional seats by funneling funds into close races. Aggregate party contributions (Table 1) and the party specific models (Table 2) consistently suggest that money flows into these volatile races.The results also suggest parties discriminate. In both election years, the Republican party contributed less money to black candidates (a differential of more than

Military experience and training effects on civilian wages

3000) than their non-black counterparts. This racial differentiation existed even though electability and unity characteristics were taken into account. Sexual discrimination is even more pronounced. While the aggregate party contributions model shows a

Duration Of Unemployment: Geographic Mobility And Selectivity Bias

1500 advantage for female candidates in 1982, more interesting conclusions arise from the party specific models. The Democratic party discriminated against women in 1980, but the absolute amounts of money were small. The Republican party results displayed substantial pro-female contributions in both elections under consideration. From the perspective of financial party support, it appears that women have greater resources in the Republican party.Interestingly, these race and sex results mirror earlier measures pertaining to other categories of contributions. Burrel (1985) finds no evidence of anti-female behavior by contributors and suggests that there may even be some pro-female bias in total finances. Similarly, Wilhite and Theilmann (1986) find evidence that PACs discriminate against black candidates but not females.Finally, it should be remembered that there are other types of party support that may give them additional influence in the electoral process. Although this paper concentrates on financial resources, contributions and other types of support often go hand in hand. To the extent that this is true, funds become a proxy for a greater tradeoff made by politicians and parties and these results may illuminate important factors in that exchange.