Alan C. Haynie

What are we protecting? Fisher behavior and the unintended consequences of spatial closures as a fishery management tool

Spatial closures like marine protected areas (MPAs) are prominent tools for ecosystem-based management in fisheries. However, the adaptive behavior of fishermen, the apex predator in the ecosystem, to MPAs may upset the balance of fishing impacts across species. While ecosystem-based management (EBM) emphasizes the protection of all species in the environment, the weakest stock often dominates management attention. We use data before and after the implementation of large spatial closures in a North Pacific trawl fishery to show how closures designed for red king crab protection spurred dramatic increases in Pacific halibut bycatch due to both direct displacement effects and indirect effects from adaptations in fishermens targeting behavior. We identify aspects of the ecological and economic context of the fishery that contributed to these surprising behaviors, noting that many multispecies fisheries are likely to share these features. Our results highlight the need either to anticipate the behavioral adaptations of fishermen across multiple species in reserve design, a form of implementation error, or to design management systems that are robust to these adaptations. Failure to do so may yield patterns of fishing effort and mortality that undermine the broader objectives of multispecies management and potentially alter ecosystems in profound ways.

Hidden Flexibility: Institutions, Incentives, and the Margins of Selectivity in Fishing

The degree to which selectivity in fisheries is malleable to changes in incentive structures is critical for policy design. We examine data for a multispecies trawl fishery before and after a transition from management under common-pool quotas to a fishery cooperative and note a substantial shift in postcooperative catch from bycatch and toward valuable target species. We examine the margins used to affect catch composition, finding that large- and fine-scale spatial decision making and avoidance of night-fishing were critical. We argue that the poor incentives for selectivity in many systems may obscure significant flexibility in multispecies production technologies. (JEL Q22, Q28)

Killer whale depredation and associated costs to Alaskan sablefish, Pacific halibut and Greenland turbot longliners.

Killer whale (Orcinus orca) depredation (whales stealing or damaging fish caught on fishing gear) adversely impacts demersal longline fisheries for sablefish (Anoplopoma fimbria), Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) and Greenland turbot (Reinhardtius hippoglossoides) in the Bering Sea, Aleutian Islands and Western Gulf of Alaska. These interactions increase direct costs and opportunity costs associated with catching fish and reduce the profitability of longline fishing in western Alaska. This study synthesizes National Marine Fisheries Service observer data, National Marine Fisheries Service sablefish longline survey and fishermen-collected depredation data to: 1) estimate the frequency of killer whale depredation on longline fisheries in Alaska; 2) estimate depredation-related catch per unit effort reductions; and 3) assess direct costs and opportunity costs incurred by longliners in western Alaska as a result of killer whale interactions. The percentage of commercial fishery sets affected by killer whales was highest in the Bering Sea fisheries for: sablefish (21.4%), Greenland turbot (9.9%), and Pacific halibut (6.9%). Average catch per unit effort reductions on depredated sets ranged from 35.1–69.3% for the observed longline fleet in all three management areas from 1998–2012 (p<0.001). To compensate for depredation, fishermen set additional gear to catch the same amount of fish, and this increased fuel costs by an additional 82% per depredated set (average

Benefits and risks of diversification for individual fishers

433 additional fuel per depredated set). In a separate analysis with six longline vessels in 2011and 2012, killer whale depredation avoidance measures resulted in an average additional cost of

Lessons from the First Generation of Marine Ecological Forecast Products

494 per depredated vessel-day for fuel and crew food. Opportunity costs of time lost by fishermen averaged

Using Vessel Monitoring System Data to Identify and Characterize Trips Made by Fishing Vessels in the United States North Pacific

522 per additional vessel-day on the grounds. This assessment of killer whale depredation costs represents the most extensive economic evaluation of this issue in Alaska to date and will help longline fishermen and managers consider the costs and benefits of depredation avoidance and alternative policy solutions.

ESTIMATING TIME-VARYING BARGAINING POWER: A FISHERY APPLICATION

Significance Individuals who rely on natural resources for their livelihoods, such as fishers, farmers, and forestry workers, face high levels of income variability. For fishers, catching multiple species has been shown to reduce revenue variability at large scales (vessels and communities), but the individual-level consequences of maintaining catch diversity are unknown. Our work demonstrates that individuals in fisheries targeting a diversity of species and individuals who participate in multiple fisheries buffer income variability compared with less diverse individuals. However, large adjustments in diversification strategies from year to year are risky and usually increase revenue variability. The most effective option to reduce revenue variability via diversification—purchasing additional permits—is also expensive, often limited by regulations, and therefore unavailable to many. Individuals relying on natural resource extraction for their livelihood face high income variability driven by a mix of environmental, biological, management, and economic factors. Key to managing these industries is identifying how regulatory actions and individual behavior affect income variability, financial risk, and, by extension, the economic stability and the sustainable use of natural resources. In commercial fisheries, communities and vessels fishing a greater diversity of species have less revenue variability than those fishing fewer species. However, it is unclear whether these benefits extend to the actions of individual fishers and how year-to-year changes in diversification affect revenue and revenue variability. Here, we evaluate two axes by which fishers in Alaska can diversify fishing activities. We show that, despite increasing specialization over the last 30 years, fishing a set of permits with higher species diversity reduces individual revenue variability, and fishing an additional permit is associated with higher revenue and lower variability. However, increasing species diversity within the constraints of existing permits has a fishery-dependent effect on revenue and is usually (87% probability) associated with increased revenue uncertainty the following year. Our results demonstrate that the most effective option for individuals to decrease revenue variability is to participate in additional or more diverse fisheries. However, this option is expensive, often limited by regulations such as catch share programs, and consequently unavailable to many individuals. With increasing climatic variability, it will be particularly important that individuals relying on natural resources for their livelihood have effective strategies to reduce financial risk.

Empirical Models of Fisheries Production: Conflating Technology with Incentives?

Recent years have seen a rapid expansion in the ability of earth system models to describe and predict the physical state of the ocean. Skilful forecasts ranging from seasonal (3 months) to decadal (5-10 years) time scales are now a reality. With the advance of these forecasts of ocean physics, the first generation of marine ecological forecasts has started to emerge. Such forecasts are potentially of great value in the management of living marine resources and for all of those who are dependent on the ocean for both nutrition and their livelihood; however, this is still a field in its infancy. We review the state of the art in this emerging field and identify the lessons that can be learnt and carried forward from these pioneering efforts. The majority of this first wave of products are forecasts of spatial distributions, possibly reflecting the inherent suitability of this response variable to the task of forecasting. Promising developments are also seen in forecasting fish-stock recruitment where, despite well-recognised challenges in understanding and predicting this response, new process knowledge and model approaches that could form a basis for forecasting are becoming available. Forecasts of phenology and coral-bleaching events are also being applied to monitoring and industry decisions. Moving marine ecological forecasting forward will require striking a balance between what is feasible and what is useful. We propose here a set of criteria to quickly identify “low-hanging fruit” that can potentially be predicted; however, ensuring the usefulness of forecast products also requires close collaboration with actively engaged end-users. Realising the full potential of marine ecological forecasting will require bridging the gaps between marine ecology and climatology on the one-hand, and between science and end-users on the other. Nevertheless, the successes seen thus far and the potential to develop further products suggest that the field of marine ecological forecasting can be expected to flourish in the coming years.

Improving detection of short-duration fishing behaviour in vessel tracks by feature engineering of training data

Time spent fishing is the effort metric often studied in fisheries but it may under-represent the effort actually expended by fishers. Entire fishing trips, from the time vessels leave port until they return, may prove more useful for examining trends in fleet dynamics, fisher behavior, and fishing costs. However, such trip information is often difficult to resolve. We identified ~30,000 trips made by vessels that targeted walleye pollock (Gadus chalcogrammus) in the Eastern Bering Sea from 2008–2014 by using vessel monitoring system (VMS) and landings data. We compared estimated trip durations to observer data, which were available for approximately half of trips. Total days at sea were estimated with < 1.5% error and 96.4% of trip durations were either estimated with < 5% error or they were within expected measurement error. With 99% accuracy, we classified trips as fishing for pollock, for another target species, or not fishing. This accuracy lends strong support to the use of our method with unobserved trips across North Pacific fisheries. With individual trips resolved, we examined potential errors in datasets which are often viewed as “the truth.” Despite having > 5 million VMS records (timestamps and vessel locations), this study was as much about understanding and managing data errors as it was about characterizing trips. Missing VMS records were pervasive and they strongly influenced our approach. To understand implications of missing data on inference, we simulated removal of VMS records from trips. Removal of records straightened (i.e., shortened) vessel trajectories, and travel distances were underestimated, on average, by 1.5–13.4% per trip. Despite this bias, VMS proved robust for trip characterization and for improved quality control of human-recorded data. Our scrutiny of human-reported and VMS data advanced our understanding of the potential utility and challenges facing VMS users globally.

Effects of increased specialization on revenue of Alaskan salmon fishers over four decades

We propose an unobserved‐components‐inspired approach to estimate time‐varying bargaining power in bilateral bargaining frameworks. We apply the technique to an ex‐vessel fish market that changed management systems from a regulated open‐access system to an individual fishing quota (IFQ) system over the timespan analyzed. We find that post‐IFQ implementation fishers do improve their bargaining power and thus accrue more of the rents generated by the fishery. However, unlike previous studies, we find that fishers do not move to a point of complete rent extraction. Rather, fishers and processors appear to be in a near‐symmetric bargaining situation post‐IFQ implementation.