Alan Code

Aristotle's response to Quine's objections to modal logic

In Section II it is shown that some of the Quinean objections to modal logic found in [ 151 can be transferred to the notions used to describe and account for temporal change.’ The remainder of the paper is devoted to a demonstration of the thesis that Aristotle’s predecessors had already formulated problems similar to the temporal puzzles so generated, and that the three most prominent reactions to Qume’s puzzles were also anticipated by certain ancient Greek philosophers. Furthermore, Aristotle’s own reaction as manifested in his analysis of the elements of change in Physics A7 can be seen to involve concepts which easily lend themselves to the kind of semantical analysis which has recently enhanced our understanding of modality. Let us begin, then, by getting clear on just what problems I have in mind.

On the Origins of Some Aristotelian Theses About Predication

The distinction between essential and accidental predication forms the basis of the doctrine of substance and categories that Aristotle had worked out by the time he wrote the Categories. In ‘The Platonism of Aristotle’, G. E. L. Owen presents his own account of the origin of that doctrine.1