Alan D. Jagolinzer

Mandatory IFRS Adoption and Financial Statement Comparability

This study examines whether mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) leads to capital market benefits through enhanced financial statement comparability. UK domestic standards are considered very similar to IFRS (Bae et al. 2008), suggesting any capital market benefits observed for UK-domiciled firms are more likely attributable to improvements in comparability (i.e., better precision of across-firm information) than to changes in information quality specific to the firm (i.e., core information quality). If IFRS adoption improves financial statement comparability, we predict this should reduce insiders’ ability to benefit from private information. Consistent with these expectations, we find that abnormal returns to insider purchases ― used to proxy for private information ― are reduced following IFRS adoption. Similar results obtain across numerous subsamples and proxies used to isolate IFRS effects attributable to comparability. Together, the findings are consistent with mandatory IFRS adoption improving comparability and thus leading to capital market benefits by reducing insiders’ ability to exploit private information.

Hiding in Plain Sight: Can Disclosure Enhance Insiders’ Trade Returns?

Can voluntary disclosure be used to enhance insiders’ strategic trade while providing legal cover? We investigate this question in the context of 10b5-1 trading plans. Prior literature suggests that insiders lose strategic trade value if their planned trades are disclosed. But disclosure might enhance strategic trade because courts can only consider publicly available evidence from defendants at the motion to dismiss phase of trial. This practice can enhance legal protection for firms that disclose planned trades, especially those disclosing detailed information. Consistent with increased legal protection, we find that voluntary disclosure of planned trades increases with firm litigation risk and potential gains to insiders’ trades. We also find that insider sales and abnormal returns are higher for disclosed plans, especially those that articulate specific plan details. This suggests that voluntary disclosure, which is conventionally thought to reduce information asymmetries, can create legal cover for opportunistic insider trading.

Strategic Reporting of Fair Value Estimate Levels

We examine whether fair value (FV) input levels and estimation sources are related to FV inflation, the difference between an insurers FV estimate and the consensus FV estimate across the securitys holders. FV inflation is higher, and self-estimation more likely, when insurers report using Level 3 inputs when the consensus level is 2. Regardless of the level, FV is greater when self-estimated. Public insurers that inflate FV through self-estimation potentially obfuscate detection by reporting the use of Level 2 inputs. Insurers with stronger incentives to appear financially healthy choose to self-estimate, resulting in greater aggregate portfolio FV inflation.