Alan E. Wiseman

Delegation and Positive-Sum Bureaucracies

I develop a formal model of bureaucratic policymaking to investigate why a legislature would choose to delegate authority to a bureaucratic agency whose actions can be controlled, ex post, by an executive with divergent policy preferences. Because the executive and legislature might find different policies to be salient to their constituencies, I demonstrate that executive review of agency rulemaking can benefit both branches of government, relative to legislative delegation without the possibility of such review. In trying to undermine the impacts of executive oversight, agencies propose policies that could benefit the legislature were the executive to choose not to intervene in agency policymaking. Likewise, if the executive does intervene, executive review allows him to implement a policy more desirable than absent such review. This joint-desirability of executive review is more likely when legislative and executive policy preferences are relatively aligned, and when legislative and agency policy preferences are relatively divergent. The broader social welfare consequences of executive review depend on the relative effectiveness of the executives oversight of agency policymaking. These results provide insight for why mediating lawmaking institutions such as the Office of Information and Regulatory Analysis (OIRA) continue to survive in a separation of powers system despite their potential to advantage one branch of government at the expense of the other.

Principles of biotechnology

1 Features of biotechnology and its scientific basis.- 1.1 Introduction.- 1.2 Interrelationships between microorganisms and enzymes.- 1.3 Success in biotechnology.- 2 Application of the principles of industrial microbiology to biotechnology.- 2.1 Introduction.- 2.2 Primary metabolism.- 2.2.1 Introduction.- 2.2.2 The batch culture.- 2.3 Secondary metabolism.- 2.3.1 Products.- 2.3.2 Definitions of a secondary metabolite.- 2.3.3 Regulatory factors.- 2.4 Primary metabolites in industrial biotechnology.- 2.4.1 Potable alcohol.- 2.4.2 Amino acids.- 2.4.3 Other organic acids.- 2.4.4 Polysaccharides.- 2.4.5 Other primary metabolites.- 2.4.6 Single cell protein (SCP).- 2.4.7 Future plans in the UK.- 2.5 Secondary metabolites in biotechnology.- 2.5.1 Penicillin.- 2.5.2 Other secondary metabolites.- 3 Application of the principles of microbial genetics to biotechnology.- 3.1 Control mechanisms in microorganisms.- 3.2 Manipulations in vivo.- 3.2.1 Mutation.- 3.2.2 Recombination.- 3.2.3 Application of manipulations in vivo to increase enzyme production.- 3.2.4 Overproduction of primary metabolites.- 3.2.5 Overproduction of secondary metabolites.- 3.2.6 Production of novel metabolites.- 3.3 Manipulations in vitro.- 3.3.1 Basic techniques of in-vitro genetic manipulation.- 3.3.2 Uses of DNA cloning.- 3.3.3 Genes and biotechnology: applications of gene cloning.- 3.3.4 Safety implications.- 3.3.5 Future prospects.- 4 Application of the principles of fermentation engineering to biotechnology.- 4.1 The fermenter.- 4.1.1 The environment.- 4.1.2 Principal types of fermenter.- 4.1.3 Mode of operation.- 4.1.4 Ancillary processes.- 4.2 General design principles.- 4.2.1 Basic design rules.- 4.2.2 Materials and components.- 4.2.3 Control and instrumentation.- 4.2.4 Stirred-tank fermenters.- 4.2.5 Gas-lift and sparged-tank fermenters.- 4.3 Heat transfer.- 4.3.1 Heat sterilization.- 4.3.2 Sterilization without heat.- 4.4 Mixing.- 4.4.1 Introduction.- 4.4.2 Outline of rheology.- 4.5 Oxygen supply in fermenters.- 4.6 Scale-up in biotechnology.- 4.6.1 The problems of large-scale operation.- 4.6.2 Selection of scale-up criteria.- 4.6.3 Interaction of criteria.- 4.7 Fermentation processes in biotechnology.- 4.7.1 Brewing.- 4.7.2 Penicillin manufacture.- 4.7.3 Biological waste-water treatment.- 4.7.4 Single-cell protein (SCP) production.- 4.7.5 Outlook for biotechnology.- 4.8 Summary.- 5 Application of the principles of enzymology to biotechnology.- 5.1 Features of enzymes in relation to biotechnology.- 5.1.1 Introduction.- 5.1.2 Advantages of using enzymes for manufacture of products.- 5.1.3 Choice and control of enzymes in applications.- 5.2 Applications of enzymes in biotechnology.- 5.2.1 Large-scale industrial applications.- 6 The biotechnology of enzyme isolation and purification.- 6.1 Introduction.- 6.2 Enzyme sources.- 6.3 Release of enzymes from cells.- 6.3.1 Sources.- 6.3.2 Extraction by physical methods.- 6.3.3 Extraction by chemical methods.- 6.4 Primary clarification of the soluble enzyme.- 6.4.1 Centrifugation.- 6.4.2 Flocculation and coagulation.- 6.4.3 Filtration.- 6.5 Concentration.- 6.5.1 Removal of nucleic acids.- 6.5.2 Precipitation.- 6.5.3 Ultrafiltration and reverse osmosis.- 6.5.4 Freeze-drying.- 6.5.5 Evaporation.- 6.5.6 Freezing.- 6.6 Enzyme purification-chromatography.- 6.6.1 Gel chromatography.- 6.6.2 Ion exchange chromatography.- 6.6.3 Affinity purification.- 6.6.4 Chromatography columns.- 6.6.5 High-performance liquid chromatography of enzymes.- 7 The application of immobilized enzymes, immobilized cells and biochemical reactors in biotechnology-principles of enzyme engineering.- 7.1 Introduction.- 7.2 The application of biological catalysts.- 7.3 Types of enzymic catalyst and commercial applications.- 7.3.1 Immobilized biocatalysts.- 7.3.2 Assessment of supports and methods.- 7.3.3 Effectiveness factors for immobilized enzymes.- 7.3.4 The kinetics of enzymes in industrial use.- 7.3.5 Factors which modify the intrinsic activity of enzymes.- 7.3.6 The stability of immobilized biocatalyst-diffusion artifacts.- 7.4 Enzyme reactors.- 7.4.1 Types of biochemical reactor.- 7.4.2 Assessment of the performance of biochemical reactors.- 7.4.3 Practical enzyme reactor kinetics.- 7.4.4 The effect of non-ideal flow on biochemical reactor performance.- 7.4.5 The stability of biochemical reactors.- 7.4.6 Physical problems associated with the use of immobilized biocatalysts in biochemical reactors.- 7.4.7 Purification and recovery of the products of biochemical reactors (downstream processing).- 7.5 Conclusions.

Joseph G. Cannon: Majoritarian from Illinois

Congression scholars regularly idenify Speaker Joseph G. Cannon as the personification of centralized authority and partisan strength in the United States Congress. Portraits of Cannon as a tyrant, however, are almost always based on anecdotal evidence and journalistic accounts. This paper assesses the conventional wisdom on Cannonism by systematically analyzing committee transfer patterns. Anecdotal evidence is consistent with recent theories of parties in legislatues, suggesting that Cannon employed seemingly unilateral committee assignment powers to punish occasional defectors on key votes of the Republican agenda and, thereby, to maintain partisan discipline. Employing the Groseclose-Stewart (1998) method for estimating values of committee seats, we study variation in member-specific committee portfolio values. The data are usefull not only for reassessing the historical thesis of Cannon as tyrant, but also for testing more recent political-science hypotheses about the underpinnings of a strong majority party. The findings fail to corroborate the notions of majority-party power and Cannon as tyrant. If anything, systematic data supports a new portrait of Cannon as a majoritarian.

A Theory of Partisan Support and Entry Deterrence in Electoral Competition

I develop a model of electoral competition with partisan campaign support. Voters’ utilities are defined over candidate locations and the amounts of party campaign support that they receive. Parties’ utilities are defined over the location of the winning candidate and how much support they dole out for their candidates. Analytical results identify cases in which parties will successfully pull the electorally induced preferences of their members away from their median voters’ ideal points and towards the party’s most favored policies. Equilibrium results yield several testable hypotheses. First, candidate policy positions and parties’ campaign contributions should be responsive to district partisan predisposition, independent of the policy preferences of a district’s median voter. Second, uncontested elections should occur more often in politically-lopsided districts than in districts where there are more even levels of political competition. Finally, there should be an inverse relationship between candidate policy extremity and partisan campaign support.

The Politics of Investigations and Regulatory Enforcement by Independent Agents and Cabinet Appointees

We develop a game-theoretic model that identifies conditions under which a political executive will be satisfied with the actions of an appointee who decides whether to investigate possible legal violations. Because investigations are a necessary precondition for enforcement, the investigator exerts significant influence over whether, and the extent to which, laws are enforced. In our model, an executive can exert power over the investigators actions only indirectly, via the threat of replacement. This threat is most effective when the investigator has preferences that diverge from those of the executive. In contrast, when the investigator and executive share similar preferences, the replacement threat can induce the investigator to behave dogmatically, contrary to the executives interests. More subtly, we show how the replacement threats effects on investigator behavior hinge on whether the executive is able to predict the behavior of potential replacements: an executive can sometimes gain leverage over the investigator if he can credibly threaten to replace her with a dogmatist. Our results have broad implications for the politics of regulatory enforcement in the United States and other developed democracies, and for the qualitative differences between regulation by independent investigators and less politically insulated agents.

The Politics of Wine: Trade Barriers, Interest Groups, and the Commerce Clause

We investigate the contemporary impacts of the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution by focusing on recent changes in state laws governing interstate direct shipment of alcohol. The elimination of interstate trade barriers, consistent with the intent of the commerce clause, clearly facilitates efficient markets. More specifically, in 2003, the state of Virginia legalized direct wine shipping to consumers from out-of-state sellers, and by 2004, the average price differential between online sellers and bricks-and-mortar stores in Northern Virginia was approximately 26–40% lower than in 2002. Virginia bricks-and-mortar retailers also began pricing their products as a function of interstate shipping costs following the legalization of direct shipment. These findings regarding the elimination of trade barriers serve as a guidepost to policymakers in various states who need to revise their laws in response to the Supreme Courts 2005 ruling striking down discriminatory direct shipment bans. The distributive consequences of these legal changes should induce intense political competition and mobilization among producers, consumers, retailers, and other affected parties. Consideration of these recent political debates over changes in alcohol regulatory structures within Virginia, Illinois, and several other states provides an illustration of the impacts of interest group competition on lawmaking and the political consequences of the commerce clause.

Tests of Vote-Buyer Theories of Coalition Formation in Legislatures

Formal theories of “vote-buying” aim to explain legislative coalition building, and lobbying. While anecdotal evidence suggests that something approximating vote-buying occurs, these theories have not been subjected to substantial empirical tests. Using roll-call data from all House bills subject to votes on final passage in the House of Representatives in the 103rd Congress, this study tests the coalition size implications of vote-buying theories. The primary method of analysis is ordinary least squares. Variation in coalition size, as represented by the percentage of the chamber voting yea, is accounted for in a manner consistent with vote buying theories. By making an assumption about what kinds of legislation are likely to attract one, or multiple, vote-buyers, we are able to operationalize the number of vote-buyers lobbying on a given bill. Other theoretical predictors of coalition size are also entered into the analysis, and the results offer support for the family of theories. When controlling for different parliamentary procedures, bills that are likely to attract two vote-buyers generate coalitions that are approximately 6 percent larger than single vote-buyer bills.

Market and Nonmarket Barriers to Internet Wine Sales: The Case of Virginia

We discuss the political and legal environment surrounding Internet wine sales, and consider the arguments in the debate over direct shipment bans on wine by investigating the wine market in the Northern Virginia suburbs of Washington, DC. Using a sample of wines identified by Wine and Spirits magazines annual restaurant poll, we find that 15 percent of wines available online were not available from retail wine stores within 10 miles of McLean, Virginia during the month the data were collected. Our results also indicate that Virginias direct shipment ban, which was in place until 2003, prevented consumers from purchasing some premium wines at lower prices online. Aggregate cost savings depends on the consumers shopping strategy, the price per bottle, the quantity of wine ordered, and the shipping method chosen. For the entire sample, online purchase could result in an average savings of as much as 3.6 percent or an average premium of as much as 48 percent. A comparison shopper who considers both online and offline retailers could save an average of 1.6-9.7 percent. These results help explain why consumers and producers have found it worthwhile to challenge interstate direct shipment bans, which tend to benefit wine wholesalers.

Gerrymanders and Theories of Law Making: A Study of Legislative Redistricting in Illinois

Redistricting politics in Illinois provide a novel opportunity for testing competing theories of law making. With this in mind, we demonstrate that the post-2000 Census redistricters in Illinois, dominated by Democrats, strategically reshuffled district demographic profiles in an attempt to convert relatively liberal Republican districts to conservative Democratic districts in the state Senate while decreasing and increasing the ideological diversity of the Democrats and Republicans, respectively, in the House. Such reshufflings suggest that legislative politics in Illinois are conducted in a manner consistent with vote-buying theories of coalition formation.

PARTISAN STRATEGY AND SUPPORT IN STATE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS The Case of Illinois

Using state-level data from Illinois General Assembly elections, I test the implications of a formal model of electoral competition where political parties present voters with platforms of ideological locations and levels of partisan support for their candidates. Consistent with the model, I find that candidate policy positions and parties’ campaign contributions are responsive to district partisan predisposition, even when controlling for the policy preferences of the district’s median voter and other conventional determinants of candidate ideology and funding. Also consistent with the theory, uncontested elections occur more often in politically lopsided districts than in districts where there are more even levels of partisan competition, and there is an inverse relationship between candidate policy extremity and campaign contributions. These results support a theory of activist programmatic parties in the electoral arena and highlight the need for further scholarship on the role of parties in the electorate and their connections with parties in the legislature.