Alan M. Leslie

Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind” ?

Abstract We use a new model of metarepresentational development to predict a cognitive deficit which could explain a crucial component of the social impairment in childhood autism. One of the manifestations of a basic metarepresentational capacity is a ‘theory of mind’. We have reason to believe that autistic children lack such a ‘theory’. If this were so, then they would be unable to impute beliefs to others and to predict their behaviour. This hypothesis was tested using Wimmer and Perners puppet play paradigm. Normal children and those with Downs syndrome were used as controls for a group of autistic children. Even though the mental age of the autistic children was higher than that of the controls, they alone failed to impute beliefs to others. Thus the dysfunction we have postulated and demonstrated is independent of mental retardation and specific to autism.

Do six-month-old infants perceive causality?

The idea of cause and effect is often assumed to originate in prolonged learning. However, the present findings suggest that 27-week-old infants may already perceive a cause-effect relationship. Reversal of an apparently causal event (direct launching) produced more recovery of attention following habituation than the reversal of a similar but apparently non-causal event (delayed reaction). In both cases the changes in the spatiotemporal properties of the stimuli were identical. Hence the infants percept of direct launching may involve more than an encoding of its spatiotemporal properties. Since the same kind of stimulus gives rise to a causal illusion in adults, it may be that the additional factor at work is the perception of a causal relationship. This finding may be significant in terms of the modularity of the infant visual system and the later development of causal understanding.

The cognitive basis of a biological disorder: autism

This article summarizes recent evidence indicating that individuals suffering from autism have a specific problem in understanding intentions and beliefs. We propose that this problem arises because they are incapable of forming a special kind of mental representation. A single cognitive deficit defines what is common to all autistic individuals. In contrast there is a wide range of proposals for the biological origins of the disorder.

Acting Intentionally and the Side-Effect Effect Theory of Mind and Moral Judgment

The concept of acting intentionally is an important nexus where theory of mind and moral judgment meet. Preschool childrens judgments of intentional action show a valence-driven asymmetry. Children say that a foreseen but disavowed side effect is brought about “on purpose” when the side effect itself is morally bad, but not when it is morally good. This is the first demonstration in preschoolers that moral judgment influences judgments of whether something was done on purpose (as opposed to judgments of purpose influencing moral judgment). Judgments of intentionality are usually assumed to be purely factual. That these judgments are sometimes partly normative—even in preschoolers—challenges current understanding. Young childrens judgments regarding foreseen side effects depend on whether the children process the idea that the character does not care about the side effect. As soon as preschoolers effectively process the theory-of-mind concept “not care that P,” children show the side-effect effect.

The perception of causality in infants.

The problem of the origins of the perception of causality in infancy has received relatively little attention in the literature despite its obvious importance. Two experiments with infants 4 1/2 and 8 months old are reported which seek to investigate sensitivity to spatiotemporal continuity in simple causal events with a differential dishabituation-of-looking technique. In the first experiment inanimate events of the familiar ‘billiard-ball launching’ type were used, while in the second animate events involving a hand/object pick-up were presented. The results suggest that both age groups of infants were sensitive to certain changes in spatiotemporal continuity in both types of event, although in the case of the inanimate stimuli the younger infants reacted less positively. It is suggested that infants in the first year of life are sensitive to certain spatiotemporal event configurations and that this sensitivity could be regarded as at least a required component of a perception of causality.

Spatiotemporal continuity and the perception of causality in infants

Infant perception of a Michottean launching event in which one object causes another to move through collision is examined in a series of habituation-test experiments. A number of hypotheses concerning how infants aged around 30 weeks might perceive and encode launching and its noncausal variants are identified and tested. The results of the first experiment indicate that infants can perceive direct launching as an event with internal structure, that is, as composed of two temporally ordered movements. The nature of the encoding by the infants is perceptual and not specifically motor-based. The second experiment makes it seem unlikely that the infants encode independent spatial and temporal features (for example, contact and successivity), while the third experiment suggests a spatiotemporal continuity gradient. Some implications for the origins of causality are discussed.

Inhibitory processing in the false belief task: Two conjectures

Although it is well established that four-year-olds outperform three-year-olds on predicting behavior from false beliefs, this is only true when the false belief is coupled with a positive desire. Four-year-olds perform poorly in an otherwise standard false belief task when the protagonists desire is to avoid rather than to approach a target. We account for this by assuming that the attribution of a false belief involves inhibitory processing. We present two versions of an inhibition model of successful belief-desire reasoning.

Autism and ostensive communication: The relevance of metarepresentation

Recent empirical and theoretical work on both normal and pathological development has led to the formulation of the metarepresentational conjecture for autism. This account of autistic development links the core impairments in imaginative abilities, communicative skills, and social competence to dysfunction of a single set of underlying cognitive mechanisms. In this context, Mundy and Sigman (1989) argue that the impairment of early gestural communication in autism cannot be accounted for by the metarepresentational theory. On the contrary, this early communication impairment in autism is highly consistent with a faulty theory-of-mind module. In normal development, this module is available from around the first year to handle estensive communication – shared pretense being a prime, though slightly later, example. We briefly consider the role in communication of perceptual processes that may trigger metarepresentation. This early theory-of-mind module, with its metarepresentational processes, provides the specific developmental basis for later versions of the childs theory of mind.

Transgressors, victims, and cry babies: Is basic moral judgment spared in autism?

Abstract Human social intelligence comprises a wide range of complex cognitive and affective processes that appear to be selectively impaired in autistic spectrum disorders. The study of these neuro-developmental disorders and the study of canonical social intelligence have advanced rapidly over the last twenty years by investigating the two together. Specifically, studies of autism have provided important insights into the nature of “theory of mind” abilities, their normal development and underlying neural systems. At the same time, the idea of impaired development of the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying “theory of mind” has shed new light on the nature of autistic disorders. This general approach is not restricted to the study of impairments but extends to mapping areas of social intelligence that are spared in autism. Here we investigate basic moral judgment and find that it appears to be substantially intact in children with autism who are severely impaired in “theory of mind”. At the same time, we extend studies of moral reasoning in normal development by way of a new control task, the “cry baby” task. Cry baby scenarios, in which the distress of the victim is “unreasonable” or “unjustified,” do not elicit moral condemnation from normally developing preschoolers or from children with autism. Judgments of moral transgressions in which the victim displays distress are therefore not likely the result of a simple automatic reaction to distress and more likely involve moral reasoning. Mapping the cognitive comorbidity patterns of disordered development must encompass both impairments and sparings because both are needed to make sense of the neural and genetic levels.

Identification of objects in 9-month-old infants: integrating ‘what’ and ‘where’ information

Following Leslie, Xu, Tremoulet and Scholl (1998), we distinguish between individuation (the establishment of an object representation) and identification (the use of information stored in the object representation to decide which previously individuated object is being encountered). Although there has been much work on how infants individuate objects, there is relatively little on the question of when and how property information is used to identify objects. Experiment 1 shows that 9-month-old infants use shape, but apparently not color, information in identifying objects that are each moved behind spatially separated screens. Infants could not simply have associated a shape with a location or a screen without regard to objecthood, because on alternate trials the objects switched locations/screens. Infants therefore had to bind shape information to the object representation while tracking the objects’ changing location. In Experiment 2, we tested if infants represented both objects rather than ‘sampled’ only one of them. Using the same alternation procedure, infants again succeeded in using shape (but not color) information when only one of the screens was removed ‐ the screen that occluded the first-hidden object (requiring the longer time in memory). Finally, we relate our behavioral findings both to a cognitive model and to recent neuroscientific studies, concluding that ventral ‘what’ and dorsal ‘where’ pathways may be functionally integrated by 9 months.