Alberto Nastasi

Airport–Airline interaction: some food for thought

Abstract We provide an interpretive analysis of vertical relations between airports and carriers, while assessing the way in which deregulation of the airline market and the privatization of airports have created incentives for airport–airline interaction. In particular, if the vertical structure approach has become the standard approach in air transport research, we add to the literature by discussing three issues that we believe need further understanding. The three issues that we think should be the focus of future research on airport–airline interaction are (i) incomplete contracts and asymmetric information structure; (ii) upstream horizontal complementarities; and (iii) airports as two-sided platforms.

Allocation of Railroad Capacity Under Competition: A Game Theoretic Approach to Track time Pricing

The reorganization of the European railway sector following the application of Directive 440 requires devising an infrastructure access mechanism for competing transport operators. This paper proposes a market-based approach to railroad track allocation and capacity pricing, formulating a three-stage game-theoretic model where transport operators request their preferred schedules to the infrastructure manager and set the final prices for the transport services on the basis of actual schedules and access tariffs. The latter are simultaneously computed by a non discriminatory mechanism which maximizes the value of the timetable of each operator. Access tariffs are based on the congestion degree each train imposes on the system.

Balanced Growth and Stability of the Leontief Dynamic Model: An Analysis of the Italian Economy

In the theory and practice of dynamic input-output modelling, the relative stability of the balanced-growth solution is a concept of particular interest. In fact, if the condition for the relative stability is satisfied, then the ratio between the balanced-growth output of each sector and the nonbalanced one converges to a positive constant as time passes, regardless of the initial sectoral distribution of production in the system. Thus, an economically meaningful trajectory is assured for any given starting point. This topic is properly discussed in the present paper, with the realistic case that the capital coefficient matrix is singular and each sector uses at least one capital good in its productive process being considered. Moreover, the stated results are applied to the Italian economy for 1985 by utilizing the intersectoral matrices calculated on the basis of the most recent input-output data.

The dynamic behavior of multiregional multisectoral models: A biregional application to the Italian economy

Abstract This paper deals with the dynamics of multiregional systems in which economic growth is strictly dependent on the capital accumulation process and multisectoral multiregional interactions evolve within a general equilibrium context. The input-output approach allows an analysis based on the structural properties of the matrices representing the linkages among the different parts of the multiregional economy. The singularity of the regional matrices of capital input coefficients is realistically imposed, and the forward-in-time projection of the model is made possible by a suitable partition of the system. Moreover, the existence and relative stability of a balanced growth path are discussed under the assumption that each sector in the economy requires, directly or indirectly, either some current flow or some capital input from all the other sectors operating in the same and in the other regions. The model is applied to the Italian economy at 1985 within a biregional framework.

Railroad Infrastructure Access and Competition among Transport Operators

EEC directive 440/91 provides for the separation of infrastructure property and management from the provision of the transport service and grants access to rail infrastructure to all those who wish to provide such service. The network will probably be operated by a state body while many operators will compete for the provision of the transport service. The problems that will arise will be: first, how to allocate the tracks among the operators who request them, and, second, what pricing scheme should be adopted for the access to the tracks themselves. The access mechanism should also respect the principles of impartiality and non-discrimination sanctioned by 440/91 and the complementary 18/95 and 19/95.

Dynamic Noncooperative Firms R&D Strategies in an Oligopolistic Industry

This paper deals with an oligopolistic industry where firms are engaged in R&D activity in order to maximize their market shares. The existence of an optimal R&D strategy for each firm is discussed using dynamic noncooperative game theory. Furthermore, the intertemporal relations among firms R&D investments, the unit costs of their outputs and their market shares are analyzed in connection with the extra-industry R&D activity and the spillover effect.

Decentralized Rail Capacity Allocation: a Model and Applications

The application of Directive 91/440 in European countries implies opening the access to railroad infrastructure to competing transport operators (TOs), while the network should be managed by an infrastructure company (IC). An adequate network access mechanism will have to be devised in order to allocate available capacity and determine access charges. We propose a game-theoretic model where the TOs request tracks to the IC and set service prices with the aim of maximizing their profit, on the basis of demand data. The IC allocates track capacity among the TOs and determines access tariffs through a market based allocation and pricing mechanism. The presented numerical simulations analyze the effects of increased congestion on a line segment with respect to effective schedules, access tariffs, service prices and profits.

Firms R&D Investments, Innovation and Market Shares

Technological innovation is one of the major factors in determining the long term performance of firms and economies. Here, this subject is analyzed from the point of view of the relationship between the innovative behaviour of a given firm within an oligopolistic industry and its market share. As a matter of fact, the firm capacity to change is closely connected to the size of its RD Allen 1977; Mowery 1983; Cohen and Levinthal 1989; Campisi and Nastasi 1993). The traditional approach to industrial innovative activity devotes little attention to this absorptive capacity of RD Tirole 1988; Quirmbach 1993).