Alec Stone Sweet

European Integration and Supranational Governance

Abstract We argue that European integration is provoked and sustained by the development of causal connections between three factors: transnational exchange, supranational organization, and European Community (EC) rule-making. We explain the transition, in any given policy sector, from national to intergovernmental to supranational governance, in two ways. First cross-border transactions and communications generate a social demand for EC rules and regulation, which supranational organizations work to supply. We thus expect that Community competences will be unevenly constructed, both across policy sectors and over time, as a function of the intensity of these demands. Second, once EC rules are in place, a process of institutionalization ensues, and this process provokes further integration. Although we recognize the importance of intergovernmental bargaining in EC politics, our theory is not compatible with existing intergovernmental theorizing.

Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions

The article summarises the analytical frameworks, questions, and empirical findings of the volume. It defines the key concepts used. It then sets out the principal-agent framework that explains delegation to NMIs through functional logics for principals. It sets out alternative explanations based on sociological and historical institutionalism. Thereafter, it relates the empirical findings of the volume to these wider debates about delegation. It argues that although functional demands for delegation can almost always be identified, purely functional accounts of delegation to NMIs are inadequate. Explaining the decision to delegate and the institutional forms of that delegation involves including and specifying interests, policy learning/institutional isomorphism and institutional inheritances. Delegation has also had major consequences on the distribution of power, policy making processes and substantive policy choices, both through its direct effects, and via feedback effects. Finally, delegation has raised questions about the legitimacy and accountability of NMIs.

The institutionalization of Europe

Contributors to this volume - Alec Stone Sweet, Neil Fligstein, And Wayne Sandholtz Neil Fligstein And Alec Stone Sweet Adrienne Heritier Sonia Mazey And Jeremy Richardson Martin Shapiro Rachel A. Cichowski Patrick Le Gales Kathleen R. Mcnamara Michael E. Smith Penelope Turnbull And Wayne Sandholtz James A. Caporaso And Alec Stone Sweet

Constructing polities and markets: An institutionalist account of European integration

As institutions and governance structures develop in modern markets, they tend to “feed back” onto economic activity. Through such feedback loops, market and political arenas can develop symbiotically into relatively coherent “fields” that gradually embed actors’ orientations and activities. Using these insights, this article develops and tests a theory of European integration focusing on the case of the European Community, the first pillar of the European Union. Traders, organized interests, courts, and the EC’s policy‐making organs, over time, have produced a self‐sustaining causal system that has driven the construction of the European market and polity. The generality of this explanation to a sociology of markets and polity‐building projects is discussed in the conclusion.

Constructing a Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community

We present a theory of European legal integration that relies on three causal factors: transnational exchange, triadic dispute resolution, and the production of legal norms. After stating the theory in abstract terms, we explain the construction of the legal system and test the relationship among our three variables over the life of the European Community. We then examine the effect of the EC legal system on policy outcomes at both the national and supranational levels in two policy domains: the free movement of goods and gender equality. Our theory outperforms its leading rival, intergovernmentalism. The evidence shows that European integration has generally been driven by transnational activity and the efforts of EC institutions to reduce transaction costs, behavior which governments react to but do not control.

Judicialization and the Construction of Governance

I present a theory of the emergence and evolution of governance, conceived as the process through which the rules systems in place in any social setting are adapted to the needs of those who live under them. The theory is composed of three elements: normative structure, dyadic contracting, and triadic dispute resolution. I demonstrate that a move to triadic dispute resolution leads the triadic dispute resolver to construct, and then to manage over time, specific causal relationships between exchange, conflict, and rules. In this way, political life is judicialized. Under certain conditions, the triad will constitute a crucial mechanism of political change. I then explain judicialization and the dynamics of change in two very different polities: the international trade regime and the French Fifth Republic. The conclusion draws out some of the implications of the theory and data for our understanding of the complex relationship between strategic behavior and social structure.

Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy

The article assesses the creation and subsequent evolution of systems of constitutional justice in West Europe, in light of delegation theory. The author argues that constitutional judges are better conceptualised as trustees, exercising fiduciary responsibilities, than as agents, who operate in the shadow of principals. The zone of discretion that organises the activities of constitutional courts is unusually large, in some contexts close to unlimited. The author then surveys why, and to what extent, constitutional adjudication has transformed the nature of parliamentary governance, focusing on the cases of France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Notwithstanding important variation, certain trends are both pan-European and irreversible: traditional separation of powers doctrines are steadily eroding; legislators and administrators are being placed under the authority of an expansive, continuously evolving constitutional law; and the judiciarys participation in law making processes is becoming more overt and assertive.

The European Court of Justice, State Noncompliance, and the Politics of Override

In an article previously published by the APSR, Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla claim that the decision making of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been constrained—systematically—by the threat of override on the part of member state governments, acting collectively, and by the threat of noncompliance on the part of any single state. They also purport to have found strong evidence in favor of intergovernmentalist, but not neofunctionalist, integration theory. On the basis of analysis of the same data, we demonstrate that the threat of override is not credible and that the legal system is activated, rather than paralyzed, by noncompliance. Moreover, when member state governments did move to nullify the effects of controversial ECJ rulings, they failed to constrain the court, which continued down paths cleared by the prior rulings. Finally, in a head-to-head showdown between intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, the latter wins in a landslide.

The liberalization and reregulation of air transport

We seek to explain the transfer of competence to govern, from national to supranational authorities, in air transport. We ask two questions. First, how and why did air transport come on to the European legislative agenda? Second, why did member state governments agree to divest themselves of control at the national level? In responding to these questions, we at times focus on the Council of Ministers, and therefore on intergovernmental stages of the legislative process. Such a focus, however, need not entail adopting intergovernmentalist theories of integration. On the contrary, our case study broadly supports theoretical arguments developed by Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1997), and corroborates recent research on the origins and evolution of supranational governance. We find that the intensity of transnational exchange and the pro-integrative behaviour of the European Communitys (ECs) supranational organizations not only generated the context in which intergovernmental bargaining took place, but provoke...

Neofunctionalism and Supranational Governance

Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet examine the evolution of Neofunctionalism, as it was modified in the 1990s, and discuss the theorys contributions to the study of European integration.