Alessandra Chirco

Vertical Differentiation and the Distribution of Income

The paper analyses the effects of income concentration on the behaviour of a duopoly with vertical product differentiation and uncovered market. By using a trapezoid distribution, we solve explicitly for market equilibrium as a function of a mean preserving spread of the income distribution. We show that overall more concentrated incomes imply stronger product differentiation, as the presence of a large share of middle-income consumers stimulates a price competition, whose effects are dampened through an enlargement of the quality spread. While the high-quality advantage and market coverage increase unambiguously in the degree of income concentration, the behaviour of prices is non-monotone in the distribution parameter.

Organizational Structure and the Choice of Price Versus Quantity in a Mixed Duopoly

We consider the choice of price/quantity by a public and a private firm in a mixed differentiated duopoly. First, we study the way in which the strategic choice of the market variable is affected by different given organizational structures (managerial or entrepreneurial) of the public and the private firm. Second, we investigate how the price/quantity choice interacts with the endogenous choice of the organizational structure, thus determining a subgame perfect equilibrium at which firms choose to behave as price-setters and to adopt a managerial structure.

COMPETITION AND THE STRATEGIC CHOICE OF MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES: THE RELATIVE PERFORMANCE CASE

In this paper we study the role of market competitiveness in a strategic delegation game in which owners delegate output decisions to managers interested in the firms relative performance. In particular we study how the optimal delegation scheme - i.e. the distortion from pure profit maximization - is affected by market concentration and the elasticity of market demand. We show that these two indexes of market competitiveness do not alter managerial incentives in the same way: while the optimal degree of delegation decreases as the market becomes less concentrated, it increases as demand becomes more elastic.

Income Share Elasticity and Stochastic Dominance

Income share elasticity is a function π which can describe the size distribution of income (Esteban in Intern Econ Rev 27:439–444, 1986). On the other hand, the conventional density representation of the latter gives parameters of first or second order stochastic dominance (SD), widely used to describe shifts in income distribution, to which inequality measures are attached. The paper draws a link between the two, by providing conditions such that a given shift to π is equivalent to a first or second order SD shift of the distribution of income. Some applications to Lorenz rankings are also provided.

Market power under income polarization

We study the reaction of a monopolistic firm to distributive shocks which lead to income polarization. We show that the movements in the set price and in the sold quantity depend on the served market share. In particular, we identify a region of parameters where the optimal markup moves in the opposite direction of market demand: in this respect, distributive shocks can provide an explanation for countercyclical movements of the markup.

Beyond the Uniform Distribution: Equilibrium Prices and Qualities in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly

The paper proves the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in a vertically differentiated duopoly with uncovered market, for a large set of symmetric and asymmetric distributions of consumers, including, among others, all logconcave distributions. The proof relies on the ’income share elasticity’ representation of the consumers’ density function, which ensures the analytical tractability of the firms’ optimality conditions at a high level of generality. Some illustrative examples of the solution are offered, in order to assess the impact of distributive shocks on the equilibrium market configuration.

Personal income distribution and market structure

Income distribution aects demand and its elasticity, and, as a consequence, the optimal behaviour of …rms and market equilibrium. This paper focuses on the eects of income polarisation, and presents a model where - for any unimodal density function describing income distribution of the consumers - income polarisation leads to market concentration, i.e., to a smaller number of …rms able to survive in the long run, provided that the

A Note on Income Share Elasticity and Stochastic Dominance

Esteban (1986) introduced the notion of income share elasticity as a function pi which can describe the size distribution of income. On the other hand, indices of first or second order stochastic dominance are widely used to describe shifts in income distribution, to which inequality measures are attached. The paper draws a link between the two, by providing conditions such that a given shift to pi is equivalent to a first or second order stochastic dominance shift of the distribution of income.

Demand Elasticity and Fiscal Policy

In this paper we study the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy based on possible changes in the elasticity of demand. These are obtained by assuming that firms face a balance of public and private demands, each characterized by different price elasticity. We show that in this set-up there exists a range of the technological conditions under which fiscal policy is expansionary, independently of the pro- or counter- cyclical nature of its impact on the desired mark-up.

Income Distribution and Monopoly: Price and Quantity Patterns with Intra- and Inter-class Income Dispersion

We analyze the direction of the co-movements of price and output in a monopolistic market when an expansive shock occurs. Price and quantity patterns are shown to depend on the consumers? income distribution. In particular, a low degree of income dispersion is associated with price and quantity reacting in opposite directions to demand shocks.