Alessia Campolmi

Which inflation to target? A small open economy with sticky wages

There is common agreement on price inflation stabilization being one of the objectives of monetary policy. But, in an open economy, two alternative measures of inflation coexist: domestic inflation and consumer price inflation. Which of the two should be the target variable? Most of the new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM) literature suggests that the monetary authority should stabilize domestic inflation. This is in sharp contrast with the practice of many inflation-targeting central banks that are using consumer price index (CPI) inflation as target variable. The paper shows that the standard result in the NOEM literature is derived under the simplifying assumption of flexible wages. The inclusion of sticky wages in an otherwise standard small open economy model is shown to rationalize CPI inflation targeting. This conclusion is robust to changes in key parameters, including the trade elasticity.

Fiscal Calculus and the Labor Market

The endorsement of expansionary fiscal packages has often been based on the idea that large multipliers can counteract rising and persistent unemployment. We explore the effectiveness of fiscal stimuli in a model with matching frictions and endogenous participation. Results show that hiring subsidies, contrary to increase in government spending, deliver large multipliers, even with distortionary taxation. Those policies increase the incentives to post vacancies, hence employment. Furthermore, by reducing marginal costs they also reduce inflation and increase private consumption.

RETHINKING OPTIMAL EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES WITH FRICTIONAL LABOR MARKETS

Currency fluctuations are an important determinant of labor market dynamics. Vice versa, relative labor costs affect real exchange rate dynamics. The optimal choice of exchange rate regimes cannot neglect this nexus. We assess such a choice using a two-country model with frictional labor markets. The monetary authority faces a tension between the classical insulating property of floating exchange rates and the destabilizing effects of currency fluctuations on (relative) job flows. Results show that the second motive is important: optimal monetary policy prescribes (some) response to the exchange rate. We also reexamine the conditions for optimal policy in a currency area whose members experience asymmetries in labor market institutions.

Trade Policy: Home Market Effect vs Terms of Trade Externality

We study trade policy in a two-sector Krugman-type trade model with home market effects. We allow for three different instruments: tariffs, export taxes and production subsidies. For each instrument, we consider unilateral trade policy without retaliation. We find - contrary to the results of previous studies - that production subsidies are always inefficiently low and driven by the incentives to improve the (welfare relevant) terms of trade. For tariffs and export taxes we show that results depend crucially on the (in)efficiency of the free trade allocation. When starting from an allocation that is distorted because of monopolistic competition, the home market effect (and in the case of export taxes also the desire to correct for the monopolistic inefficiency) induces policy makers to set a tariff (an export subsidy). However, when monopolistic distortions are corrected, terms of trade effects dominate the choice of trade policy and lead to an import subsidy (an export tax).