Alex Marshall

Imperial nostalgia, the liberal lie, and the perils of postmodern counterinsurgency

Since 9/11, counterinsurgency is back in fashion; the ‘war on terror’ has even been branded a ‘global counterinsurgency’. However the context within which counterinsurgency originally arose is critical to understanding the prospects for its present success; the radically changed environment in which it is currently being conducted casts into considerable doubt the validity of the doctrines application by many national militaries currently ‘rediscovering’ this school of military thought today. Above all, classical counterinsurgency was a profoundly imperial, state-centric phenomenon; consequently it only rarely faced the thorny issue of sovereignty and legitimacy which bedevils and may doom these same efforts today.

Managing Withdrawal: Afghanistan as the Forgotten Example in Attempting Conflict Resolution and State Reconstruction

Perhaps surprisingly, given the availability of new Russian memoir material, some excellent individual monographs, and a large variety of declassified documents, a full operational–political account of the Soviet Unions withdrawal strategy from Afghanistan has yet to be written. This article, utilising openly published yet neglected sources, attempts to fill that gap. The final fate of the Najibullah regime, and the contradictory effect of the National Reconciliation Policy in Afghanistan itself, suggests four key lessons for international forces today as disengagement from both Iraq and Afghanistan again becomes a pressing issue, and as questions around re-creating stability within a failed state scenario again occupy the international community.

Russian military intelligence, 1905-1917: the untold story behind tsarist Russia in the First World War

The role of military intelligence in the First World War has been relatively neglected compared with the revelations that have wholly altered the historiography of the Second World War since the 1970s. The role of Russian military intelligence in that first conflict has in particular been an enigma for many decades, because of the difficulty of archival access. Now, however, a new generation of Russian, European and American scholars are uncovering the role of Russian military intelligence in the First World War, and a series of fresh discoveries combined with the reprint of previously rare biographical material allows one to reach new and more informed conclusions both on Russian military intelligence of the period and on the nature of the Russian revolution itself.

Missionaries of modernity. Advisory missions and the struggle for hegemony in Afghanistan and beyond

was unhappy about a split among non-Western powers but also unwilling to spend political capital to broker a settlement. Johan Cavoski documents a split within the Non-Aligned Movement, which India had been neglecting prior to 1962. Some leading states in the movement, notably Yugoslavia, backed India in hopes of salvaging the movement’s solidarity; other Asian states tilted instead towards China. Both the United States and the United Kingdom, Paul McGarr suggests, wanted to use India’s conflict with the PRC to win India to the West, but each hoped the other would take the lead. The relative openness of Indian versus Chinese society explains the decided tilt towards India in coverage of domestic developments. There is nothing on how the war affected Chinese society, but there are three chapters on the issue of internment and imprisonment of perceived internal threats in India, and a fourth by Jabin Jacob on memories of the war today. On the question of preventive detention and internment, Imtiaz Omar gives a detailed legal history of India’s internal security measures. Subho Basu looks at the effect of preventive detention on Indian Marxism. While the split of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) away from the Communist Party of India has generally been seen as a result of the Sino-Soviet split, Basu instead traces a more complex dynamic. In response to the war, more radical members of the CPI, particularly those opposed to a military defense of India, were imprisoned. Perceiving themselves as betrayed not only in a general ideological sense but concretely in terms of time behind bars by the CPI mainstream, the left wing of the CPI became increasingly embittered and radicalized and broke away to create the CPI(M) in 1964. The largest number of detainees, however, were not domestic radicals but several thousand ethnic Chinese resident in India, including a substantial number of Indian citizens. An internment camp was set up in Deoli in Rajasthan. At least 2400 ethnic Chinese (a status defined as one Chinese grandparent) were deported to China; the last detainees were released only in 1967.

From civil war to proxy war: past history and current dilemmas

Abstract The use of surrogate or ‘proxy’ actors within the context of ‘irregular’ or guerrilla conflict within or between states constitutes a phenomenon spanning nearly the whole of recorded human military history. Yet it is a phenomenon that has also acquired urgent contemporary relevance in the light of the general evolution of conflict in Ukraine and the current Middle East. This introduction to a special issue on the theme investigates some potentially important new avenues to studying the phenomenon in the light of these trends.

Jonathan N.C. Hill, Identity in Algerian Politics: The Legacy of Colonial Rule

democratic society’’ like America’ (p.401). Kissinger understood classic statecraft but did he understand how wiretapping ranking journalists Joseph Kraft and Henry Brandon, and his own loyal White House staffers, undercut his own reputation and American values? Horne gives Kissinger a pathetic pass on this most basic of issues, laying the blame on FBI director J. Edgar Hoover. To make his case for Kissinger, Horne derogates President Nixon and fails to show Kissinger as a courtier struggling to save his job and become Secretary of State at any cost. Nixon was the strategist, Kissinger the skilful, implacable negotiator. Nixon, for all his personal lack of self-esteem, was a brilliant if ruthless strategist and realist. (Before he became president, Nixon visited Chiang Kai Shek as his guest in Taiwan six times. After he was elected president, Nixon shunned his old friend the Generalissimo and dropped Taiwan for Mao’s Communist China without ever notifying Chiang until after the fact.) Horne quotes some of Kissinger’s critics, but simply dismisses their criticism. ‘I know at least one distinguished New York Times journalist who’, he writes, ‘to this day considers Kissinger indictable for war crimes against humanity for his responsibility in the Cambodian Operation’ (p.42). In a footnote, Horne names her as Margaret Becker (fn16, p.411). An obvious error, since in the acknowledgements he thanks Elizabeth Becker of the New York Times, who covered Cambodia. His reference to Barry Shield is also incorrect; he is referring to longtime State Department Correspondent Barry Schweid of the Associated Press (p.191). This is a celebrity biography of Kissinger in shiny wrapping, adorned with names of the famous and choice quotes from Bismarck and Byron. Like Winston Churchill, who wrote his own self-serving history of World War II, Kissinger has turned to Horne to validate his version of reality by predominately citing Kissinger’s own memoirs. Except for flashes of honest answers to Horne about his feelings of frustration toward Israel, Kissinger emerges as a chameleon, changing colours to blend into the kaleidoscope of history, spinning his story to Horne in an effort to salvage his reputation.

Book Reviews: Napoleon’s Other War: Bandits, Rebels and Their Pursuers in the Age of Revolutions. By Michael Broers. Oxford: Peter Lang. 2010. xxiii+232 pp. £25.00 hbk. ISBN 978 1 906165 11 6

views. The essentialist view sees differences between different ways of war as intrinsic or even permanent, and rooted in fixed features of a culture or nation, whereas the constructivist view sees strategic culture as more fluid, open to being dismantled, remade, and copied. Chapter 4 examines Western images of the Mongols in the first half of the thirteenth century, by focusing upon the writings of one of the leading theorists of armoured warfare, Basil Henry Liddell Hart. In so doing, Porter shows how the Mongols’ mobility and aggressiveness have long inspired Western strategic thinkers, and how they linked the mobile warfare of the Asian steppe with the potential of modern mechanized forces. In his writings, which are still influential in war/strategic studies, Liddell Hart insisted that military wisdom could not only transcend cultural traditions, but could also be applied across the ages. Chapters 5 and 6 argue that the Taliban in the Afghan War and Hezbollah in the 2006 July War are cultural realists. For example, the Taliban was culturally rigid when in government, but the discipline of war caused it to embrace pragmatism, strategically trading off and redefining its cultural codes. Here again Porter reminds readers of the fact that culture is dynamic and volatile. When facing battle, actors such as the Taliban and Hezbollah change long-established behaviour and traditions, violate norms, and innovate in order to gain an advantage. This book shows us how difficult culture is to understand or analyse in a way relevant to military affairs, and how easily the discussion can slip into ahistorical myth. It also shows us that war does not express the pre-existing culture of the actors, but can force them to alter it. To be sure, culture does not just shape war; war shapes culture. Porter convinces his readers that seeing the relevance of culture in war and strategy is a very important step forward, but that seeing culture as rigid and static can be misleading. This book is a ‘must read’.

Book Review: Waging War in Waziristan: The British Struggle in the Land of Bin Laden, 1849— 1947. By Andrew M. Roe. University Press of Kansas. 2010. ix + 313 pp. £28.95 hardback. ISBN 978 0 7006 1699 2

collected during his research to identify the ‘unspoken assumptions’ that exist within the Army. The model consists of the ‘formal command structure’, which considers issues of hierarchy and discipline; the ‘informal structure’, which looks at both the range of relationships that can exist within the army and the attitudes towards rules; the ‘functional structure’, which considers opinions towards soldierly duties; and the ‘loyalty/identity structure’, which explores ideas of belonging and association and the prevalent notion of ‘being the best’, an important consideration for a regimental force such as the British army. For historians, the second part of the book, where the author uses the model to analyse selected historical periods, is likely to be of great interest. Kirke uses mainly published memoirs and letters from the early eighteenth century through to the Second World War to test his theories, and finds significant levels of continuity in the ideas, attitudes, and behavioural conventions held by soldiers throughout the period under consideration, what the author describes as ‘enduring preoccupations’ (p. 146). He successfully demonstrates that British soldiers throughout the past 300 years have shared similar concerns: all have been subject to some level of formal command, all take pride in their ability to carry out military tasks effectively, and all share a fierce loyalty to their units and regiments, as illustrated by the frequently expressed idea that their particular unit is the best. In the ‘informal’ sphere Kirke is able to use the model to challenge existing interpretations about officer–men relationships in the earlier period by demonstrating that, even in the early eighteenth century, interdependence existed between ranks that helped to strengthen group cohesion and make the army a more effective fighting force. Many have challenged the utility of ‘models’ as a resource for historians. Kirke demonstrates that he is not guilty of any special pleading to defend his theory by identifying and discussing its weaknesses, specifically with regard to the importance of external societal influences on the army, such as the dominance of concepts of ‘personal honour’ in the eighteenth century, as manifested in the frequent duels that took place between officers. He openly accepts the need to make adjustments to the model to accommodate these, recognizing that ‘military organisational culture is embedded within a wider social environment’ (p. 189). There are some minor problems with the book. The title inexplicably changes between the front cover and the title page, some may find the social science referen-cing system irritating, and parts of the second half could have been dealt with more thematically. However, these in no way detract from what is indeed an innovative work, one that succeeds in demonstrating the levels of continuity in the experiences of British soldiers since 1700 and provides a welcome invitation for further, more detailed work using such approaches.

Moscow and the Emergence of Communist Power in China, 1925–30. The Nanchang Uprising and the Birth of the Red Army

Taylor and Francis FDEF_A_528699.sgm 10.1080/14702436.2011.528699 Defence Studies 470-2436 (pr nt)/1743-9698 (online) Book R view 2 11 & Francis 1 0 0 0020 1 AlexM rshall a.marshall@h story.arts.gla.ac.uk Bruce A. Elleman, Moscow and the Emergence of Communist Power in China, 1925–30. The Nanchang Uprising and the Birth of the Red Army (Routledge: London, 2009). Pp. 241. £80.00 (hbk); ISBN 978-0-415-77641-1.

Book Review: War and Peace in the Caucasus: Russia’s Troubled Frontier. By Vicken Cheterian. Hurst. 2008. viii + 395 pp. £15.99 paper. ISBN 978 1 85065 987 7

In his comprehensive account of the pre-invasion period, Yates effectively explores many of the problems encountered by US military leaders in the field. He details, for example, inter-service friction in a joint command, especially operational and tactical disputes between the Army and the Marine Corps. Moreover, he also documents the failure of leaders to establish an effective command and control relationship between special operations and conventional forces. While even-handed in his critiques of US military and political officials during the two-year crisis, Yates has noticeable sympathy for General Frederick F. Woerner Jr, the commander of US Southern Command based in Quarry Heights, Panama. It fell to Woerner to protect US rights and citizens and also prevent an outbreak of hostilities with the Panamanian military. As Yates documents well, it was Woerner who ‘was persistent in pushing for a multifaceted approach that would combine international, political, economic, and military pressure on Panama’s regime and armed forces in such a way as to compel a “Panamanian solution” to the crisis, but his entreaties could never overcome the entrenched positions of the various U.S. agencies involved’ (p. 280). In the end, Woerner was ousted by the White House and replaced by a more aggressive general, Maxwell R. Thurman. A first-rate history, this book is highly recommended for interested scholars and active duty officers. It provides a clear, thoughtful case study of day-to-day leadership decisionmaking during a complex, extended crisis. For those disappointed by the text’s anticlimactic end, they can look forward to Yates’s forthcoming companion volume which promises to detail the operational history of Just Cause.