Alex Wilson

Renegotiating the state of autonomies: statute reform and multi-level politics in Spain

The regional/national question is central to Spanish politics, where different conceptions of the state co-exist. The 1978 Constitution sets out different paths to autonomy, although the end point is similar. State-wide parties have sought to contain autonomy and to make regional statutes uniform. Territorial parties in the historic nationalities have sought to maintain a differential status, while other regions have sought to catch up, creating a competitive dynamic. The recent round of statute reform involved more parties and more complex politics than previous rounds, with an active role for regional governments. Regional political elites used statute reform to make symbolic assertions and resource claims, as well as to demand more competences. Competition among regional elites to gain more symbolic status and substantive powers creates centrifugal dynamics. On the other hand, the normalisation of territorial politics at both centre and periphery may be an integrative factor. The dominance of parties is also a reflection of the weak institutionalisation of territorial relations and intergovernmental conflict.

New parties in government: party organization and the costs of public office

Previous studies suggest, and common wisdom holds, that government participation is detrimental for new parties. This paper argues that the opposite is true. Drawing on a large-N analysis (111 parties in 16 countries) in combination with two case studies, it demonstrates that new parties generally benefit organisationally from supporting or entering a government coalition. Compared to established parties, new parties have the advantage that their leadership is more able to allocate effectively the spoils of office, and can change still malleable rudimentary party structures so as to respond to intra-organisational demands, as well as the functional demands of holding office. The authors conclude by setting their finding in wider perspective and elaborate on its implications for contemporary West European politics.

The Italian Election of April 2008: A Political Earthquake?

The Italian election of April 2008 was held soon after the collapse of the centre-left government led by Romano Prodi, which had been elected in May 2006 (Newell 2006; Bull and Rhodes 2007b). During its brief existence the Prodi government was characterised by a fractious governing coalition, unpopular government policies, and a fragile parliamentary majority in the Senate. As a result the centre-right coalition, once again led by Silvio Berlusconi, was universally expected to win this election. Yet it faced a new and unpredictable challenge from the Democratic Party, led by the charismatic Walter Veltroni. The ensuing electoral campaign was bi-polar and personalised around these competing leaders. The centre-right coalition won by a convincing margin; secured a comfortable governing majority in both chambers of parliament; and swiftly formed a new government in May 2008. The 2008 election produced a huge simplification in the Italian party system. Only seven parties were elected in the new legislature, in sharp contrast to the 20þ parties present at the end of the 2006–08 Legislature, most of which were located in the centre-left. This striking development can be primarily attributed to the Democratic Party’s decision to form an exclusive electoral alliance with Italy of Values, excluding all other parties in the former centre-left coalition. This obliged the radical left parties to form an electoral coalition (Rainbow Left) among themselves, whose disastrous performance led to the unexpected disappearance of their parliamentary contingent for the first time in post-war history. Conversely the Democratic Party and Italy of Values increased their vote share and parliamentary representation. The main centre-right parties, Forza Italia and National Alliance, formed a more successful electoral coalition for this election (People of Liberty), and repeated their electoral alliance with the autonomist Northern League, whose support doubled in this election.

Multi-level Coalitions and Statute Reform in Spain

Between 2003 and 2007 six regional statutes of autonomy were reformed in Spain. These are Organic Laws that form part of the ‘constitutional bloc’ in Spain and determine the characteristics of state decentralization, so contain high thresholds for revision in the regional and Spanish parliament. Statutes are a flexible component of ‘non-institutional federalism’ in Spain and their negotiation highlights both centripetal and centrifugal dynamics in state design. Existing empirical studies have compared the content of these reforms. This article compares the political dynamics of statute reform, in light of existing literature on coalitional bargaining. It argues that statute reform is a competitive two-level game (regional and central), which requires parties to form single-issue ‘statute coalitions’. Statute coalitions require varying degrees of inter-party co-operation, and can distort more permanent governing or parliamentary coalitions between statewide and non-statewide parties. They can exacerbate intra-party tensions, but may also be useful for ‘coalitional experimentation’ in multi-level arenas. Statute negotiations are unbounded because Spanish parties exploit them for electoral advantage and not merely to secure their policy preferences. This article contains two case studies of statute reform (Catalonia, Valencia) which illustrate these complex and varied dynamics, and suggests comparative avenues for further research on constitutional reform in multi-level systems.

Multi-level Party Systems in Spain

This article compares party systems in Spain from a multi-level perspective, evaluating structures of party competition and processes of party system change at central and regional levels, with a view to understanding their broader impact on territorial dynamics in Spanish politics. Since the 1990s, the central party system has become characterized by intense bipolarization between state-wide parties and wholesale alternation in government. Although a similar process of bipolarization has occurred in most (but not all) regional party systems, the effects in terms of coalition formation and government alternation are very different. Spanish regions are characterized by innovative coalitions between state-wide and non-state-wide parties, with patterns of government alternation that diverge from the central level. A majority of regions are characterized by predominant party systems with no alternation in government, while others see partial alternation where small regionalist parties form promiscuous coalitions with state-wide parties to stay perpetually in office. Meanwhile, the large bilingual regions (Catalonia, Basque Country, Galicia) have all shifted from predominant party systems to more competitive ones characterized by wholesale alternation, but with underlying structures of competition and party coalitions that differ significantly from the central level. Curiously, incongruence in multi-level party systems has so far proven to be a largely stabilizing factor in the territorial politics of Spain. It has contributed to ending the monopoly of regional government by powerful nationalist parties in Catalonia and the Basque Country, while not undermining the core features of party competition at central level. It has drawn state-wide and nationalist/regionalist parties into closer collaboration, so helping to blunt the edge of territorial conflicts. Yet enduring incongruence in multi-level party systems could ultimately induce more centrifugal pressures on the Spanish state. Through their electoral competition and coalitional relations with nationalist parties, regional branches of state-wide parties are more likely to develop positions that conflict with the central leadership, whether on policy issues, coalitional options or regional autonomy and influence. Such developments are already occurring in the most autonomous regional branches of state-wide parties, where regional leaders have built on existing asymmetrical arrangements to pursue distinct policies and coalitions, while advancing more autonomist positions on state design. If these developments became more widespread they could undermine the organizational coherence of state-wide parties, perhaps shifting the balance of power in territorial politics.

Coalition Formation and Party Systems in the Italian Regions

Few studies have focused on coalition formation in the Italian Ordinary Status (OS) regions. Studies that implicitly considered this issue have tended to highlight its nationalized features, particularly the congruence of pre-electoral coalitions and the absence of region-specific parties. Yet these studies have overlooked the intra-coalitional dynamics of regional party systems, ignored the post-electoral dimension of coalition formation, and failed to explain regional variations in the intensity of inter-coalitional party competition. This article incorporates these dimensions of analysis to argue that coalition formation in the Italian OS regions displays strong territorial features, which are directly linked to the “format” and “structures of competition” (Sartori, 1976) in regional party systems. These dual structures of regional party competition are heavily affected by the heterogeneous distribution of electoral support for state-wide parties, the presence or absence of non-state-wide parties (Northern League, Udeur), the diverse coalitional behaviour of Italian parties, and the distinctive patterns of electoral hierarchy in regional governing coalitions. The introduction of a new regional electoral system (proportional representation with majoritarian bonus) has also produced distinct coalitional incentives, leading to ‘perfect’ patterns of inter-coalitional bipolarism. Regional elections in Italy are confirmed as vital processes of national coalition testing.

Institutional Change in Advanced European Democracies: An Exploratory Assessment

Recent decades have seen a wave of institutional changes of the core democratic rules in advanced democracies. These changes include reforms of electoral systems; decentralization of power to sub-national governments; the creation or enhancement of direct-democratic institutions; a rise in public subsidies to political parties; and shifts in the balance of power between executive and legislature. Nevertheless, political science has developed a limited understanding of what explains institutional change in democracies that are already consolidated. This is partly due to the lack of comparative data on the subject, with most studies of institutional change focusing on a single country, or on a single type of reform (e.g. electoral system change). Our paper seeks to bridge this gap by presenting the preliminary findings of an international research project that compared seven dimensions of institutional change in 18 consolidated European democracies between 1990 and 2008, producing a unique dataset whose content has been fully verified by national experts. This dataset provides the empirical basis for evaluating the type and extent of institutional change in consolidated European democracies, as well as developing hypotheses about the motivations and calculations behind these reforms.

Direct election of regional presidents and party change in Italy

This article assesses the impact that direct election of regional presidents has had on party politics in Italy. It finds regional presidents exert a growing personalisation of power within parties at sub-national levels, primarily through their capacity for political nomination and de facto status as party negotiators in the governing coalition. While presidents may shape structures of regional party competition, they remain constrained by coalitional politics and can struggle to assert their authority against powerful governing partners or local powerbrokers rooted in the legislature. They also possess few mechanisms to consolidate their position at national level, consistent with a broader tendency towards ‘stratarchy’ in multi-level parties. Although the distinction between densely and loosely structured parties remains relevant, a common trend towards ‘cartelisation’ at sub-national levels is noted as political parties prioritise the control of state resources and the governing legitimacy this entail...