Alex Y. Lo

Deliberative Monetary Valuation: In Search of a Democratic and Value Plural Approach to Environmental Policy

The use of deliberative methods to assess environmental values in monetary terms has been motivated by the potential for small group discussion to help with preference formation and the inclusion of non‐economic values. In this review, two broad approaches are identified: preference economisation and preference moralisation. The former is analytical, concentrates upon issues of poor respondent cognition and produces a narrow conception of value linked to utilitarianism. The latter emphasises political legitimacy, appeals to community values and tends to privilege arguments made in the public interest. Both approaches are shown to embrace forms of value convergence, which undermine the prospects for value pluralism. As a result exclusion and predefinition of values dominates current practice. In order to maintain democratic credentials, the importance attributed to monetary value needs to be left as an open question to be addressed as part of a process determining an “agreement to pay”. To this end we identify a discourse‐based approach as a third way consistent with the democratic and value plural potential of deliberative monetary valuation.

Challenges to the development of carbon markets in China

China has introduced several pilot emission trading schemes to build the basis for a national scheme. The potential scale of this initiative raises prospects for a regional carbon trading network as a way to further engage other major Asian economies. However, the Chinese carbon markets rest upon a unique political-economic context and institutional environment that are likely to limit their development and viability. This article offers an overview of such structural economic and political constraints. Four main challenges are identified, namely, inadequate domestic demand, limited financial involvement, incomplete regulatory infrastructure, and excessive government intervention. The first two challenges concern economic dimensions and may be partially addressed by the incentives created by the newly introduced emission trading schemes. The other two are more deeply entrenched in the dominant political system and governing practice. They require fundamental changes to the ways in which the state and the market interact. The success of Chinas carbon market reform depends crucially on the ability of the ongoing efforts to transform the distorted state–market relationship. Policy relevance The burgeoning carbon markets offer opportunities for emissions mitigation at lower costs and enable circulation of a new form of capital, i.e. carbon credits, across borders. China accounts for a gigantic share of global GHG emissions and has the potential to significantly scale up these opportunities. There are clear implications for market developers and participants worldwide, including climate policy makers who attempt to link their emission trading schemes to other schemes, firms who seek to take advantage of the inexpensive carbon offsets generated in developing countries, international financial institutions who endeavour to establish their business in an emerging major carbon market, etc. This article can inform their decisions by identifying key issues that may undermine their ability to achieve these goals. Policy makers and stakeholders will benefit from this analysis, which shows how the Chinese carbon markets operate in ways that may be different from their experience elsewhere.

Analysis and Democracy: The Antecedents of the Deliberative Approach of Ecosystems Valuation

As a political institution, open deliberation on public policy can enhance legitimacy and procedural justice. As a science, decision-aiding deliberative procedures can help overcome bounded rationality of individuals. Integrating the two modes of inquiry would be perfect for capturing the plural values of the environment. However, the analytic requirements seem to point in a different direction from the political ideals. Legitimacy problems arise when the supposedly unconstrained process is professionally ‘guided’. But rigorous decision aids fail to work without some degree of cognitive guidance. A trend in ecosystems valuation research is the use of analytic techniques in the deliberative processes of value articulation. In this paper an analytic – deliberative approach is assessed against a deliberative democracy theory. This approach seeks to facilitate deliberation within individuals and to engineer preference towards instrumental rationality. The evaluative framework allows predetermination of the range of outcomes. Little room has been made for value debates, thus the moral need for actual discussion is weak. Being expert centred, the framework provides constricted spaces for empowerment. Alternative expressions unintelligible to the science may be put at a disadvantage. The scope for a reflexive democratic institution appears limited. A promising deliberative valuation approach should be integrative, including analytic and political elements as complementary to each other, and should be democratic in its production.

Reason and rhetoric in climate communication

Rhetoric can facilitate movement beyond impasse on whether and how to confront climate change, enabling more effective public reasoning. Our evidence comes from a small deliberative group that contained climate-change deniers. We show how, in this setting, bridging rhetoric (capable of reaching those who do not share the speaker’s perspective) managed to bring deniers and others into accepting that particular greenhouse-gas mitigation measures were in the range of acceptable policy choices – even as deniers continued to dispute the existence of anthropogenic climate change. What we observed drives home the need for rhetorical bridges in broader public debates on climate change.

The relationship between climate change concern and national wealth

Based on a cross-national social survey, this paper ascertains how perception of climate change is related to national wealth and adaptive capacity across 33 countries. Results indicate that citizens of wealthier countries tend to see climate change as the most important problem, but are less likely to rank it as a highly dangerous threat. We find that Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita correlates positively with perceived importance of climate change, but negatively with perceived risk. Also, climate change is less likely to be seen as highly dangerous in those countries that are better prepared for climate change. These findings have important implications for climate adaptation. The relatively weaker sense of danger among the wealthiest societies may eventually lead to maladaptation to climate change. Adequate economic resources provide people collective security and protection from impending crises, but could elevate a self-assuring attitude that might prematurely reduce their caution toward the impending threat and capacity for dealing with climate uncertainties.

Active conflict or passive coherence? The political economy of climate change in China

Human-induced climate change has been a trigger of domestic conflict in many parts of the world, prompting prolonged periods of contention between environmental activists and climate change sceptics. But, what about countries without legal oppositional politics, such as China? China ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol in 1992 and 2002, respectively. As a nonAnnex I developing country it has not been subject to emission limits. Although it does not lack aggressive mitigation efforts, there is strong reluctance to curb skyrocketing emission levels by adhering to mandatory limits. Substantial climate commitment from China is contingent on fulfilment of its own economic and social goals. This is accepted not only by the government and business leaders but also by the general public and many nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). These actors converge in their views about the relative priority of responsibility for climate change and for the majority’s material wellbeing. Moreover, Chinese citizens and civil society do not, or cannot, confront the state. The issue of climate change, then, does not involve a great deal of conflict, and Chinese nationalism may keep it that way for the foreseeable future. Many Chinese strongly disapprove of Western criticisms of China’s political traditions. Following the Copenhagen conference and in view of China’s rapidly growing energy consumption, the government is confronted with mounting international pressure demanding further concessions. The dynamics of global climate politics, however, may effectively create a political arena where the Chinese public remains firmly behind the state’s defence of national autonomy in formulating responses to climate change. This widely shared support for autonomy may then indicate a passive form of political coherence, where official policies and public preferences are not in conflict. I examine evidence for this hypothesis and call for further

Powered by the state or finance? The organization of China’s carbon markets

This paper reviews the progress of carbon trading in China and examines the involvement of the state and financial sectors. China witnessed proliferation of domestic carbon markets before attempting to institutionalize the carbon trading regime. Direct and strong government intervention is a key feature of this process. The domestic carbon markets are primarily created, shaped, and operated by the central and local governments supported by a cohort of macro-economic planners, local economic agencies, state-owned financial institutions, and business organizations with government backing. Key market players are institutionally dependent on the state – much more so than in capitalist economies. Private investments have not been adequately and effectively mobilized due to unfavorable economic, regulatory, and policy conditions. Non-state financial actors are not an active and influential player. This indicates a hierarchical relationship between the state and finance and a clear asymmetry of power in the organization of China’s carbon markets. These observations constitute a notable difference to the international carbon markets, which are subject to the strong influence of private finance. China has put the market-based policy instrument of carbon trading under a substantial concentration of state power. The findings have important implications for understanding the rise of carbon markets in non-traditional capitalist economies.

China’s Response to Climate Change

China has become the biggest CO2 emitter. The expanding economy generated 6028 Mt CO2 in 2007, contributing onefifth of the world total and surpassing the U.S. for the first time (1). China’s per capita CO2 emissions level rose by 80%, from 2.54 tonnes in 1998 to 4.57 tonnes in 2007. The figure is lower than that of the Annex I industralized economies (11.21 tonnes in 2007). Carbon intensity (CO2/GDP) is caught at 2.52 kg CO2/US

Could urban greening mitigate suburban thermal inequity?: the role of residents’ dispositions and household practices

in 2007. It follows a decreasing trend but remains high relative to the world average of 0.73 kg CO2/ US

Reciprocity as deliberative capacity: lessons from a citizen’s deliberation on carbon pricing mechanisms in Australia

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