Alexander C. Lembcke

Union Density and Varieties of Coverage: The Anatomy of Union Wage Effects in Germany

Collective bargaining in Germany takes place either at the industry level or at the firm level; collective bargaining coverage is much higher than union density; and not all employees in a covered firm are necessarily covered. This institutional setup suggests to explicitly distinguish union power as measured by net union density (NUD) in a labor market segment, coverage at the firm level, and coverage at the individual level. Using linked employer-employee data and applying quantile regressions, this is the first empirical paper which simultaneously analyzes these three dimensions of union influence on the structure of wages. Ceteris paribus, a higher share of employees in a firm covered by industry-wide or firm-level contracts is associated with higher wages. Yet, individual bargaining coverage in a covered firm shows a negative impact both on the wage level and on wage dispersion. A higher union density reinforces the effects of coverage, but the effect of union density is negative at all points in the wage distribution for uncovered employees. In line with an insurance motive, higher union density compresses the wage structure and, at the same time, it is associated with a uniform leftward movement of the distribution for uncovered employees.

The Vision of War without Casualties: On the Use of Casualty Aversion in Armament Advertisements

Casualty aversion is understood to be one major factor influencing the way Western democracies have been fighting theirwars since the end of the cold war. However, only a few studies have systematically tested its influence on state behavior. Consequently, important questions about the scope and depth of its relevance remain unanswered. This study opens up a new way of testing the casualty hypothesis by systematically comparing 587 advertisements for weapon systems placed in fifteen volumes of Janes International Defence Reviewby Western-style democracies. The authors suggest that casualty aversion is an important argument in the advertisement of Western defense industrial companies for modern weapon systems and has grown in importance since the end of the cold war. Their findings are based on a multivariate analysis in which they control for the most prominent factors brought forward in the current casualty aversion debate.

Does It Pay to Live in Big(ger) Cities?: The Role of Agglomeration Benefits, Local Amenities, and Costs of Living

This study approaches the question whether it “pays” to live in big(ger) cities in a three-fold manner: first, it estimates how city size affects worker productivity (agglomeration benefits) in Germany, based on individual-level wage data. Second, it considers whether productivity benefits translate into real gains for workers by taking local price levels into account. Third, it examines the role of amenities in explaining differences in real benefits across cities. The estimated elasticity for agglomeration benefits is around 0.02, implying that comparable workers in Hamburg (3 million residents) are about 6% more productive than in Recklinghausen (150 000). But agglomeration benefits are, on average, offset by higher prices, i.e. city size does not systematically translate into real pecuniary benefits for workers. Amenities, e.g. seaside access, theatres, universities, or “disamenities”, e.g. air pollution, explain – to a large degree – variation in real pecuniary benefits, i.e. real wages are higher in low-amenity cities.

Unionization, Stochastic Dominance, and Compression of the Wage Distribution

This paper establishes theoretical and empirical linkages between union wage setting and the structure of the wage distribution. Theoretically, we identify conditions under which a right-to-manage model implies compression of the wage distribution in the union sector relative to the nonunion sector as well as first-order stochastic dominance. These implications are investigated using quantile regressions on the 2001 GSES, a large German linked employer–employee data set which contains explicit information on coverage by collective agreements. The empirical results confirm that, in case of industry-wide collective agreements, log union wage effects decline in quantiles, implying union wage compression. This finding, however, cannot be corroborated for wages determined at the firm level. Stochastic dominance is confirmed, as predicted by the theoretical model, for both types of collective agreements.