Alexander H. Bolyanatz

Costly punishment across human societies.

Recent behavioral experiments aimed at understanding the evolutionary foundations of human cooperation have suggested that a willingness to engage in costly punishment, even in one-shot situations, may be part of human psychology and a key element in understanding our sociality. However, because most experiments have been confined to students in industrialized societies, generalizations of these insights to the species have necessarily been tentative. Here, experimental results from 15 diverse populations show that (i) all populations demonstrate some willingness to administer costly punishment as unequal behavior increases, (ii) the magnitude of this punishment varies substantially across populations, and (iii) costly punishment positively covaries with altruistic behavior across populations. These findings are consistent with models of the gene-culture coevolution of human altruism and further sharpen what any theory of human cooperation needs to explain.

Markets, religion, community size, and the evolution of fairness and punishment

A Fair Society Many of the social interactions of everyday life, especially those involving economic exchange, take place between individuals who are unrelated to each other and often do not know each other. Countless laboratory experiments have documented the propensity of subjects to behave fairly in these interactions and to punish those participants deemed to have behaved unfairly. Henrich et al. (p. 1480, see the Perspective by Hoff) measured fairness in thousands of individuals from 15 contemporary, small-scale societies to gain an understanding of the evolution of trustworthy exchange among human societies. Fairness was quantitated using three economic games. Various societal parameters, such as the extent to which food was purchased versus produced, were also collected. Institutions, as represented by markets, community size, and adherence to a world religion all predict a greater exercise of fairness in social exchange. The origins of modern social norms and behaviors may be found in the evolution of institutions. Large-scale societies in which strangers regularly engage in mutually beneficial transactions are puzzling. The evolutionary mechanisms associated with kinship and reciprocity, which underpin much of primate sociality, do not readily extend to large unrelated groups. Theory suggests that the evolution of such societies may have required norms and institutions that sustain fairness in ephemeral exchanges. If that is true, then engagement in larger-scale institutions, such as markets and world religions, should be associated with greater fairness, and larger communities should punish unfairness more. Using three behavioral experiments administered across 15 diverse populations, we show that market integration (measured as the percentage of purchased calories) positively covaries with fairness while community size positively covaries with punishment. Participation in a world religion is associated with fairness, although not across all measures. These results suggest that modern prosociality is not solely the product of an innate psychology, but also reflects norms and institutions that have emerged over the course of human history.

More ‘altruistic’ punishment in larger societies

If individuals will cooperate with cooperators, and punish non-cooperators even at a cost to themselves, then this strong reciprocity could minimize the cheating that undermines cooperation. Based upon numerous economic experiments, some have proposed that human cooperation is explained by strong reciprocity and norm enforcement. Second-party punishment is when you punish someone who defected on you; third-party punishment is when you punish someone who defected on someone else. Third-party punishment is an effective way to enforce the norms of strong reciprocity and promote cooperation. Here we present new results that expand on a previous report from a large cross-cultural project. This project has already shown that there is considerable cross-cultural variation in punishment and cooperation. Here we test the hypothesis that population size (and complexity) predicts the level of third-party punishment. Our results show that people in larger, more complex societies engage in significantly more third-party punishment than people in small-scale societies.

Small-scale societies exhibit fundamental variation in the role of intentions in moral judgment

Significance It is widely considered a universal feature of human moral psychology that reasons for actions are taken into account in most moral judgments. However, most evidence for this moral intent hypothesis comes from large-scale industrialized societies. We used a standardized methodology to test the moral intent hypothesis across eight traditional small-scale societies (ranging from hunter-gatherer to pastoralist to horticulturalist) and two Western societies (one urban, one rural). The results show substantial variation in the degree to which an individual’s intentions influence moral judgments of his or her actions, with intentions in some cases playing no role at all. This dimension of cross-cultural variation in moral judgment may have important implications for understanding cultural disagreements over wrongdoing. Intent and mitigating circumstances play a central role in moral and legal assessments in large-scale industrialized societies. Although these features of moral assessment are widely assumed to be universal, to date, they have only been studied in a narrow range of societies. We show that there is substantial cross-cultural variation among eight traditional small-scale societies (ranging from hunter-gatherer to pastoralist to horticulturalist) and two Western societies (one urban, one rural) in the extent to which intent and mitigating circumstances influence moral judgments. Although participants in all societies took such factors into account to some degree, they did so to very different extents, varying in both the types of considerations taken into account and the types of violations to which such considerations were applied. The particular patterns of assessment characteristic of large-scale industrialized societies may thus reflect relatively recently culturally evolved norms rather than inherent features of human moral judgment.

The ‘spiteful’ origins of human cooperation

We analyse generosity, second-party (‘spiteful’) punishment (2PP), and third-party (‘altruistic’) punishment (3PP) in a cross-cultural experimental economics project. We show that smaller societies are less generous in the Dictator Game but no less prone to 2PP in the Ultimatum Game. We might assume people everywhere would be more willing to punish someone who hurt them directly (2PP) than someone who hurt an anonymous third person (3PP). While this is true of small societies, people in large societies are actually more likely to engage in 3PP than 2PP. Strong reciprocity, including generous offers and 3PP, exists mostly in large, complex societies that face numerous challenging collective action problems. We argue that ‘spiteful’ 2PP, motivated by the basic emotion of anger, is more universal than 3PP and sufficient to explain the origins of human cooperation.

Culture does account for variation in game behavior

Lamba and Maces critique (1) of our research (2–4) is based on incorrect claims about our experiments and several misunderstandings of the theory underpinning our efforts. Their findings are consistent with our previous work and lead to no unique conclusions.

Detecting affiliation in colaughter across 24 societies

Significance Human cooperation requires reliable communication about social intentions and alliances. Although laughter is a phylogenetically conserved vocalization linked to affiliative behavior in nonhuman primates, its functions in modern humans are not well understood. We show that judges all around the world, hearing only brief instances of colaughter produced by pairs of American English speakers in real conversations, are able to reliably identify friends and strangers. Participants’ judgments of friendship status were linked to acoustic features of laughs known to be associated with spontaneous production and high arousal. These findings strongly suggest that colaughter is universally perceivable as a reliable indicator of relationship quality, and contribute to our understanding of how nonverbal communicative behavior might have facilitated the evolution of cooperation. Laughter is a nonverbal vocal expression that often communicates positive affect and cooperative intent in humans. Temporally coincident laughter occurring within groups is a potentially rich cue of affiliation to overhearers. We examined listeners’ judgments of affiliation based on brief, decontextualized instances of colaughter between either established friends or recently acquainted strangers. In a sample of 966 participants from 24 societies, people reliably distinguished friends from strangers with an accuracy of 53–67%. Acoustic analyses of the individual laughter segments revealed that, across cultures, listeners’ judgments were consistently predicted by voicing dynamics, suggesting perceptual sensitivity to emotionally triggered spontaneous production. Colaughter affords rapid and accurate appraisals of affiliation that transcend cultural and linguistic boundaries, and may constitute a universal means of signaling cooperative relationships.

Reply to van Hoorn: Converging lines of evidence

We agree with the comments by van Hoorn (1) on our critique (2): testing causal hypotheses about human behavior is a challenge (1, 3). Making progress requires specifying alternative hypotheses and then testing these hypotheses using diverse and converging lines of evidence. We have defended the hypothesis that social norms, which culturally coevolved with the institutions of large-scale societies including markets, influence economic decision-making. This hypothesis emerged from a larger set that we developed both at the outset of our project and as we went along. Our interdisciplinary team’s initial list of hypotheses included the idea that experimental games might spark an innate reciprocity module that would yield little variation across populations. We also considered the hypothesis that group-level differences might result from individual differences in wealth or income. Nevertheless, what emerged in the data in our first project was (i) substantial variation among 15 populations, (ii) a strong correlation with market integration, and (iii) little relation to individual-level economic or demographic variables. Not satisfied with our first effort, we sampled 10 new populations, replicated these findings with improved protocols (developed based on critiques of the Phase I), and then extended them to two additional experimental games. Along the way, we have explored alternative hypotheses using measures of genetic relatedness, social network position, anonymity manipulations, and framing tools. To our knowledge, no other existing hypotheses can better account for the observed patterns of variation.

Moral Parochialism Misunderstood: A Reply to Piazza and Sousa

rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org Invited reply Cite this article: Fessler DMT et al. 2016 Moral parochialism misunderstood: a reply to Piazza and Sousa. Proc. R. Soc. B 283: http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2015.2628 Received: 3 November 2015 Accepted: 3 December 2015 Author for correspondence: Daniel M. T. Fessler e-mail: dfessler@anthro.ucla.edu Present address: Department of Anthropology, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901- 1414 USA and The School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-2402, USA. The accompanying comment can be viewed at http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2015.2037. Electronic supplementary material is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2015.2628 or via http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org. Moral parochialism misunderstood: a reply to Piazza and Sousa Daniel M. T. Fessler 1 , Colin Holbrook 1 , Martin Kanovsky 2 , H. Clark Barrett 1 , Alexander H. Bolyanatz 3 , Matthew M. Gervais 1,† , Michael Gurven 4 , Joseph Henrich 5 , Geoff Kushnick 6 , Anne C. Pisor 4 , Stephen Stich 7 , Christopher von Rueden 8 and Stephen Laurence 9 Department of Anthropology and Center for Behavior, Evolution, and Culture, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1553, USA Institute of Social Anthropology, FSEV, Comenius University, 820 05 Bratislava 25, Slovakia Social Sciences Subdivision, College of DuPage, Glen Ellyn, IL 60137-6599, USA Department of Anthropology, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-3210, USA Department of Psychology and Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada V6T 1Z4 School of Archaeology and Anthropology, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 0200, Australia Department of Philosophy and Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University, New Brunswick NJ 08901-1107, USA Jepson School of Leadership Studies, University of Richmond, VA 23173, USA Department of Philosophy and Hang Seng Centre for Cognitive Studies, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S3 7QB, UK Our paper [1] compared two competing hypotheses. The hypothesis that we label universalistic moral evaluation holds that a definitional feature of reasoning about moral rules is that, ceteris paribus, judgements of violations of rules con- cerning harm, rights or justice will be insensitive to spatial or temporal distance or the opinions of authority figures. The hypothesis that we label moral parochi- alism, consonant with a variety of theories of the evolutionary origins of morality, holds that, because moral judgements primarily serve to navigate local social arenas, remote events will not activate the mechanisms that generate negative moral evaluation to the same extent as events occurring in the here and now, whereas the consent of local authority figures will temper condemna- tion. Hence, moral parochialism predicts that the collective output of the faculties responsible for moral judgement will exhibit a reduction in the severity of judgement as a function of spatial or temporal distance or the opinions of local authority figures. We provided evidence from seven diverse societies, including five small-scale societies, showing that such reductions in severity judgements exist in all of the societies examined. Piazza and Sousa [2] argue that our data do not support parochialism, and instead support universalism, because (1) Only a minority of our participants reversed their initial judgement of the wrong- ness of an action (from wrong to not wrong or good) when it was subsequently framed as having occurred long ago or far away, or as having been sanctioned by authority figures. (2) Our use of graduated moral judgements, rather than dichotomous judgements, is inappropriate. (3) Only a minority of our participants diminished the severity of their initial judgement of the wrongness of an action when it was subsequently framed as having occurred long ago or far away, or as having been sanctioned by an important person. These objections stem from misunderstandings of moral parochialism and the evolutionary reasoning behind it. & 2016 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted use, provided the original author and source are credited.

Correction for Bryant et al., Detecting affiliation in colaughter across 24 societies (vol 113, pg 4682, 2016)

Author(s): Bryant, GA; Fessler, DMT; Fusaroli, R; Clint, E; Aaroe, L; Apicella, CL; Petersen, MB; Bickham, ST; Bolyanatz, A; Chavez, B; Smet, DD; Diaz, C; Faněoviěova, J; Fux, M; Giraldo-Perez, PP; Hu, A; Kamble, SV; Kameda, T; Li, NP; Luberti, FR; Prokop, P; Quintelier, K; Scelza, BA; Shin, HJ; Soler, M; Stieger, S; Toyokawa, W; Van den Hende, EA; Viciana-Asensio, H; Yildizhan, SE; Yong, JC; Yuditha, T; Zhou, Y