Alexander K. Wagner

Tie-Breaking Power in Committees

We investigate the effects of voting power in a committee in which one member (the chairman) holds, on top of a regular vote, also the power to break ties. In contrast to the equilibrium prediction under strategic voting, known as the Chairman’s Paradox, experimental data reveals that the tie-breaking power of the chairman is large and real. The chairman is able to induce her preferred outcome much more often than predicted, but only partially because of exercising tie-breaking power directly. The advantage of the chairman is largely determined by the limited strategic sophistication of committee members and the chairman’s salient position in the committee.We investigate the effects of voting power in a committee in which one member (the chairman) holds, on top of a regular vote, also the power to break ties. In contrast to the equilibrium prediction under strategic voting, known as the Chairman’s Paradox, experimental data reveals that the tie-breaking power of the chairman is large and real. The chairman is able to induce her preferred outcome much more often than predicted, but only partially because of exercising tie-breaking power directly. The advantage of the chairman is largely determined by the limited strategic sophistication of committee members and the chairman’s salient position in the committee.