Alexander Kupatadze

Organized crime before and after the Tulip Revolution: the changing dynamics of upperworld-underworld networks

More than a decade of post-Soviet transition has given rise to political-criminal clans in Kyrgyzstan, thus blurring the boundaries between the legitimate sector and the criminal underworld. The Tulip Revolution, which is frequently referred to as an ‘anti-crime’ and an ‘anti-corruption’ event, was followed by increasing political violence and more powerful organized crime groups. This article looks at the reasons for these developments. It argues that the involvement of criminal figures in the revolutionary process, the weakness of the political opposition to Akaevs outgoing regime and post-revolutionary uncertainty and chaos were the main factors. After temporary confusion, the incoming elites mobilized resources, revitalized the corruption pyramid schemes and fought back criminal leaders in order to reassert themselves. Following the assassination of two of the most influential underworld leaders in unclear circumstances, the incumbent regime and new ruling family are progressively consolidating their power. So far, however, the increased power of the ruling regime has not strengthened the Kyrgyz state. The state-crime nexus is still in place, now mainly dominated by political and administrative elites rather than by previously powerful criminal leaders. Judging from three years of post-revolutionary developments, the Tulip Revolution has failed on the anti-corruption and anti-crime fronts.

Explaining Georgia's anti-corruption drive

This article explains Georgias achievements against rampant corruption that plagued the country for decades. It demonstrates how Georgia has moved from being a ‘failed state’ to the state with low corruption rates following the Rose Revolution of 2003. It is argued that several internal and external drivers motivated Georgian leadership to fight corruption in the post-revolutionary setting, including drawing legitimacy from anti-corruption campaign and using it for political purposes, ‘the West’ as allure and desire to drift away from Russian trajectory of development.

Political corruption in Eurasia: Understanding collusion between states, organized crime and business

This article presents the problem of illicit collusion between states, organized criminals and white-collar criminals in the post-Soviet region, showing the blurring of these phenomena. It charts the development of political corruption and argues that this is a particular problem in the region due to the way state resources were sold off during the 1990s. The article however shows that the countries of the region now diverge significantly in terms of the extent and form that collusion takes. The goal of the article is to understand this variation. The article suggests that roughly two broad categories of state now exist in the post-Soviet region, excluding the Baltic States. These are broadly politically competitive states such as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia and broadly politically non-competitive ones such as Russia, Belarus or Kazakhstan. I show that collusion takes differing forms across these categories due to the effect that the presence or absence of political competition has. In conclusion I argue that the post-Soviet region provides little evidence to believe that political competition actually reduces corruption and collusion. However, some cases from the region show that successful anti-corruption campaigns are more likely where there is more political contestation.

Kyrgyzstan – A virtual narco-state?

Numerous myths have surrounded the drug trade in Central Asia over the past two decades. Analysts writing on the issue and the law enforcement structures of the respective countries often have no complete and accurate information about the scale of the trade, the different groups involved and the role of drugs-related money in politics. Generally there are two dominating views: the first considers Kyrgyzstan to be a virtual narco-state and overstates the involvement of politicians and police officials; the alternative underestimates the role of state representatives, describes the smuggling as more decentralised and chaotic and emphasises the role of organised crime gangs and radical Islamic organisations. Based on the interviews in the field conducted in January-March 2012, this paper analyses these alternative perspectives and the empirical evidence supporting these views. It highlights methodological problems relating to research on similar issues, elucidates networks of smuggling and their links with politics and reflects on complexities in addressing these challenges.

Radiological Smuggling and Uncontrolled Territories: The Case Of Georgia

The article focuses on radiological smuggling and its connection with uncontrolled territories, the “grey zones” that have emerged as important conduits for illicit contraband, including the trafficking of radioactive materials. The presence of “grey zones,” together with poor border security, weak law enforcement and corruption in government structures, are the most important regional factors that facilitate radiological smuggling. The paper documents the collaboration between criminals, politicians, military and security officers and entrepreneurs in this kind of illicit activity and argues that the fight against radiological smuggling has to shift its focus from technical issues to intelligence gathering and analysis.

Georgia's Break with the Past

Abstract:This paper looks at Georgia’s path to reform in 2004–2012. The author argues that the young, ideologically and structurally cohesive elite capitalized on the window of opportunity and implemented “big bang” reform in 2004–2008. As time passed, the new incumbents developed vested interests that became apparent with the reemergence of a state-business nexus reemerged in 2008–2012. During the Saakashvili administration, these interests undermined market competition, and elite networks used state power to control economic and political structures. Even though concerns over particularistic practices have remained, petty bribery has decreased substantially.

Popular Punitiveness? Punishment and Attitudes to Law in Post-Soviet Georgia

Abstract Georgia is the only country in the post-Soviet region where incarceration rates significantly grew in the 2000s. Then in 2013, the prison population was halved through a mass amnesty. Did this punitiveness and its sudden relaxation after 2012 impact attitudes to the law? We find that these attitudes remained negative regardless of levels of punitiveness. Furthermore, the outcomes of sentencing may be less important than procedures leading to sentencing. Procedural justice during both punitiveness and liberalisation was not assured. This may explain the persistence of negative attitudes to law. The Georgian case shows that politically-driven punitive turns or mass amnesties are unlikely to solve the problem of legal nihilism in the region.