Alexander Molchanov

Precarious Politics and Return Volatility

We examine how local and global political risks affect industry return volatility. Our central premise is that some industries are more sensitive to political events than others. We find that industries that are more dependent on trade, contract enforcement, and labor exhibit greater return volatility when local political risks are higher. Political uncertainty in countries of trading partners of trade-dependent industries similarly results in greater volatility. Volatility decomposition results indicate that while systematic volatility is associated with domestic political uncertainty, global political risks translate into larger idiosyncratic volatility. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.

Foreign Risk - Domestic Problem: Capital Allocation and Performance under Political Instability

We argue that firms with foreign operations misallocate capital and underperform when they face political instability abroad. We develop and test a dynamic model of firm capital allocation under foreign political instability. The model shows that as a political regime becomes less stable, independently of whether the regime becomes less business-friendly or more business-friendly, firms invest sub-optimally (firms either over-invest or under-invest), and their marginal qs diverge further from an optimal level. Using elections and textual analysis of local media during national elections, we construct a novel index of political instability. We find that U.S. firms and industries with a greater exposure to election-induced political instability experience disruptions of investment efficiency which lead to lower valuations and lower Total Factor Productivity. Therefore, international trade is a significant conduit of foreign political instability into U.S. markets.

Foreign Risk - Domestic Problem: Trade, Capital Allocation, and PerformanceUnder Political Uncertainty

We argue that international trade is a significant conduit of foreign political uncertainty into U.S. markets. We find that industries that export considerable shares of their output to countries with high political risk or countries that hold national elections in a given year experience lower total factor productivity growth, lower valuation, and worse accounting performance. The key channel of political uncertainty transmission is disruption of investment efficiency. Our results are not driven by economic risk or the quality of institutional environment of trading-partner countries, and they remain robust when we account for potential endogeneity of export flows.

Foreign Risk - Domestic Problem: Trade, Politics, and Capital Allocation

We argue that international trade is a significant conduit of foreign political uncertainty into U.S. markets. We find that industries that export considerable shares of their output to countries with high political risk or countries that hold national elections in a given year experience suboptimal investment efficiency, slower total factor productivity growth, lower valuation, and worse accounting performance. Our results are not driven by economic risk or the quality of institutional environment of trading-partner countries, and they remain robust when we account for potential endogeneity of export flows.

The 2008 Beijing Olympic Sponsorships: Value for Money?

Sports-related event sponsoring has rapidly grown into a key ingredient of the marketing communications mix. We use event study methodology to assess the net economic value of 2008 Beijing Olympic Games sponsorships. We find that investors judge the benefits that accrue to sponsoring companies to be commensurate with the expenses, as evidenced by insignificant announcement date abnormal returns. Furthermore, on the Games opening ceremony date the domestic sponsors’ share prices fall significantly while the international sponsors on average experience positive returns. The domestic firms’ sponsorship decision may have been based on national pride and emotional commitment, rather than on profit maximization.

Events and Price Adjustment Accuracy: Evidence from Post-IPO Market

We use the post-IPO market to examine this accuracy of price adjustment to new information. The unique setting of immediate aftermarket allows us to assess subject after the trading has just begun and investors possess little information about stock return properties. They are, therefore, likely to misinterpret firm-specific information in the immediate aftermarket. As time since the IPO elapses, investors accumulate more information, and price reaction to new events becomes more accurate. We show that the accuracy of price adjustment increases by 14% in the first year of trading for all events, and by as much as 26% for public events. We conclude that the incorporation of new information into stock prices becomes more accurate as stocks season.