Alexander Thomson

Trading places: The role of agents in international student recruitment from Africa

As state subsidies to higher education contract, the recruitment of international students is becoming a strategic priority for many UK universities. Academic roles are reconfigured as the commercialisation of higher education and the commodification of education services re-position the student as consumer, academic as entrepreneur, and university as ‘marketer’ (Slaughter and Rhoades 2009). Despite rapid growth in the number of students and universities using external third-party recruitment agents, little research has been undertaken on the work of agents and the relationships between agents, institutions and students. Drawing on a case study of one UK higher education institution conducted in May–June 2012, this paper considers the role and experiences of the principal actors in this economised relationship: educational consultants/recruitment agents operating in the sub-Saharan African market, university international officers (UK-based and offshore), faculty and international students. The paper considers the position and role of education brokers (within public and for-profit contexts) in the international higher education market. Whilst these actors pursue common activity in linking students with providers, they differ in terms of rationale and stance. Although internationalisation presents opportunities for enhanced revenue, questions of ‘value’ raise important educational and ethical issues for universities as they develop collaborative ventures in emerging markets.

U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa, 1948-1994

of the United States. Annual editions: 1963, 1974, 1985, 1990, 1993. Washington DC: U.S. GPO, 1963, 1974, 1984, 1990, 1993; and U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Survey of Current Business. 1956, 36(8), 19 and 23; 1961, 41(8), 22–23; 1966, 46(9), 34–35; 1972, 52(11), 30; 1977, 57(8), 44 and 50; 1984, 64(11), 24–25; 1986, 66(8), 70; and 1994, 74(8), 134. 9781403972279ts03.indd 11 10/17/2008 8:02:48 PM U. S . P O L I C Y T OWA R D S A PA RT H E I D S O U T H A F R I C A 12 The primary attraction of the South African market for U.S. transnational corporations was the returns they gained on their investments. These averaged 13.72 percent in the period between 1950 and 1990, for example, while average worldwide U.S. investment netted only 11.2 percent during this same period.33 A particularly strong area of the South African economy was its mining industry. It was a country that, in the words of one American corporate director, “makes U.S. mining companies’ mouths water.”34 In this sector, returns on investment consistently outperformed similar investments in the rest of the world. Money risked in the Republic produced an average return of 30 percent between 1950 and 1980, double the : gure made by U.S. mining companies in Latin America and the Caribbean, and quadruple the amount netted in Canada.35 Due to this pro: tability, whether in the mining sector or elsewhere, 57 percent of Fortune’s wealthiest 500 U.S. industrial companies could be found investing directly in the South African economy by 1980.36 The pro: ts that U.S. business could extract from the South African economy and the number of top U.S. : rms that enjoyed operating in this environment became a major consideration for administrations formulating foreign policy toward this country. Any form of punitive measures, designed to challenge Pretoria over its apartheid policy, risked damaging U.S. economic interests in this country, as well as exacting a political cost amongst corporate representatives at home. U.S. Interests and Human Rights in South Africa A major theme of U.S. foreign policy in the postwar years was the attempt of successive administrations to promote American values abroad. “There are those who will say that the liberation of humanity, the freedom of man and mind, is nothing but a dream. They are right. It is the American dream.”37 These words of Archibald MacLeish serve to highlight the liberal tradition that can be found at the very heart of U.S. society.38 It is a tradition that can be traced all the way back to the founding document of the United States. The 1776 Declaration of Independence states: “all men are created equal” with “certain unalienable rights,” who have the “right” and “duty” to throw oA “destructive” government. The United States wrote a constitution and Bill of Rights to enshrine these values in law. With such a strong domestic political tradition of liberty and equality, it is hardly surprising that these values should : nd their way into U.S. foreign policy. Dexter Perkins, in his study of the American Approach to Foreign Policy, argued that it is “fair to say that there is a highly moralistic ; avor to our diplomacy as compared with other nations.” He gives the example of President Woodrow Wilson’s belief, found in his Fourteen Points and the Versailles Treaty, that “The world must be made safe for democracy.”39 Indeed, similar rhetoric was repeated regularly throughout the twentieth century. President Franklin D. Roosevelt talked of “four freedoms” (the freedom of expression, religion, from economic privation, and fear of aggression); the United States, together with the United Kingdom, penned the Atlantic Charter during World War II advocating self-determination; 9781403972279ts03.indd 12 10/17/2008 8:02:48 PM A B A L A N C I N G AC T 13 and the Cold War found Washington DC consistently advocating the expansion of freedom and democracy throughout the world (whilst criticizing the authoritarianism of the Soviet Union). It is certainly the case that advocates of “realism” tempered the practical application of these beliefs in postwar U.S. foreign policy, but there is no denying that, in the words of Richard Cooper and Joseph Nye, “Neither politics nor morality really stops at the water’s edge. They just become more complicated . . . Given the nature of American political culture, there will always be a demand for moral expression in foreign policy.”40 Given this demand, the relationship between the United States and South Africa could never be a simple friendship between two states committed to the containment of communism and the development of a capitalist commerce. Apartheid prevented this. No amount of realist reasoning could ignore Pretoria’s audacious attempt at social engineering. As the postwar era progressed, the fact that black South Africans were being denied basic human rights increasingly poisoned relations between the two countries. The National Party in South Africa was elected to power in 1948. Over the next 40 years, practicing overt and legalized racism, this government attempted to separate the lives of black and white South Africans by means of parliamentary legislation and aggressive policing. Legislation prior to 1948 had already limited the land Africans could purchase and restricted them to certain types of labor, but apartheid was about consolidating this position and separating the population groups comprehensively. In a tidal wave of legislation during the late 1940s and early 1950s, marriage and sexual relations between individuals of diA erent race became illegal (1949 Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, followed by the 1950 Immorality Act); all South Africans were designated an oF cial racial identity (1950 Population Registration Act); population groups had their residence limited to allocated geographical zones (1950 Group Areas Act); black “citizens” were required to carry passes stating their oF cial racial categorization and outlining where they were permitted to be (the perversely named 1952 Abolition of Passes and Consolidation of Documents Act); the races were kept apart in public spaces and on public transport (1952 Reservation of Separate Amenities Act); the education system was segregated (1953 Bantu Education Act); and a security apparatus was put in place to enforce this social engineering (1950 Suppression of Communism Act). The objective of the Afrikaner government was to make it a crime for any meaningful relationship to exist between black and white individuals. Later, this “separate development” became even more comprehensive with “petty apartheid” moving on to “grand apartheid.” The objective now was to consolidate the territorial segregation of the races. The logical conclusion of grand apartheid would be that all Africans would live in their own independent states with their own governments. Such individuals would only be permitted to live and work in “white” South Africa if they were of bene: t to the white economy, and even then these people would be present as temporary guests only, having no political rights within white South Africa. The 1970 Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act, to this end, assigned all Africans a homeland. According to their ethnic origin, each of these individuals was required to live in a certain territory 9781403972279ts03.indd 13 10/17/2008 8:02:48 PM U. S . P O L I C Y T OWA R D S A PA RT H E I D S O U T H A F R I C A 14 de: ned by the government (unless gainfully employed in the white economy). Mass “removals” of whole communities accompanied this legislation. The theory of apartheid attempted to reconcile Afrikaner nationalist power with a notion of justice. The idea was that apartheid was giving black South Africans what the Afrikaner demanded for himor her-self: self-determination, and a right to develop their own culture. In reality, however, apartheid merely amounted to exploitation, hardship, and human rights abuses on a massive scale. Simple mathematics made apartheid impossible. An equal chance of development was not possible when 75 percent of the population was shoehorned into the homelands, which territorially amounted only to 13 percent of the Republic’s territory. Steve Biko, the black consciousness leader, called these homelands “sophisticated concentration camps.”41 Statistics support his view. The health comparisons are quite appalling. In 1950, white South Africans lived some 23 years longer than their African compatriots. At the other end of life, white infant mortality measured 3.6 percent compared to 20 percent for African children.42 Then there was the question of employment. The majority of work was to be found on the prime agricultural land and the urban industrial areas of prosperous white South Africa, forcing most African workers to live apart from their families for months at a time. Even then there was a color bar ensuring that whites earned, on average, up to twenty times more than Africans.43 As the full extent of the consequences of apartheid became known to the outside world, it became diF cult for the international community to ignore the South African government’s program of legislation. Made all the more stark by the obvious contrast between black and white levels of wealth and poverty, the systematic abuse and exploitation of the majority population by its own government put the issue of apartheid squarely on the agenda of world politics. Apartheid also had a particular resonance for the United States because of tensions in its own domestic racial relations. In a country where slavery had been a prominent factor in the : ghting of a civil war in the nineteenth century, and where African Americans were now mobilizing to claim their civil rights, U.S. oF cials had to be sensitive to the domestic rami: cations of how they dealt with South Africa. It should be noted that at the same time the National Party was pushing through its petty apartheid legislation, several southern stat

Bringing in the grassroots: transitional justice in Zimbabwe

Since 2008, the Government of Zimbabwe, the international community and non-governmental organisations have all advocated the need for transitional justice in Zimbabwe. Yet, few initiatives have emerged. This article suggests that local communities could be enabled to help fill this policy vacuum. The results of a pilot research project are presented, where 1,400 victims of violence were engaged. The data collected highlights a clear demand for justice at the grassroots, but an educational input is necessary and transitional justice capacity needs to be built. Currently unstructured and unorganised opinions on how to cope with past violence need to be translated into practical programmes of action. The article asserts that such leadership, stimulated from the grassroots, represents a potential strategy capable of challenging the existing policy vacuum. Even if this challenge is initially rebuffed, it is contended that such an input still remains vital for the longer term. An opportunity currently exists to deepen an understanding of transitional justice in Zimbabwe which will enable community groups to initiate and respond to Zimbabwes transitional justice processes when the national political environment becomes more receptive to this need.

Perceptions of value: assessing the agent/commission model of UK higher education recruitment in Africa

The UKs higher education relationship with Africa has changed in recent years. Past associations of developmental cooperation have been superseded by market-based student recruitment seeking income for UK universities. This paper is about assessing a form of recruitment that helps underpin this new relationship: the agent/commission model. It identifies the nature of this approach to recruitment, and the processes involved. The paper also asks who benefits from the agent/commission model. The research captured a ‘snapshot’ of opinion within a case study UK university, seeking the views of agents themselves and their service users. It was found that all these actors considered the work of agents to be of value. There are certainly flaws in the agent/commission model, and wider societal implications for African states and economies, but it is suggested that agents should be given more credit for the work that they do than is presently reflected in the current literature.

A more effective constructive engagement: US policy towards South Africa after the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986

As it stands, much of the historical account of US foreign policy towards South Africa ends in the mid-1980s. Little academic literature looks beyond 1986, and the imposition of US sanctions underwritten by the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA). This article offers an analysis of US policy in the wake of the CAAA, covering the 1986–1994 period. It charts the adaption of the Reagan Administrations constructive engagement policy, and then considers how Washington DC engaged South Africas negotiation process and this countrys transition to a new non-racial democratic state. In contrast to US policy prior the CAAA, Washington DCs post-sanctions strategy proved effective. By building a working relationship across South African society, US diplomats were able to play a useful role in apartheids endgame. The article does caution, however, that the impact of this US assistance can be overstated, as has occurred in diplomatic memoirs. It is argued that this foreign policy netted a significant but minor contribution.

The Diplomacy of Impasse: the Carter Administration and Apartheid South Africa

This article seeks to explain the diplomatic impasse that developed between the United States and South Africa during later 1970s. Although the Carter Administrations foreign policy towards Pretoria was more confrontational than its predecessors, it failed to bring South Africa to account over apartheid. The critical rhetoric and diplomatic symbolism used against the Republic was intensified, yet Carter continued to reject the use of punitive economic sanctions. Instead, the United States supported the notion of an international corporate presence in the Republic, regarding such business contacts as a force for change. It is argued that this dichotomy between a short-term strategy of confrontation and a longer-term strategy of continued economic engagement ultimately undermined Carters South Africa policy. Exploiting the contradictory and confused signals emanating from Washington DC, the Republics government chose to simply weather Carters political storm, and a diplomatic stalemate ensued.

The Annapurna Conservation Area Project : tourists as agents of development and environmental management in the high Himalaya?

The Annapurna Conservation Area Project (ACAP) strives to blend environmental and cultural conservation with economic development in the Nepali Himalayas. At the heart of ACAPs strategy, is a programme of sustainable tourism. This paper seeks to contribute to a broader assessment of ACAPs work. It focuses on the part one specific constituency ? foreign trekkers ? play in helping deliver the projects goals. Based on interviews conducted with western tourists in the region, this paper assesses the extent to which trekkers are engaged with the ACAP mission. The research found that, although foreign tourists, on the whole, acted in an environmentally responsible manner whilst enjoying their time in the Annapurna region, they were not particularly aware of the work that ACAP undertook. This paper suggests that if policy adjustments are made by ACAP, and awareness levels raised, then trekkers could play an increased role as agents for development and conservation in the high Himalaya.

Balancing interests beyond the water's edge: Identifying the key interests that determined US foreign policy towards apartheid South Africa

Abstract The United States, in formulating a foreign policy towards apartheid South Africa, attempted to balance a number of conflicting interests. These interests are divided into three categories (strategic, economic and human rights interests), and examined in turn. Initially, strategic considerations were to the fore. South Africa was judged by Washington DC to be a reliable ally on the tip of a continent vulnerable to Communist expansion. Strategic minerals and this countrys location at a ‘choke point’ on the Cape sea route were arguments often aired. The Union, and then the Republic, of South Africa was also a profitable market for US commercial interests. No US foreign policy addressing apartheid could ignore this economic relationship. There remained, however, the question of apartheid. No simple relationship of friendship, based on shared interests, could exist between these governments as long as this programme of social engineering endured. Eventually, in the mid-1980s, the US would impose punitive sanctions against the Republic, with human rights interests finally superseding strategic and economic concerns.