Alexander Tsesis

The Thirteenth Amendment and American Freedom: A Legal History

1 Slavery and Its Social Penetration A. Slavery and the Founding Generation B. Slavery as a Cultural Institution C. Centrality of Slavery in Sectional Con?icts 2 On the Road to Rati?cation A. Emancipation by Statute and Proclamation B. Congressional Debates on the Thirteenth Amendments Meaning C. The Immediate Aftermath of Liberation 1. What Sort of Freedom? 2. Legal Protections 3 End of Radical Ideals and Judicial Response A. Political Abandonment of Reconstruction B. Supreme Court Abandonment of Reconstruction 1. Early Opinions 2. Relinquishment of Thirteenth Amendment Principles C. A Ray of Hope: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer D. Summing Up 4 Summing Up and Looking Ahead 5 Theoretical Foundation A. Abolition and Natural Rights B. Thirteenth Amendment and Universal Liberty 6 Thirteenth Amendment and Constitutional Rights A. Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment FreedomsB. Source for Substantive Freedom C. Commerce Clause and Thirteenth Amendment 7 Contemporary Settings A. Confederate Symbols 1. National Symbolism 2. Peculiarities of Confederate Symbols 3. Revival of Confederate Symbolism 4. Federal Authority B. Hate Crimes C. Contemporary Instances of Peonage Conclusion

Hate speech, volition, and neurology.

This is a peer review essay of Gail B. Murrow and Richard Murrow, A Hypothetical Neurological Association between Dehumanization and Human Rights Abuses, J. Law & BIOSCI. (2015).In our essay we agree with the authors arguments demonstrating the harmful effects of hate speech. We find their arguments to be erudite, and deeply thought out. However, their scientific premises rely on significant extrapolations from neurological theories on manifold human behavior that weaken overall analysis. Neurological reactions to hate speech are less informative than sociological ones demonstrating the manifold motivations behind dehumanizing rhetoric.

Campus Antisemitic Speech and the First Amendment

In the face of mounting campus anti-Semitic incidents in the U.S., college and university administrators are left with the quandary of how to prevent anti-social behavior without running afoul of the First Amendment protections of free speech. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Virginia v. Black, opens a door to resolving that dilemma. The First Amendment protection of free speech is one of the most fundamental constitutional provisions. Speech is often regarded to be the most fundamental right to a democracy, but the United States Supreme Court has never been regarded to be an absolute. There are already a variety of legitimate limitations on expression that do not run afoul of the First Amendment, these include defamation, copyright, and fighting words laws. Any statutory or administrative responses to antisemitic speech on campus must be carefully crafted to avoid running afoul of the First Amendment. Recent United States Supreme Court precedent demonstrate the constitutionality of laws prohibiting the use of hate symbols, like cross burning, to intentionally intimidation others. College administrators can use the Court guidelines to develop a policy punishing the use of intimidating symbols -- such as swastikas and Hamas flags -- on campus. The standard for proving that the speaker meant to intimidate should be the same objective, reasonable person standard applied to public defamation cases. This standard of proof will relieve the difficulty of proving intent, while requiring objective evidence that the speaker used a hate symbol or historic antisemitic trope to intimidate others using university facilities or grounds.