Alexandra D'Arcy

Frequency and variation in the community grammar: Tracking a new change through the generations

In this article we perform a quantitative analysis of verbs of quotation in a cohesive speech community. The incoming form be like overshadows all other quotative verbs among speakers under 30. This telescoped rate of change provides an opportunity to investigate the actuation problem as well as to probe the underlying mechanism of change in the contrasting variable grammars across generations. Multivariate analyses of factors conditioning be like (content of the quote, grammatical person, sex) reveal stability in the significance of constraints, however the rankings and relative strengths reveal subtle ongoing changes in the system. Interpreting these in sociocultural context, we suggest that be like is an innovation that arose out of a preexisting niche in the grammar. It accelerated during the 1980s due to its preppy associations, later specializing as a marker of narrative present. In accounting for these findings, we are led to contrast generational and communal change and to question what it means to ‘participate’ in linguistic change. The first author gratefully acknowledges the support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) for grant #410-2003-0005 “Linguistic changes in Canada entering the 21st century” and the Research Opportunities Program at the University of Toronto (ROP). Special thanks are owed to the research assistants on these projects who have been instrumental in transcribing, and in some cases extracting, the data: Stephanie Cali, Jonille Clemente, Derek Denis, Louis Filipe, Kevin Galloway, Marion Hau, Matthew King, Megan Lyon, Marion Macdonald, Sonja Molfenter, Jenny Seppanen, Karina von Stedingk, Muhammad Velji, Jessica Wertman, Lina Yang, and Stacy Yeh. An earlier version of this article was presented at NWAVE 33 (Ann Arbor, October 2004), where feedback from our audience was instrumental. We are also grateful to Nathalie Dion and Shana Poplack for their discerning comments on an earlier written version.

LIKE AND LANGUAGE IDEOLOGY: DISENTANGLING FACT FROM FICTION

The selective attention paid to the language of adolescents has led to the enduring belief that young people are ruining the language and that, as a consequence, the language is degenerating. One feature of contemporary vernaculars that is often held up as exemplification of these ideological principles is like, the “much-deplored interjection . . . that peppers the talk of so many of the unpliant young these days” (Wilson 1987, 92). There is, in fact, an intricate lore surrounding like. It includes the idea that like is meaningless, that women say it more than men do, and that it is an Americanism, introduced by the Valley Girls. This article systematically addresses ideologically driven myths about the uses and users of like. Drawing on empirical data, it seeks to disentangle the facts from the fiction that has been cultivated in the general social consciousness. It is argued that most beliefs about like are either false (e.g., meaninglessness, Valley Girl creationism) or too broad to reflect any coherent reality (e.g., the role of women). However, in examining individual beliefs about like, it becomes clear that each contributes to the perpetuation of others in important and nontrivial ways. Throughout the inhabited world, in all times and under every circumstance, the myths of man have flourished. [Campbell 1949, 13] Campbell was referring to traditional mythology, yet there is a link here to language ideology, since it is likely that myths about language have flourished for as long as language has functioned in social contexts, that is, from the beginning. Modern examples include the belief that right-handed people are more proficient linguistically than left-handed people, that double negatives are illogical, that women talk too much, that King Arthur spoke English, and most notably, that the media/America/teenagers are ruining the language. This final grouping belongs to the overarching and timeless gestalt that the language is degenerating.1 Ideologies such as these are widespread, virtually intractable, and so deeply ingrained as part of one’s cultural heritage that they often cease to be recognized for the myths they are (see also Bauer and Trudgill 1998, xvi). As a result, they tend to be accepted, generally unquestioningly, as fact. Like and Language Ideology 387 From a linguistic perspective, the veracity of individual language myths is often dubious if not fictional. But like traditional myths, language myths reflect the society that produces them, and for this reason they offer important insights into cultural attitudes and mores. For example, ongoing language change is often met with derision. This may reflect a general unease with change in any form, but when considering language, it typically results in the characterization of new forms as sloppy, lazy, ignorant, or vulgar. These are, of course, social rather than linguistic notions, but the recurrence of such comments underlies the poignancy of the sentiment. A particularly interesting aspect of the social context of language change is that from a diachronic perspective, the cumulative effects of change are unexceptional, yet in synchronic time individual changes are synonymous with degradation. As Ogden Nash writes in “Laments for a Dying Language” (cited in Aitchison 1981, 17): “Farewell, farewell to my beloved language / Once English, now a vile orangutanguage.” Inevitably, language change is always most advanced among younger speakers. A peak in the progress of change among adolescent cohorts is a recurrent finding of apparent-time studies (Labov 2001, 454; Chambers 2003, 223; Tagiamonte and D’Arcy 2007b) and has come to be seen as a criterial feature of ongoing change (Labov 2001, 455). Because this peak typically occurs among speakers between the ages of 13 and 17, it is not a coincidence that children and adolescents are singled out as the primary offenders in the linguistic arena. The proposed solution to the “language misuse” of younger generations is often more rigid teaching standards, a suggestion that undoubtedly draws on another folk belief: that children learn the fundamentals of the spoken language at school. As James Milroy (1998, 63) points out, since children have already acquired the basic spoken grammar by the time they arrive at school, complaints about the way young people speak are not about language ability; they are about language variety. And as just discussed, it is adolescent varieties that are at the forefront of ongoing linguistic changes. One feature of contemporary vernaculars currently subject to widespread condemnation is like when used in the ways highlighted in (1). 1. a. He was like, “Yeah so I’m going out with Clara now.” And then she sounded really disappointed; she was like, “Yeah she’s really smart.” So then he was like, “I kind of feel bad, but then again, I don’t.” [N/f/18]2 b. He looks like he’s like twelve or like eight. [2/f/16] c. Like if you’re doing your undergrad, no big deal. Like it’s not that bad, but like I’m in a professional school. I want to be a professional. [N/f/26] d. Like the first hour I was like totally fine, like I wasn’t like drunk. [3/ m/18] american speech 82.4 (2007) 388 As with all forms involved in change, like is associated in popular culture with adolescents and young adults, and perceptual investigations by Dailey-O’Cain (2000) and Buchstaller (2006b) have documented the strength of this belief. Older speakers seldom claim to use like themselves, characterizing its occurrence in their vernaculars as rare or nonexistent, while younger age groups stipulate to its regularity in their own speech (Dailey-O’Cain 2000, 69). There is an intricate and multifaceted lore surrounding like. The belief that younger speakers alone are responsible for the propagation of like constitutes just one part of the complex. This conglomerate of beliefs is the focus of the current analysis. As with other language ideologies, those surrounding like have been cultivated by popular consensus, but such consensus is not necessarily informed by empirical truth(s). Thus, in examining beliefs about like, my intention is to disentangle fact from fiction. Many of the commonly held beliefs about like will be shown to be false, while others are simply too broad to reflect any coherent reality. In such cases, certain aspects of the myth may bear merit, though as encapsulated the belief itself remains unmotivated. However, in examining individual beliefs about like, it becomes clear that each contributes to the perpetuation of others in important and nontrivial ways to create a unified whole. THE LIKE LANGUAGE MYTH Entwined with the multitude of beliefs about like are a number of subjective reactions to the use of this form. These include the feeling that it is an exasperating tic and that it makes those who use it seem less educated, intelligent, or interesting (Dailey-O’Cain 2000, 73; Buchstaller 2006b, 371). Indeed, general attitudes toward like are overtly negative (De Quincey 1840–41, 224; Jespersen 1942, 417; Schourup 1983, 29; Dailey-O’Cain 2000, 69–70). It is not the aim of this article to address or to change such attitudes, though such consequences may inadvertently result from the discussion. Rather, the focus is centered on those aspects of the myth that can be dispelled objectively, drawing on empirical data. Thus, the beliefs to be examined are those listed here, for which there is evidence of the ways in which the folklore either reflects or obscures actual usage: Like is just like, that is, there is one like that is recycled repeatedly. Like is meaningless; it simply signals a lack of articulacy. Women say like more than men do. Like began with the Valley Girls. Only young people, and adolescents in particular, use like. Like can be used anywhere in a sentence. Like and Language Ideology 389

The diachrony of quotation: Evidence from New Zealand English

Much recent work on English direct quotation assumes that the system is undergoing rapid and large-scale change via the emergence of “innovative” forms such as be like . This view is supported by synchronic evidence, but the dearth of diachronic evidence forces reconsideration of this assumption. Drawing on data representing the full history of New Zealand English, this paper presents a variationist analysis of the quotative system, providing a continuous link between present-day quotation and that of the late 19th century. It reveals a longitudinal and multifaceted trajectory of change, resulting in a highly constrained variable grammar in which language-internal contextual factors have evolved and specialized, the effects of which reverberate throughout the sector.

LEXICAL REPLACEMENT AND THE LIKE(S)

This article investigates the function of like when it occurs in numerically quantified contexts. The pragmatic literature espouses two distinct positions on this topic, though neither has yet been tested empirically. On the one hand, like is argued to be a genuine pragmatic particle, indistinguishable from other discourse uses of this lexeme. Alternatively, others argue that in numerical contexts like carries propositional content and in this respect, it functions adverbially. Quantitative analysis from a large corpus of contemporary English suggests the latter: like is an approximative adverb, alternating with the more traditional form about in the spoken vernacular. However, the perspective afforded by apparent time reveals rapid, ongoing change whereby the traditional adverb is in the process of being ousted. The pattern of change therefore suggests lexical replacement. Among older speakers the preferred form for approximation is about, while among younger speakers the form of choice is like. These results thus indicate that what has previously been treated as a single entity, discourse like, is in fact two distinct forms: like the adverb and like the particle. Of the lexemes that make up the English language, one of the most ubiquitous and multifunctional is like. Among its traditional “grammatical” functions, it may be a lexical verb (1a), a noun (1b), a preposition (1c), a conjunction (1d), or a suffix (1e).1 1. a. I don’t really like her that much. [2/m/f/12]2 b. He grew up with the likes of the company of all great fighters. [N/TM/ m/60] c. It looks like a snail; it just is a snail. [I/@/f/19] d. It felt like everything had dropped away. [I/TM/m/40] e. He said I went “(mumbling)” or something like stroke-like. [N/H/ f/31] However, like also performs a number of discourse functions. It concatenates, for example, with be as a quotative complementizer, as in (2). As well, it encodes textual information as a discourse marker, shown in (3), where it occurs clause-initially and relates the current utterance to prior discourse (see, for example, Fraser 1988, 1990; Brinton 1996, 2006; Traugott 1995; also Schiffrin 1987 for discourse deictics). Finally, like functions interpersonally as a discourse particle, situated within the clause and signaling american speech 81.4 (2006) 340 pragmatic information (e.g., the speaker’s epistemic stance to the form of the utterance; see Schourup 1983; Andersen 1997, 2001). The particle is exemplified in (4). 2. a. They’re like, “Okay we’ll pay you now.” [I/¢/m/21] b. He’s like, “You have to calm down.” [2/i/f/19] c. It skinned us. It was like, “(whoosh).” [3/P/f/16] 3. a. Like my uncle’s sister married this guy, George-J. [N/‡/m/85] b. You-know, like the people were very, very friendly. [N/V/f/60] c. Like one of my cats meows so much, ’cause like he’s really picky and everything. [3/V/m/11] 4. a. I remember there being like a solar eclipse. [I/~/f/29] b. It like went like seamlessly into it. [N/p/m/20] c. She’s like really smart. [2/m/f/12] A characteristic trait of discourse features is their lack of lexical meaning (Östman 1982; Schiffrin 1986). This is one of the reasons why they are notoriously difficult to categorize, gloss, or translate (Brinton 1996; see also Hasund 2003). This aspect of their semantic profile arguably derives from the grammaticalization process, which in the initial stages is characterized by pragmatic strengthening, a development that is generally followed by semantic bleaching or weakening (Hopper and Traugott 2003; Brinton 2006). As both a marker and a particle, like meets the semantic emptiness criterion, imbued instead with pragmatic meaning(s). However, in the highly circumscribed context of quantifiers and numerical expressions in particular, as in (5), like has been argued to carry propositional content, denoting an approximative meaning (Schourup 1983; Underhill 1988; Meehan 1991; Jucker and Smith 1998; Biber et al. 1999). 5. a. It could have taken you all day to go like thirty miles. [N/©/f/76] b. You-know, it was like a hundred and four [degrees]. [N/w/m/84] c. They were like eighteen years old; they were kids. [N/s/f/52] Historically, the use of like in quantified contexts can be traced to the early nineteenth century. However, as the examples in (6) demonstrate, its content in this frame was not originally approximative. Example (6a) is drawn from Scottish dialect data, where Grant and Dixon (1921, 142) describe its function as an adverb of probability. This same function is present in (6b), from the Oxford English Dictionary (OED2), where it can be glossed as ‘more like(ly)’. 6. a. The three mile diminished into like a mile and a bittock. [Sir Walter Scott, Guy Mannering; or, The Astrologer (Edinburgh: Ballantyne, 1815), c.1] Lexical Replacement and the Like(s) 341 b. No more at midway to heaven, but liker, midway to the pit. [George Meredith, Odes in Contribution History (Westminster: Constable, 1898), 29] In fact, even though like has embodied approximative meanings for well over four centuries in some of its uses as a preposition and conjunction (Meehan 1991; OED2), the OED2 contains no examples in which like can be construed as carrying this meaning before quantified phrases. Nonetheless, contemporary data indicate that like is used in this way not only among younger speakers in London (Andersen 2001, 277), where it reportedly occurs quite frequently, but also among older speakers of regional varieties across the United Kingdom, as seen in (7). Crucially, here, as in (5), like occupies the same syntactic slot as approximative adverbs such as about and roughly, occurring to the immediate left of the quantifier. 7. a. I was only like forty-one or forty-two or something aye. [AYR/J/f/86] b. It used to be frae Cumnock to Ayr was like eighteen miles. [AYR/c/ f/78] c. Whenever I was wee, whenever I was like ten or twelve year old. [PVG/ d/f/62] d. That’ll have been like thirty-five year I would say. [MPT/z/m/78] [data from Tagliamonte forthcoming] The germane question is, is the use of like in measurable, numeric contexts part of its function as a pragmatic particle, or is this an entirely different form? That is, is the like in (5) the same like that we find in (8)? 8. a. There was all like dirt roads and all that. [N/©/f/76] b. It lasted like through the night into the next morning. [N/w/m/84] c. I’ve discovered new reading material which is like so interesting. [N/s/ f/52] Andersen (2001, 260) argues yes, when like is used as it is in (5), it is a genuine pragmatic device because it signals to the listener that “the utterance contains a loose interpretation of the speaker’s thought.” In other words, whereas adverbs such as roughly, approximately, and about operate at the propositional level, like operates metalinguistically, that is, pragmatically. This argumentation implies that like is not functionally equivalent to the adverbials; they are not lexical variants. At the same time, however, Andersen does acknowledge that like can affect truth conditions in quantified contexts (see also Jucker and Smith 1998; Siegel 2002), pointing out that its omission can affect the propositional meaning of the utterance. This means that in these contexts, like is not in fact distinct from other truth-conditional approximative adverbs. Consider, for example, the data (9) and (10). american speech 81.4 (2006) 342 9. a. This is about four years later, so I guess I’ve been back for about eight years now. [N/fi/m/37] b. This is four years later, so I guess I’ve been back for eight years now. 10. a. If there was a lot of traffic, like twenty-five minutes maximum. And usually it takes like fifteen minutes to get there. [3/U/f/12] b. If there was a lot of traffic, twenty-five minutes maximum. And usually it takes fifteen minutes to get there. Neither the amended utterance in (9b) nor the one in (10b) is propositionally equivalent to (9a) and (10a). The use of about in (9) and like in (10) signals that the time spans are approximations and that their literal interpretation is not intended. In contrast, the statements in which these forms are omitted are to be interpreted verbatim. The ability of like to affect truth conditions in this way is problematic for the pragmatic argument, since one of the primary definitions of discourse features is their inability to interfere with semantics (Hölker 1991; Jucker 1993; Fraser 1996; see also Siegel 2002). Despite the contrasting views concerning the function of like in quantified contexts that we find in the literature, the question of its grammatical status as either a particle or an adverb has never been tested empirically. This investigation confronts the issue directly, seeking evidence that supports either the pragmatic argument, whereby like in (5) is functionally equivalent to like in (8), or the adverbial argument, whereby like in quantified contexts is better accounted for in a model of lexical change. If like does function as an approximative adverb in such contexts, then this instantiation is distinct from the discourse particle in (8). Based on a quantitative analysis of data from a large corpus of contemporary English, this latter view is the one argued for here. The discussion is organized as follows. I first detail the methodological considerations, outlining the corpus and the method used in the current study. I then present the results and interpret the findings in light of previous research on lexical replacement. Finally, I summarize the results and address further issues raised in the analysis, such as the role of synonymy and the implications for future research.

Prestige, accommodation, and the legacy of relative who

This article presents a quantitative variationist analysis of the English restrictive relative pronouns. However, where previous research has largely focused on language-internal explanations for variant choice, the focus here is the social meaning of this erstwhile syntactic variable. We uncover rich sociolinguistic embedding of the relative pronouns in standard, urban speech. The only productive wh- form is who , which continues to pattern as a prestige form centuries after its linguistic specialization as a human subject relative. This legacy of prestige is reflected not only in the social characteristics of those with whom it is associated, but also in the patterns of accommodation that are visible in its use. These findings simultaneously demonstrate the tenacious nature of social meaning and the enduring effects of grammatical ideology, both of which influence pronoun choice in the context of face-to-face interaction. (Restrictive relative pronouns, who , change from above, age-grading, prestige, accommodation) *

Social work and linguistic systems: Marking possession in Canadian English

The system of stative possession has been subject to variation and change since at least the Early Modern period, with have got rising in frequency in British and Antipodean varieties of English. In Canadian English, as represented by data from the largest city, Toronto, have predominates. Nonetheless, the full set of constraints previously reported for this variable are operative, corroborating the longitudinal maintenance of linguistic factors across time and space (Kroch, 1989). At the same time, variation among possessive forms is conditioned by robust sociolinguistic patterns. Have is correlated with education and with female speakers, whereas less-educated men favor have got and got . Such findings demonstrate that the domination of one form or another in a variable system can be the result of historical accident, in this case a founder effect at a particular point in history, and that the social value of forms is a product of local circumstances at the time of change.

Not always variable: Probing the vernacular grammar

Written and spoken language are known to differ substantially (Biber, 1988; 1995; Biber, Johansson, Leech, Conrad, & Finegan, 1999). Standard written language is highly uniform and governed by prescription, whereas the vernacular is most revealing of structured heterogeneity (Weinreich, Labov, & Herzog, 1968). We focus on four English morphosyntactic variables that problematize assumptions about the nature of variation in the vernacular: the genitive, the comparative, the dative, and relative pronouns. Each is characterized in casual speech by functional divides that reflect discrete configurations of variant use. After detailing the patterning of these variables in speech, we explore a characteristic arguably shared by each: its historical pathway into the language, where analogy and prestige were powerful motivations for variant choice. We suggest that this combination of systemic and social factors contributed to the nature of these variables in the vernacular grammar. Furthermore, we advocate for greater scrutiny of written and spoken data and the outcomes of change from above and below within each register. The type of innovation and its trajectory may affect the nature of the emergent variable grammar.

Discourse-Pragmatic Variation in Context

Like is a ubiquitous feature of English with a deep history in the language, exhibiting regular and constrained variable grammars over time. This volume explores the various contexts of like , each of which contributes to the reality of contemporary vernaculars: its historical context, its developmental context, its social context, and its ideological context. The final chapter examines the ways in which these contexts overlap and inform current understanding of acquisition, structure, change, and embedding. The volume also features an extensive appendix, containing numerous examples of like in its pragmatic functions from a range of English corpora, both diachronic and synchronic. The volume will be of interest to students and scholars of English historical linguistics, grammaticalization, language variation and change, discourse-pragmatics and the interface of these fields with formal linguistic theory.