Alexandros Xenakis
Edinburgh Napier University
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Featured researches published by Alexandros Xenakis.
hawaii international conference on system sciences | 2004
Alexandros Xenakis; Ann Macintosh
In this paper, we explore the security related procedures that are required for the successful development and deployment of electronic voting in legally-binding government elections. Initiating our research on the theoretical basis, which justifies the necessity for security in deploying electronic elections, we further explore the question of who and what should be safeguarded in the course of the e-electoral process. Based on our research study, we suggest that security in e-voting has two aspects, the technical and the procedural one. It is recognised that from the technical perspective further research is necessary to ensure full and complete voter authentication and voting security to enable an e-election. However, we argue that e-voting security can also be enhanced through providing procedural security measures at specific points in the e-electoral process. Our analysis of the Electoral Commissions evaluation reports on the 2002 UK local government e-voting pilots identified past cases of procedural security issues. Interviews and observations conducted during the 2003 UK e-voting pilots further confirmed these issues. We have established the need to further explore the re-design of the electoral process and consider procedural security as primarily applicable to agent-related processes. In view of the increased complexity of the e-voting processes, which can involve multi-channel e-voting options, and the increase in the number of agents involved in the administration of e-elections, we relate procedural security to the need for transparent allocation of responsibilities among the different agents. In concluding we argue that existing procedural security should be enhanced, that there is a clear need for better monitoring of compliance to such procedures and that further security procedures need to be put in place at specific points in the e-election process.
electronic government | 2004
Alexandros Xenakis; Ann Macintosh
Recent e-voting pilots in the UK have demonstrated that there are different factors to be considered in the administration of electronic voting. In this paper we present a framework for the evaluation of the level of difficulty involved in the deployment of e-voting schemes. Taking the public authority’s point of view we identify eight factors, which increase the overall difficulty of e-voting administration. We suggest that as new e-voting technologies and associated activities are introduced in the re-design of the electoral process, its administration becomes increasingly more difficult. We provide examples explaining the practical use of the suggested framework based on some of the 2003 UK e-voting pilots. In concluding we refer to existing limitations of the framework and suggest future work, which could expand its analytical value.
electronic government | 2003
Alexandros Xenakis; Ann Macintosh
In this paper, a process approach to the investigation of e-voting is adopted defining the process stages and the agents involved in each stage. The technologies used in the delivery of electronic voting, the locations related to the different stages of the process and the main legal issues involved have been identified in the existing literature. These five elements, namely agents, legal issues, process stages, technologies used and locations involved, form the framework of this taxonomy. The aim of the taxonomy is to provide an insight into the legal issues emerging according to the different combined relationships between these five elements, and provide a tool for the identification of legal accountabilities amongst the different agents involved.
international conference on digital information management | 2008
Euripidis N. Loukis; Alexandros Xenakis
Although many countries today exploit the potential of ICT for supporting citizenspsila engagement in the democratic processes and invest significant amounts of money in e-participation, have do not pay corresponding attention in evaluating these efforts. In this direction, this paper describes a framework that has been developed for evaluating e-participation pilots in the legislation development processes of parliaments. The proposed framework is based on a) the objectives and basic characteristics of the dasiatraditionalpsila public participation, the e-participation and the legislation development processes, and b) the existing frameworks for the evaluation of information systems, e-participation and traditional public participation. It includes four evaluation perspectives: process, system, context and outcomes evaluation, each of them being analysed into a number of evaluation criteria/variables; also, it includes the assessment of associations between the assessed values of outcomes evaluation factors on one hand and the assessed values of the context, process and system evaluation factors on the other, in order to identify the reasons of positive of negative outcomes.
Journal of E-government | 2004
Alexandros Xenakis; Ann Macintosh
Abstract This paper documents the major issues arising from the UK local authority e-voting pilots. The formal evaluation reports on all the UK e-voting pilots conducted in 2002, which provided actual case data. Identified issues are categorised into four high-level areas: legal, social, political, and voter education. Each category is presented and the major issues discussed. Verification of the initial findings is achieved through a web site review of the Local Authority web sites involved in the 2003 e-voting pilots.
electronic government | 2004
Alexandros Xenakis; Ann Macintosh
In this paper we identify the high-level requirements for a G2G collaborative platform to support the deployment of e-voting in the UK context. After referring to the stakeholders involved in the deployment of e-voting projects we identify the government agents that the platform would serve. Based on the process description followed in earlier pilots we define the role of each government agent and subsequently suggest four areas of collaborative support. Accordingly we refer to aspects of knowledge sharing that the system could foster. In concluding we suggest not only the usefulness of such a collaborative system for government agents but also its prospective benefit in supporting transparency and public scrutiny of e-voting.
Social Science Computer Review | 2005
Alexandros Xenakis; Ann Macintosh
This article explores the issue of trust in the context of the e-electoral process based on the experience gained through the 2002 and 2003 U.K. e-voting pilots. In our analysis, we adopt a process-stage approach to e-elections. We identify the different agents involved in the e-electoral process so as to indicate who generates trust and to whom they convey their trust during the evolution of the process. We then describe agent responsibilities for each of the process stages to identify the issues that require trust between agents. Thus we indicate why trust was needed to support the deployment of the pilots. Based on our analysis we describe cases where “inherited trust” was indirectly conveyed between agents. Finally, because trust in e-voting is primarily needed from the electorate, we propose four levels of social acceptance for the e-voting process and discuss some trust-building arguments for prospective public administration e-transaction environments.
International Journal of Public Administration | 2008
Alexandros Xenakis; Ann Macintosh
Abstract In this paper, we explore the issue of security of e-voting procedures, given the established limitations of technology. We examine security in the context of the increased complexity of multiple-channel voting, provided by a multiplicity of agents involved in the administration of e-elections. In the course of interviews and observations conducted during the 2003 UK local government legally binding e-voting pilots we have identified several procedural security gaps and related procedural security measures. We adopt an existing framework of e-voting security objectives and use it as an analytical tool to indicate the importance of the procedural aspect of security. In concluding we extend the use of procedural security measures to the need for transparency, trust and public confidence towards the newly introduced voting practices.
electronic government | 2003
Alexandros Xenakis; Ann Macintosh
In this paper we argue that knowledge management is required to improve transparency in e-government processes and to support their social acceptance. We present the main information flows and knowledge management issues identified in the case of the UK Local Authority elections 2nd May 2002 electronic voting pilots. We provide a comprehensive view of the major areas of information flows either provided to or produced by the main agents (namely voters, administration staff, local authorities and commercial suppliers) involved in the projects. In doing so we highlight the issues of security, data protection, and transparency of information flows and their relation to the social acceptance of electronically services elections.
trust and privacy in digital business | 2004
Alexandros Xenakis; Ann Macintosh
This paper explores the issue of trust in information and communication technologies (ICT) mediated public administration transactional environments. This is particularly important in the case of the e-electoral process since it is necessary to maintain the existing level of citizen trust for current electoral arrangements, in the newly introduced e-voting processes. In our analysis we adopt a process stage approach of e-elections. We identify the different agents involved in the e-electoral process so as to indicate who generate trust and to whom they convey their trust during the evolution of the process. We then describe agent responsibilities for each of the process stages in order to indicate the issues on which some agents trust others. Thus we indicate why trust was needed to support the deployment of electronic voting. Finally, based on our analysis we describe cases where “inherited trust” was indirectly conveyed between agents.