Alexis H. Kunz

Wertorientierte Unternehmenssteuerung und das Problem des ungeduldigen Managers

Der Artikel untersucht, wie eine wertorientierte Unternehmenssteuerung auf Bereichsebene ausgestaltet werden kann, wenn der Manager über unbekannte Zeitpräferenzen verfügt. Ziel ist es, ein Anreizsystem so zu wählen, dass Zielkongruenz zwischen Zentrale und Manager herbeigeführt wird. Es zeigt sich, dass Bemessungsgrundlagen, die nur auf Cash Flows basieren, im allgemeinen zu unflexibel sind, um das Problem des ungeduldigen Managers zu lösen. Im Gegensatz dazu gewährleisten Umperiodisierungen von Einund Auszahlungen die notwendige Flexibilität und damit die Möglichkeit, das Verhalten des Managers von seinen eigenen Zeitpräferenzen abzukoppeln.

Kapitalmarktorientierte Unternehmenspublizität und der Informationsverbund zwischen in- und externem Rechnungswesen

SummaryRecent revisions in German accounting laws are heavily promoting the informational function of financial accounting systems. Until now possibly detrimental ramifications of such regulations for a firm’s internal governance structures have not been investigated. We develop a game-theoretical model which explicitly accounts for information transfers between a firm’s financial accounting system and its management accounting system. The subsequent analysis identifies conditions under which a firm’s internal allocation processes are either detrimentally or beneficially affected when federal laws force a firm to credibly report finer information to the capital markets.

The Enforcement of Say on Pay Votes and CEOs’ Investment Incentives

We investigate experimentally how the enforcement of negative say on pay (SoP) votes affects a CEO’s investment incentives, the level and structure of executive compensation, and firm performance. We operationalize the board’s discretion in response to a no-vote via three levels of SoP enforcement. Boards in our experiment either (i) neglect the vote and never adjust CEO compensation (no enforcement), (ii) enforce the vote and always adjust CEO compensation in accord with the vote (unconditional enforcement), or (iii) enforce the vote and adjust CEO compensation only when the firm performs poorly (conditional enforcement). We find that the unconditional enforcement of no-votes is an effective instrument to curb rents of powerful CEOs. However, it also creates a hold-up problem that undermines CEOs’ investment incentives and firm profit. Conversely, the conditional enforcement of SoP votes eliminates the hold-up problem and improves the pay-for-performance relation, but has no effect on firm profit. We also find that the non-enforcement of SoP votes increases CEO compensation without affecting firm profit. These negative effects of an unconditional enforcement of SoP votes remain robust when participants interact repeatedly and/or when shareholders communicate “acceptable” bonus levels to CEOs. Our results inform regulators and boards of directors on the externalities and the potential cost that may arise when negative SoP votes are enforced mechanically.∗We are grateful for valuable comments and suggestions received from John Antonakis, Oliver Duerr, Miles Gietzmann, Lorenz Goette, Florian Hoos, Peter Kroos, Rafael Lalive, Louis Pinto, Andrew Yim, Christian Zehnder, and seminar participants at Cass Business School, London, the 2010 EIASMWorkshop on Accounting and Economics in Vienna, and the EAA 2011 in Rome. Financial aid by research grant HEC-260309 is greatly acknowledged. †Prof. Dr. Robert F. Göx, Chair of Managerial Accounting, University of Fribourg, Bd. de Pérolles 90, CH-1700 Fribourg, Switzerland, Tel.: +41 26 300 8310/8311, Fax +41 26 300 9659, email: robert.goex@unifr.ch. ‡Frédéric Imhof, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, Internef 510, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland, Tel: +41 21 692 34 58, email: frederic.imhof@unil.ch. §Prof. Dr. Alexis H. Kunz, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, Internef 523, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland, Tel: +41 21 692 34 62, email: alexis.kunz@unil.ch.