Alfonso Del Giudice

Italian Open End Mutual Fund Costs

We investigate the costs investors incur when they hold shares of Italian open end mutual funds. The overall explicit cost can range from less than 50 to well over 250 basis points in terms of assets under management. Nevertheless, mutual funds investors seem to be almost unaware of the importance of costs and tend to focus mainly on the net return when making their investment decisions. We measure the overall costs of a large sample of mutual funds managed by Italian intermediaries in the period 2000-2003 and also evaluate the determinants of cost efficiencies for the period 2000-2003.

Sovereign Wealth Funds and Target Firms: Does ‘Networking’ Matter?

This paper analyses the impact of Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) equity investments on target firm operating performance. Metrics from network analysis are used to investigate whether target firms, that are better connected each other by means of the SWF investments, extract benefits from this network in terms of higher operating performance. The study dataset is made up of 507 SWF acquisition deals worldwide in the time span between 2000 and 2011. Findings indicate that more central firms in the SWF-target firm network enjoybetter operating performance. In addition, the analysis points out that operating performance is higher: (i) the larger the stake acquired, (ii) if the investment is direct and domestic, (iii) if the SWF is run by a politician. Overall, the results reveal that only when a target firm can benefit from the network of both political andcommercial connections created by SWFs, do they enjoy these benefits and gain in operating performance.

Social Impact Bonds and Institutional Investors: An Empirical Analysis of a Complicated Relationship

Over the past 8 years, social impact bonds (SIBs) have attracted increasing attention from scholars, policy makers, and investors. Notwithstanding good intentions and policy makers’ enthusiasm, SIBs have failed to attract significant private capital. Considering the SIBs issued worldwide until December 2017, we look for the critical success factors of SIB funding by investigating both the financial and contractual characteristics of SIB contracts. We find that institutional investors are more likely to participate in an SIB funding when there are fewer agency problems.

Risk Incentives, CEO Age, and Hedging Strategy

This study tests if managerial preferences explain how firms hedge, i.e. how they choose between linear contracts and put options, and if they finance these hedging positions with cash-on-hand or by selling upside (call options). Using hand-collected data on derivative portfolios we characterize hedging strategies in the oil and gas industry. Our main findings are that the likelihood of being a hedger increases with CEO age, and that near-retirement CEOs prefer linear hedging instruments. This suggests that these CEOs place a premium on the additional certainty that comes with linear strategies. The predictions of the managerial risk incentives-theory of hedging strategy, according to which managers with convex compensation schemes would avoid hedging strategies that cap upside potential, find no support in the data. Our findings on managerial preferences add to previous literature emphasizing non-linear exposures and financial status as determinants of hedging strategy.