Ali Riaz

God Willing: The Politics and Ideology of Islamism in Bangladesh

“God willing, we shall form the next government,” declared Khaleda Zia, former prime minister and then leader of the opposition at a rally in the port city of Chittagong on April 4, 2000 almost eighteen months ahead of the general elections in Bangladesh. Pointing her finger to the leaders of her four-party alliance sitting on the dais, Khaleda Zia declared firmly that “we have united to protect the nation, our hard earned independence and Islam.” Present on the dais were Golam Azam, the Ameer (chief) of the largest Islamist party, Jaamat-iIslami; Azizul Haq, who claims himself a Shaikhul Hadit (meaning an interpreter of Prophet Muhammad’s words) and a leader of a militant Islamist organization called Islami Oikya Jote; and former military dictator General H. M Ershad, who was previously convicted on graft charges and indicted on a number of other corruption related matters. “Representatives of 66 percent of the people are here,” Zia told the meeting.

Traditional Institutions as Tools of Political Islam in Bangladesh

Since 1991, salish (village arbitration) and fatwa (religious edict) have become common features of Bangladesh society, especially in rural areas. Women and non-governmental development organizations (NGOs) have been subjected to fatwas delivered through a traditional social institution called salish. This article examines this phenomenon and its relationship to the rise of Islam as political ideology and increasing strengths of Islamist parties in Bangladesh. This article challenges existing interpretations that persecution of women through salish and fatwa is a reaction of the rural community against the modernization process; that fatwas represent an important tool in the backlash of traditional elites against the impoverished rural women; and that the actions of the rural mullahs do not have any political links. The article shows, with several case studies, that use of salish and fatwa as tools of subjection of women and development organizations reflect an effort to utilize traditional local institutions to further particular interpretations of behavior and of the rights of individuals under Islam, and that this interpretation is intrinsically linked to the Islamists’ agenda.

The State-Society Relationship and Political Conflicts in Nepal (1768-2005)

For nearly a decade, from the declaration of Maoist ‘peoples war’ in January 1996 to the formation of new alliance for the restoration of democracy in December 2005, Nepal has experienced a three-way power struggle between Maoist insurgents who want a republic based on egalitarian principles, elected politicians who want an unfettered role in policy making and a monarch bent upon a return to pre-democratic Nepal. This article attempts to explain this crisis from a structural-historical perspective and argues that fundamental to the understanding of this crisis is the state-society relationship. The article contends that the complex use of the constructed Hindu identity to provide cultural legitimacy to the monarchical political order, that has existed since the inception of the state in the 18th century to the democratic revolution in 1990, has contributed to the political alienation of substantial segment of ethnically, socially and economically marginalized population from the Nepalese state. By examining complex interactions among political and economic factors, this article further contends that the unrepresentative process of state formation and the tradition of governance have contributed to the alienation of the citizens from the state and created a political space for violent rebellion and state terrorism undermining fragile but emerging democratic institutions.

The new Islamist public sphere in Bangladesh

Historically, Bangladesh has a strong and culturally embedded vibrant public sphere. The Bangladeshi public sphere always consists of a multiplicity of publics. The idea of public sphere in Bangladesh was based on the idea of secular rationality or religious neutrality. However, the situation is changing; attempts are being made to create an Islamist public sphere. This paper highlights two examples of this effort to foster the Islamization of the public sphere: production of Islamist fiction and founding womens discussion groups. It argues that the emerging Islamist public sphere in Bangladesh only subscribes to one interpretation of Islam and that the traditional authorities are now being replaced by the Islamist interpretation advanced by ideologues. It further argues that the absence of reference to local syncretistic traditions in the new Islamist discourse makes its authenticity suspect.

Two trends in analyzing the causes of military rule in Bangladesh

AbstractFor more than fifteen of the twenty-five years since its independence in 1971, Bangladesh has been dominated by either direct military rule and martial law or military rule in civilian guis...

Bangladeshi Militants: What Do We Know?

ABSTRACT Although militant groups have been present in Bangladesh since the 1990s, the country catapulted to international media attention on July 1, 2016, after an attack on a café in the upscale neighborhood of the capital Dhaka. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack which killed 29 people, mostly foreigners. The attack came in the wake of a series of attacks on religious and ethnic minorities, foreigners, liberal activists, authors, and publishers by both an AQIS affiliate and ISIS. The government denied the existence of militant groups tied to international terrorist organizations. Despite these developments and instances of Bangladeshis joining the ISIS in Iraq and Syria, there has been very little in-depth discussion about who these militants are and what is driving Bangladeshis to militancy. This article addresses this lacuna. This paper examines the common traits of alleged Bangladeshi militants and explores the factors of radicalization. Drawing on media reports of the profiles of the alleged militants, between July 2014 and June 2015, and between July 2016 and August 2017, the article finds that most of the Bangladeshi militants are young, educated males increasingly coming from well-off families. We have also found evidence that four factors—social relationships, use of the Internet, personal crises, and external relations—appear most frequently in the narratives of Bangladeshi militants.

MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE: THE NARRATIVES OF SECULARISM AND ISLAM IN BANGLADESH

This paper challenges the popular perception that Bangladesh has become the latest battleground between secularism and Islam and problematizes the simplified understanding and the binarization of religion and secularism in Bangladesh. It argues that extant discussions on the one hand overlooks the historical background of the interactions of religion and while on the other hand, it ignores the extant multiplicity of both Islamic practices and the understanding of secularism. The author calls for a nuanced understanding of the complex historical and contemporaneous developments regarding relationships between religion and politics.