Ali S. Khan

Public Health Assessment of Potential Biological Terrorism Agents

As part of a Congressional initiative begun in 1999 to upgrade national public health capabilities for response to acts of biological terrorism, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) was designated the lead agency for overall public health planning. A Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Office has been formed to help target several areas for initial preparedness activities, including planning, improved surveillance and epidemiologic capabilities, rapid laboratory diagnostics, enhanced communications, and medical therapeutics stockpiling (1). To focus these preparedness efforts, however, the biological agents towards which the efforts should be targeted had to first be formally identified and placed in priority order. Many biological agents can cause illness in humans, but not all are capable of affecting public health and medical infrastructures on a large scale. The military has formally assessed multiple agents for their strategic usefulness on the battlefield (2). In addition, the Working Group on Civilian Biodefense, using an expert panel consensus-based process, has identified several biological agents as potential high-impact agents against civilian populations (3–7). To guide national public health bioterrorism preparedness and response efforts, a method was sought for assessing potential biological threat agents that would provide a reviewable, reproducible means for standardized evaluations of these threats. In June 1999, a meeting of national experts was convened to 1) review potential general criteria for selecting the biological agents that pose the greatest threats to civilians and 2) review lists of previously identified biological threat agents and apply these criteria to identify which should be evaluated further and prioritized for public health preparedness efforts. This report outlines the overall selection and prioritization process used to determine the biological agents for public health preparedness activities. Identifying these priority agents will help facilitate coordinated planning efforts among federal agencies, state and local emergency response and public health agencies, and the medical community.

The Reemergence of Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1995

In May 1995, an international team characterized and contained an outbreak of Ebola hemorrhagic fever (EHF) in Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo. Active surveillance was instituted using several methods, including house-to-house search, review of hospital and dispensary logs, interview of health care personnel, retrospective contact tracing, and direct follow-up of suspect cases. In the field, a clinical case was defined as fever and hemorrhagic signs, fever plus contact with a case-patient, or fever plus at least 3 of 10 symptoms. A total of 315 cases of EHF, with an 81% case fatality, were identified, excluding 10 clinical cases with negative laboratory results. The earliest documented case-patient had onset on 6 January, and the last case-patient died on 16 July. Eighty cases (25%) occurred among health care workers. Two individuals may have been the source of infection for >50 cases. The outbreak was terminated by the initiation of barrier-nursing techniques, health education efforts, and rapid identification of cases.

Rift Valley Fever Epidemic in Saudi Arabia: Epidemiological, Clinical, and Laboratory Characteristics

This cohort descriptive study summarizes the epidemiological, clinical, and laboratory characteristics of the Rift Valley fever (RVF) epidemic that occurred in Saudi Arabia from 26 August 2000 through 22 September 2001. A total of 886 cases were reported. Of 834 reported cases for which laboratory results were available, 81.9% were laboratory confirmed, of which 51.1% were positive for only RVF immunoglobulin M, 35.7% were positive for only RVF antigen, and 13.2% were positive for both. The mean age (+/- standard deviation) was 46.9+/-19.4 years, and the ratio of male to female patients was 4:1. Clinical and laboratory features included fever (92.6% of patients), nausea (59.4%), vomiting (52.6%), abdominal pain (38.0%), diarrhea (22.1%), jaundice (18.1%), neurological manifestations (17.1%), hemorrhagic manifestations (7.1%), vision loss or scotomas (1.5%), elevated liver enzyme levels (98%), elevated lactate dehydrogenase level (60.2%), thrombocytopenia (38.4%), leukopenia (39.7%), renal impairment or failure (27.8%), elevated creatine kinase level (27.3%), and severe anemia (15.1%). The mortality rate was 13.9%. Bleeding, neurological manifestations, and jaundice were independently associated with a high mortality rate. Patients with leukopenia had significantly a lower mortality rate than did those with a normal or high leukocyte count (2.3% vs. 27.9%; odds ratio, 0.09; 95% confidence interval, 0.01-0.63).

Transmission of Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever: A Study of Risk Factors in Family Members, Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1995

The surviving members of 27 households in which someone had been infected with Ebola virus were interviewed in order to define the modes of transmission of Ebola hemorrhagic fever (EHF). Of 173 household contacts of the primary cases, 28 (16%) developed EHF. All secondary cases had direct physical contact with the ill person (rate ratio [RR], undefined; P < .001), and among those with direct contact, exposure to body fluids conferred additional risk (RR, 3.6; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.9-6.8). After adjusting for direct contact and exposure to body fluids, adult family members, those who touched the cadaver, and those who were exposed during the late hospital phase were at additional risk. None of the 78 household members who had no physical contact with the case during the clinical illness were infected (upper 95% CI, 4%). EHF is transmitted principally by direct physical contact with an ill person or their body fluids during the later stages of illness.

Clinical Virology of Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever (EHF): Virus, Virus Antigen, and IgG and IgM Antibody Findings among EHF Patients in Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1995

Ebola hemorrhagic fever (EHF) patients treated at Kikwit General Hospital during the 1995 outbreak were tested for viral antigen, IgG and IgM antibody, and infectious virus. Viral antigen could be detected in virtually all patients during the acute phase of illness, while antibody was not always detectable before death. Virus was also isolated from patients during the course of their febrile illness, but attempts to quantify virus in Vero E6 cells by standard plaque assay were often unsuccessful. IgG and IgM antibody appeared at approximately the same time after disease onset (8-10 days), but IgM persisted for a much shorter period among the surviving convalescent patients. IgG antibody was detectable in surviving patients through about 2 years after onset, the latest time that samples were obtained. Detection of Ebola virus antigens or virus isolation appears to be the most reliable means of diagnosis for patients with suspected acute EHF, since patients with this often-fatal disease (80% mortality) may not develop detectable antibodies before death.

Clinical, Virologic, and Immunologic Follow-Up of Convalescent Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever Patients and Their Household Contacts, Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo

A cohort of convalescent Ebola hemorrhagic fever (EHF) patients and their household contacts (HHCs) were studied prospectively to determine if convalescent body fluids contain Ebola virus and if secondary transmission occurs during convalescence. Twenty-nine EHF convalescents and 152 HHCs were monitored for up to 21 months. Blood specimens were obtained and symptom information was collected from convalescents and their HHCs; other body fluid specimens were also obtained from convalescents. Arthralgias and myalgia were reported significantly more often by convalescents than HHCs. Evidence of Ebola virus was detected by reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction in semen specimens up to 91 days after disease onset; however, these and all other non-blood body fluids tested negative by virus isolation. Among 81 initially antibody negative HHCs, none became antibody positive. Blood specimens of 5 HHCs not identified as EHF patients were initially antibody positive. No direct evidence of convalescent-to-HHC transmission of EHF was found, although the semen of convalescents may be infectious. The existence of initially antibody-positive HHCs suggests that mild cases of Ebola virus infection occurred and that the full extent of the EHF epidemic was probably underestimated.

Reye's Syndrome in the United States from 1981 through 1997

BACKGROUND Reyes syndrome is characterized by encephalopathy and fatty degeneration of the liver, usually after influenza or varicella. Beginning in 1980, warnings were issued about the use of salicylates in children with those viral infections because of the risk of Reyes syndrome. METHODS To describe the pattern of Reyes syndrome in the United States, characteristics of the patients, and risk factors for poor outcomes, we analyzed national surveillance data collected from December 1980 through November 1997. The surveillance system is based on voluntary reporting with the use of a standard case-report form. RESULTS From December 1980 through November 1997 (surveillance years 1981 through 1997), 1207 cases of Reyes syndrome were reported in patients less than 18 years of age. Among those for whom data on race and sex were available, 93 percent were white and 52 percent were girls. The number of reported cases of Reyes syndrome declined sharply after the association of Reyes syndrome with aspirin was reported. After a peak of 555 cases in children reported in 1980, there have been no more than 36 cases per year since 1987. Antecedent illnesses were reported in 93 percent of the children, and detectable blood salicylate levels in 82 percent. The overall case fatality rate was 31 percent. The case fatality rate was highest in children under five years of age (relative risk, 1.8; 95 percent confidence interval, 1.5 to 2.1) and in those with a serum ammonia level above 45 microg per deciliter (26 micromol per liter) (relative risk, 3.4; 95 percent confidence interval, 1.9 to 6.2). CONCLUSIONS Since 1980, when the association between Reyes syndrome and the use of aspirin during varicella or influenza-like illness was first reported, there has been a sharp decline in the number of infants and children reported to have Reyes syndrome. Because Reyes syndrome is now very rare, any infant or child suspected of having this disorder should undergo extensive investigation to rule out the treatable inborn metabolic disorders that can mimic Reyes syndrome.

An Outbreak of Rift Valley Fever in Northeastern Kenya, 1997-98

In December 1997, 170 hemorrhagic fever-associated deaths were reported in Carissa District, Kenya. Laboratory testing identified evidence of acute Rift Valley fever virus (RVFV). Of the 171 persons enrolled in a cross-sectional study, 31(18%) were anti-RVFV immunoglobulin (Ig) M positive. An age-adjusted IgM antibody prevalence of 14% was estimated for the district. We estimate approximately 27,500 infections occurred in Garissa District, making this the largest recorded outbreak of RVFV in East Africa. In multivariate analysis, contact with sheep body fluids and sheltering livestock in one’s home were significantly associated with infection. Direct contact with animals, particularly contact with sheep body fluids, was the most important modifiable risk factor for RVFV infection. Public education during epizootics may reduce human illness and deaths associated with future outbreaks.

Genetic Analysis of Viruses Associated with Emergence of Rift Valley Fever in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, 2000-01

The first confirmed Rift Valley fever outbreak outside Africa was reported in September 2000, in the Arabian Peninsula. As of February 2001, a total of 884 hospitalized patients were identified in Saudi Arabia, with 124 deaths. In Yemen, 1,087 cases occurred, with 121 deaths. Laboratory diagnosis of Rift Valley fever virus (RVFV) infections included virus genetic detection and characterization of clinical specimens by reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction, in addition to serologic tests and virus isolation. Genetic analysis of selected regions of virus S, M, and L RNA genome segments indicated little genetic variation among the viruses associated with disease. The Saudi Arabia and Yemen viruses were almost identical to those associated with earlier RVF epidemics in East Africa. Analysis of S, M, and L RNA genome segment sequence differences showed similar phylogenetic relationships among these viruses, indicating that genetic reassortment did not play an important role in the emergence of this virus in the Arabian Peninsula. These results are consistent with the recent introduction of RVFV into the Arabian Peninsula from East Africa.

Outbreak of human monkeypox, Democratic Republic of Congo, 1996 to 1997.

Human monkeypox is a zoonotic smallpox-like disease caused by an orthopoxvirus of interhuman transmissibility too low to sustain spread in susceptible populations. In February 1997, 88 cases of febrile pustular rash were identified for the previous 12 months in 12 villages of the Katako-Kombe Health Zone, Democratic Republic of Congo (attack rate = 22 per 1,000; case-fatality rate = 3.7%). Seven were active cases confirmed by virus isolation. Orthopoxvirus- neutralizing antibodies were detected in 54% of 72 patients who provided serum and 25% of 59 wild-caught animals, mainly squirrels. Hemagglutination-inhibition assays and Western blotting detected antibodies in 68% and 73% of patients, respectively. Vaccinia vaccination, which protects against monkeypox, ceased by 1983 after global smallpox eradication, leading to an increase in the proportion of susceptible people.