Alícia Adserà

Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness

Politics remains prominently absent in the literature showing that higher levels of trade integration lead to a larger public sector. As openness increases, the state, acting as a social planner, adopts a salient role to minimize the risks of economic integration and secure social peace. Given the highly redistributive nature of both trade and fiscal policies, we claim, however, that the interaction of the international economy and domestic politics leads to three distinct political-economic equilibria. First, nations may embrace protectionist policies to shore up the welfare of key domestic sectorsÑwithout engaging, therefore, in substantial public spending. Second, to maintain trade openness in democracies, policymakers develop compensation policies to muster the support of the losers of openness. Finally, given the tax burden of public compensation, pro-free trade sectors may impose an authoritarian regime to exclude (instead of buying off) their opponents. After formally stating the conditions under which each regime emerges, we test the model on a panel data of around sixty-five developing and developed nations in the period 1950Ð1990 and explore its implications through a set of key historical cases drawn from the last two centuries.

Vanishing Children: From High Unemployment to Low Fertility in Developed Countries

During the last four decades the average total fertility rate in OECD countries witnessed a dramatic fall: from 2.9 in 1960 to 2.0 in 1975 and then to 1.6 in the late 1990s (reaching 1.25 in Southern Europe). With the exception of the United States, all advanced countries now have fertility rates well below the replacement rate of 2.1. In the absence of either sharp changes in fertility behavior or large inflows of immigrants, their populations are set to shrink, particularly in Europe. Still, within this generalized fall, cross-national differences in fertility behavior have remained significant. By 2000, fertility rates ranged from 2.1 in the United States and over 1.8 in France and Norway to less than 1.3 in Greece, Italy, and Spain. Most standard accounts attribute the fall in fertility rates to a shift in personal preferences over the size of the family due to either changes in religious beliefs or growing female participation in the labor market. Yet, even though the ideal number of children for men and women 20–34 years old has declined, it is fairly similar across the European Union at around the replacement level of 2.1 (Eurostat, 2001). Hence, the sources of cross-national variation in fertility behavior must lie somewhere else. As women have joined the labor force, fertility rates have adjusted as a function of the institutional structures that shape the job market and determine its long-run unemployment rate. Exploiting the considerable variation of fertility rates and employment conditions across industrial countries, this paper shows that the current demographic transition is ultimately associated with the constraints of the labor market where fertility decisions are taken.

The Role of Language in Shaping International Migration

This paper examines the importance of language in international migration from multiple angles by studying the role of linguistic proximity, widely spoken languages, linguistic enclaves and language-based immigration policy requirements. To this aim we collect a unique dataset on immigration flows and stocks in 30 OECD destinations from all world countries over the period 1980-2010, and construct a set of linguistic proximity measures. Migration rates increase with linguistic proximity and with English at destination. Softer linguistic requirements for naturalization and larger linguistic communities at destination encourage more migrants to move. Linguistic proximity matters less when local linguistic network are larger.

Marital fertility and religion in Spain, 1985 and 1999

Since the transition to democracy in Spain in 1975, both total fertility and rates of church attendance of Catholics have dropped dramatically. In this study the 1985 and 1999 Spanish Fertility Surveys were used to investigate whether the significance of religion for fertility behaviour—current family size and the spacing of births—changed between the survey dates. In the 1985 survey, family size was similar for those Catholics who actively participated in religious activities and those who, though nominally Catholic, were not active participants. By 1999, the family size of the latter was lower and comparable to the family size of those without religious affiliation. These findings accord with the declines in both church attendance and fertility in Spain. The small groups of Protestants and Muslims had the highest fertility. Women in inter-faith unions had relatively low fertility.

History and Coordination Failure

An extensive literature discusses the existence of a virtuous circle of expectations that might lead communities to Pareto-superior states among multiple potential equilibria. It is generally accepted that such multiplicity stems fundamentally from the presence of positive agglomeration externalities. We examine a two-sector model in this class and look for intertemporal perfect foresight equilibria. It turns out that under some plausible conditions, positive externalities must coexist with external diseconomies elsewhere in the model, for there to exist equilibria that break free of historical initial conditions. Our main distinguishing assumption is that the positive agglomeration externalities appear with a time lag (that can be made vanishingly small). Then, in the absence of external diseconomies elsewhere, the long-run behaviour of the economy resembles that predicted by myopic adjustment. This finding is independent of the degree of forward-looking behavior exhibited by the agents.

Fertility Changes in Latin America in the Context of Economic Uncertainty

We explored the relation between fertility and the business cycle in Latin America. First, we used aggregate data on fertility rates and economic performance for 18 countries. We then studied these same associations in the transitions to first, second, and third births with DHS individual data for ten countries. The results show that in general, childbearing declined during economic downturns. The decline was mainly associated with increasing unemployment rather than slowdowns in the growth of gross domestic product, although there was a positive relationship between first-birth rates and growth. While periods of unemployment may be a good time to have children because opportunity costs are lower, in fact childbearing was reduced or postponed, especially among the most recent cohorts and among urban and more educated women. The finding is consistent with the contention that, during this particular period in Latin America, income effects were dominant.

Sectoral spillovers and the price of land: a cost analysis

If firms and workers are free to move within a country, they will choose to locate in areas where local attributes enhance their productivity. In equilibrium, however, differences in local productivity should be offset by higher local prices. In this paper, I estimates both local sectoral cost functions in the panel of US states for 1969-1992 and across MSAs in 1990, and rent and wage hedonic equations for individual households and workers to study, first, what determines different productivity adavatages across areas and, second, the extent to which productivity gains from local attributes vary across sectors.

Must we choose? European unemployment, American inequality, and the impact of education and labor market institutions

In the last fifteen years two equilibria have arisen in the advaced world. On the one hand, wage dispersion has widened in those countries where unemployment has remained low (with cyclical variation). On the other hand, wherever income inequality has remained unchaged, unemployment has shot upwards. To account for there distinct patterns, a combination of current theories - focusing separately on either technological and trade shocks or institutional arrangements - is required.

Marital Fertility and Religion: Recent Changes in Spain

Since the onset of democracy in 1975, both total fertility and Mass attendance rates in Spain have dropped dramatically. I use the 1985 and 1999 Spanish Fertility Surveys to study whether the significance of religion in fertility behavior – both in family size and in the spacing of births – has changed. While in the 1985 SFS family size was similar among practicing and non-practicing Catholics, practicing Catholics portray significantly higher fertility during recent years. In the context of lower church participation, religiosity has acquired a more relevant meaning for demographic behavior. Among the youngest generation, non-practicing Catholics behave as those without affiliation. The small group of Protestants and Muslims has the highest fertility and interfaith unions are less fertile.

Factors influencing the fertility choices of child immigrants in Canada

We analysed the fertility of women who migrated to Canada before reaching age 19, using the 20 per cent sample of the Canadian censuses from 1991 to 2006. Fertility increases with age at immigration, and is particularly high for those immigrating in late adolescence. This pattern prevails regardless of the country of origin, and of whether the mother tongue of the migrants was an official language in Canada. The fertility of those for whom it was an official language is always lower on average than of those for whom it was not, but there does not seem to be a critical age at which the fertility of the former and the latter starts to diverge. Formal education has an effect: the fertility of immigrants who arrived in Canada at any age before adulthood and who were or became college graduates is similar to that of their native peers. An appendix to this paper is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00324728.2013.802007