Alison Ledgerwood

Flexibility Now, Consistency Later: Psychological Distance and Construal Shape Evaluative Responding

Researchers have long been interested in understanding the conditions under which evaluations will be more or less consistent or context-dependent. The current research explores this issue by asking when stability or flexibility in evaluative responding would be most useful. Integrating construal level theory with research suggesting that variability in the mental representation of an attitude object can produce fluctuations in evaluative responding, we propose a functional relationship between distance and evaluative flexibility. Because individuals construe psychologically proximal objects more concretely, evaluations of proximal objects will tend to incorporate unique information from the current social context, promoting context-specific responses. Conversely, because more distal objects are construed more abstractly, evaluations of distal objects will be less context-dependent. Consistent with this reasoning, the results of 4 studies suggest that when individuals mentally construe an attitude object concretely, either because it is psychologically close or because they have been led to adopt a concrete mindset, their evaluations flexibly incorporate the views of an incidental stranger. However, when individuals think about the same issue more abstractly, their evaluations are less susceptible to incidental social influence and instead reflect their previously reported ideological values. These findings suggest that there are ways of thinking that will tend to produce more or less variability in mental representation across contexts, which in turn shapes evaluative consistency. Connections to shared reality, conformity, and attitude function are discussed.

Group-Identity Completion and the Symbolic Value of Property

Building on symbolic self-completion theory, we conceptualize group identity as a goal toward which group members strive, using material symbols of that identity. We report four studies showing that the value placed on such material symbols (e.g., a building) depends on commitment to group identity, the extent to which a symbol can be used to represent in-group identity, and situational variability in goal strength induced through group-identity affirmation or threat. Our results suggest that property derives value from its capacity to serve as an effective means in the pursuit of group-identity goals. Implications for inter-group conflict are discussed.

The trade-off between accuracy and precision in latent variable models of mediation processes.

Social psychologists place high importance on understanding mechanisms and frequently employ mediation analyses to shed light on the process underlying an effect. Such analyses can be conducted with observed variables (e.g., a typical regression approach) or latent variables (e.g., a structural equation modeling approach), and choosing between these methods can be a more complex and consequential decision than researchers often realize. The present article adds to the literature on mediation by examining the relative trade-off between accuracy and precision in latent versus observed variable modeling. Whereas past work has shown that latent variable models tend to produce more accurate estimates, we demonstrate that this increase in accuracy comes at the cost of increased standard errors and reduced power, and examine this relative trade-off both theoretically and empirically in a typical 3-variable mediation model across varying levels of effect size and reliability. We discuss implications for social psychologists seeking to uncover mediating variables and provide 3 practical recommendations for maximizing both accuracy and precision in mediation analyses.

Short, Sweet, and Problematic? The Rise of the Short Report in Psychological Science

Our field has witnessed a rapid increase in the appeal and prevalence of the short report format over the last two decades. In this article, we discuss both the benefits and drawbacks of the trend toward shorter and faster publications. Although the short report format can help us cope with ever-increasing time constraints; ease the burden on hiring, promotion, and tenure committees; speed the publication of our findings; and promote the dissemination of research beyond the borders of our discipline, it can also exacerbate problems with publication bias and selective reporting, decrease theoretical integration within our science, and risk overemphasizing colorful effects relative to basic processes. In the face of these challenges, we believe it is essential to find ways to preserve the advantages of the short-and-fast approach while minimizing its disadvantages and while acknowledging the complementary and critical importance of longer articles in advancing the field.

The Effects of Psychological Distance on Abstraction: Two Meta-Analyses

Psychological distance and abstraction both represent key variables of considerable interest to researchers across cognitive, social, and developmental psychology. Moreover, largely inspired by construal level theory, numerous experiments across multiple fields have now connected these 2 constructs, examining how psychological distance affects the level of abstraction at which people mentally represent the world around them. The time is clearly ripe for a quantitative synthesis to shed light on the relation between these constructs and investigate potential moderators. To this end, we conducted 2 meta-analyses of research examining the effects of psychological distance on abstraction and its downstream consequences. Across 106 papers containing a total of 267 experiments, our results showed a reliable and medium-sized effect of psychological distance on both level of abstraction in mental representation and the downstream consequences of abstraction. Importantly, these effects replicate across time, researchers, and settings. Our analyses also identified several key moderators, including the size of the difference in distance between 2 levels of a temporal distance manipulation and the dependent variables capacity to tap processing of both abstract and concrete features (rather than only one or the other). We discuss theoretical and methodological implications, and highlight promising avenues for future research.

Flexibility and Consistency in Evaluative Responding: The Function of Construal Level

Abstract This chapter explores the issue of evaluative consistency and context-dependence by considering when stability or flexibility in evaluative responding would be most useful for the social organism. We propose that cues about distance functionally shape evaluations to flexibly incorporate information from their current context when individuals are acting on proximal stimuli, but to transcend these immediate details when acting on distal stimuli. In this chapter, we review research within and beyond the attitude domain that has helped to shed light on issues of evaluative consistency, and then build on this research to describe the proposed link between distance and evaluative consistency in more detail. We suggest that construal level provides a cognitive mechanism by which distance can regulate evaluative consistency, and describe both past research that can be reinterpreted in this light as well as more recent research that provides some direct support for our approach. We conclude by discussing implications for shared reality and social influence.

The Social Side of Abstraction Psychological Distance Enhances Conformity to Group Norms

Intuition suggests that a distanced or abstract thinker should be immune to social influence, and on its surface, the current literature could seem to support this view. The present research builds on recent theorizing to suggest a different possibility. Drawing on the notion that psychological distance regulates the extent to which evaluations incorporate context-specific or context-independent information, we suggest that psychological distance should actually increase susceptibility to sources of social influence that tend to be consistently encountered across contexts, such as group norms. Consistent with this hypothesis, two studies showed that psychological distance and abstraction increased conformity to group opinion and that this effect persisted in a novel voting-booth paradigm in which participants believed their voting behavior was both anonymous and consequential. We discuss implications of these findings for understanding the social side of abstraction as well as the conditions under which different types of social influence are likely to be most influential.

Introduction to the Special Section on Advancing Our Methods and Practices

Psychological science is in the midst of a sea change. Over the last few years, our field’s confidence in the status quo has been shaken by a number of largely unrelated events that happened to coincide—Jonah Lehrer’s (2010) widely read New Yorker article on the effects of publication bias in science, Bem’s (2011) controversial paper on precognition, a rising concern about direct replication, the Stapel fraud case (Tilburg University, 2011), and the publication of several troubling critiques of current practices in research and publishing (e.g., Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011; Vul, Harris, Winkielman, & Pashler, 2009). Although the ensuing crisis of confidence was by no means the first that psychology has faced (see e.g., Rosenthal & Rubin, 1978; Sears, 1986; Wicker, 1969), this one seems to have resonated more widely and more deeply. The convergence of events within our field was situated within a broader context of similar issues emerging across a range of scientific disciplines, from cancer research to genetics to neuroscience (e.g., Begley & Ellis, 2012; Button et al., 2013; Fanelli, 2012; Ioannidis, 2005; Moonesinghe, Khoury, & Janssens, 2007). Meanwhile, online communication, media attention, and a series of conference symposia and journal issues kept the critiques and concerns front and center. The first wave of responses to the sense of crisis understandably focused on problems—many of which had been raised before and even repeatedly (Cohen, 1992; Greenwald, 1975; Maxwell, 2004; Rosenthal, 1979)—but which in this new context seemed more urgently and insistently to demand the field’s consideration. A chorus of critiques focused our attention on issues of publication bias, underpowered studies, replication, flashy findings, and questionable research practices (e.g., Bakker, van Dijk, & Wicherts, 2012; John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012; Ledgerwood & Sherman, 2012; Nosek, Spies, & Motyl, 2012; Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012). Some embraced these critiques wholeheartedly, whereas others pushed back, arguing that some of the problems were overstated or oversimplified. This first wave of responses was loud enough and big enough to overcome the inevitable inertia of an existing system and propel the field into forward motion. We can and surely should debate which problems are most pressing and which solutions most suitable (e.g., Cesario, 2014; Fiedler, Kutzner, & Krueger, 2012; Murayama, Pekrun, & Fiedler, 2013; Stroebe & Strack, 2014). But at this point, most can agree that there are some real problems with the status quo. Many researchers feel poised to change their current practices in an effort to improve our science. Already, new initiatives and journal policies have started moving the field forward to meet some of the recently articulated challenges head on (Chambers & Munafo, 2013; Eich, 2014; LeBel et al., 2013; Open Science Framework, 2014; PSPB, 2014; Spellman, 2013). It is in many ways an exciting time: Our momentum has placed psychological science at the forefront of a broader movement to improve standards and practices across scientific disciplines (see e.g., McNutt, 2014). But of course, change also involves uncertainty. For the average researcher or student standing on the shifting sands of new journal policies, conflicting reviewer standards, and ongoing debates about best practices, the view can seem rather turbulent. One might reasonably wonder, “What should I be doing differently in my own research? Do I really need to triple all my sample sizes? Is it ever okay to peek at my data? What should I conclude when I run the same study twice and get different results? And in the midst of all of this, how should I adapt my own expectations as a reviewer or editor . . . and what can I expect from others reviewing my manuscripts?” This special section brings together a collection of articles that address exactly these kinds of questions. The goal is to provide a concrete set of practical best practices—that is, things we can change right now about the way we conduct and evaluate research that will make our science better. The section opens with an overview of cutting-edge tools that enable researchers to increase the evidential value of their studies (Lakens & Evers, 2014, 529448 PPSXXX10.1177/1745691614529448LedgerwoodIntroduction to the Special Section research-article2014

Introduction to the Special Section on Moving Toward a Cumulative Science Maximizing What Our Research Can Tell Us

As the conversation about methods and practices continues to evolve both within and beyond the borders of psychological science, researchers are seeking their footing in a new and still shifting landscape of policies, recommendations, and standards. The end goal, however, is clear. We’re scientists. We want to learn from our research. We want to accumulate knowledge that converges on truth. The question is: What concrete steps can we take,

Sticky prospects: Loss frames are cognitively stickier than gain frames

Research across numerous domains has highlighted the current--and presumably temporary--effects of frames on preference and behavior. Yet people often encounter information that has been framed in different ways across contexts, and there are reasons to predict that certain frames, once encountered, might tend to stick in the mind and resist subsequent reframing. We propose that loss frames are stickier than gain frames in their ability to shape peoples thinking. Specifically, we suggest that the effect of a loss frame may linger longer than that of a gain frame in the face of reframing and that this asymmetry may arise because it is more difficult to convert a loss-framed concept into a gain-framed concept than vice versa. Supporting this notion, loss-to-gain (vs. gain-to-loss) reframing had a muted impact on both risk preferences (Study 1) and evaluation (Study 2). Moreover, participants took longer to solve a math problem that required reconceptualizing losses as gains than vice versa (Studies 3-5), and reframing changed gain-based conceptualizations but not loss-based ones (Study 6). We discuss implications for understanding a key process underlying negativity bias, as well as how sequential frames might impact political behavior and economic recovery.