Alison Mawhinney

Opting out or opting in? Conscience clauses, minority belief communities and the possibility of inclusive Religious Education in Northern Ireland

A recent research study has examined the role and effectiveness of conscience clauses as a means of protecting the freedom of religion and belief of members of minority faith communities in relation to the teaching of religious education (RE) in schools. While the specific context for this study related to young people from such communities in Northern Ireland, its implications have wider application to other national contexts. In this article, the principal focus is on the significance of the study for the content of, and approach to, RE in schools.

A discriminating education system: religious admission policies in Irish schools and international human rights law

Irish equality legislation permits discrimination in favour of co-religionists in admission policies to state-funded schools. This article examines whether Irish policies and practice in the area of pupil admissions meet and satisfy international human rights standards. In doing so it draws on material from interviews with parents and a survey to schools to provide an insight into how religious admission polices impact on the lives and rights of individuals. It concludes that by providing exemptions from equality legislation to religious schools, in a situation where these schools are in a near-monopolistic position, the Irish State is disregarding its responsibility to protect the right to non-discrimination, the right to education and the right to freedom of religion of those children and parents who do not adhere to the ethos of these religious bodies.

Religion in Schools: A Human Rights Contribution to the Debate’

The challenges facing those who wish to find a place for religion in public schools are many and various; and, within these, the dominant concern has been how to do this without interfering in the freedom of thought of pupils and parents. Historically, for many Western countries the line of tension in debates on education and religious liberty has run between various Christian denominations. Today, the tensions are more typically located between Christian and non-Christian belief systems and, in particular, between those holding theistic beliefs and those holding non-theistic beliefs. Nevertheless, despite the change in the identity of the stakeholders, the essential challenge remains the same: how to include and teach religion in schools while protecting the right of an individual to freedom of thought, conscience and belief? International human rights law has a role to play in shaping responses to this challenge. In so doing, it draws upon principles and practices established by societies over time to treat situations where individuals of differing beliefs share a common space or service. The aim of this chapter is to identify the contemporary norms set down by human rights law when it comes to the teaching and place of religion in schools. A secondary aim is to highlight the difficulties that arise when religion is incorporated into a learning environment, in this instance by using these standards to appraise the treatment of religion in the Irish education system. This examination focuses on two points in time: when the Irish education system was originally established in the early nineteenth century and then today in the twenty-first century. The chapter also presents the conundrum in which the principles and practices of the earlier system are seen to be more closely aligned with contemporary human rights standards than those of the present-day Irish education system.

Ensuring that Others Behave Responsibly: Giddens, Governance, and Human Rights Law

Governance produces a complex landscape of public power that state authorities have to take account of when discharging their duties under international human rights law. A traditional model of human rights law views the state as the primary duty-holder. However, to restrict the reach of human rights law to actions carried out by state bodies is extremely problematic in a context where the private and voluntary sectors are involved in service delivery and the boundary between the public and private is hazy. This article examines the approaches taken by international and domestic human rights law to the question of the applicability of human rights law. In this examination it draws upon the recent work of Anthony Giddens as a means of illustrating the socio-political context in which human rights law must now be implemented. The article argues that an understanding of Giddens’ evolving conception of the modern state is instructive in posing questions on the appropriate response of human rights law to governance. An analytical framework comprising three possible approaches – institutional, functional or regulatory – is put forward. The article argues that the shift to what Giddens calls the ‘ensuring’ state ought to entail a corresponding shift to a ‘regulatory approach’ in the interpretation of human rights obligations.

Claims of Religious Morality: The Limits of Religious Freedom in International Human Rights Law

Abstract The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is not a constant. As human rights law has progressively acquired a conceptual status as a means of reconciling tensions, the substantive legal content of the right to freedom to manifest religion or belief has widened. This paper argues that the admittance of claims of religious morality within this expanded understanding of the right exposes the conceptual imprecision underlying the right and presents a complex challenge to human rights supervisory bodies to address such claims without undermining their founding objectives. The first part of the paper traces the historical treatment of the right to freedom of religion or belief as a means of understanding its evolving and multifaceted nature. Part II draws on this overview to develop a taxonomy of aspects of the right and, in particular, it suggests that claims of religious morality ought to be viewed and treated as a distinct facet. The final part of the paper examines a group of recent cases before the European Court of Human Rights to explore current judicial responses to such claims and considers the risks posed by claims of religious morality for the contemporary right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.

Ensuring that Others Behave Responsibly

Governance produces a complex landscape of public power that state authorities have to take account of when discharging their duties under international human rights law. A traditional model of human rights law views the state as the primary duty-holder. However, to restrict the reach of human rights law to actions carried out by state bodies is extremely problematic in a context where the private and voluntary sectors are involved in service delivery and the boundary between the public and private is hazy. This article examines the approaches taken by international and domestic human rights law to the question of the applicability of human rights law. In this examination it draws upon the recent work of Anthony Giddens as a means of illustrating the socio-political context in which human rights law must now be implemented. The article argues that an understanding of Giddens’ evolving conception of the modern state is instructive in posing questions on the appropriate response of human rights law to governance. An analytical framework comprising three possible approaches – institutional, functional or regulatory – is put forward. The article argues that the shift to what Giddens calls the ‘ensuring’ state ought to entail a corresponding shift to a ‘regulatory approach’ in the interpretation of human rights obligations.

Crucifixes, classrooms and children: a semiotic cocktail

The display of religious symbols in state schools presents the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) with different concerns to the teaching of timetabled doctrinal teaching. This chapter sets out and examines the standards relevant to a discussion of rights under Article 2 of Protocol I. It argues that the Court fails to engage with the necessary standards by too readily accepting that there was no evidence that the crucifix could have an influence on pupils. The chapter proposes that a semiotic approach to the facts in the Lautsi case-and in other cases dealing with religious symbols-is of value in allowing the Court to tackle cases of this nature and properly assess the issues. In particular, it argues, a semiotic perspective would call attention to the fact that the meanings of symbols cannot be controlled or prescribed by governments. Keywords:crucifix; European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR); Lautsi ; religious symbols; semiotic approach

Ensuring others behave responsibly: Giddens, governance and international human rights law

Governance produces a complex landscape of public power that state authorities have to take account of when discharging their duties under international human rights law. A traditional model of human rights law views the state as the primary duty-holder. However, to restrict the reach of human rights law to actions carried out by state bodies is extremely problematic in a context where the private and voluntary sectors are involved in service delivery and the boundary between the public and private is hazy. This article examines the approaches taken by international and domestic human rights law to the question of the applicability of human rights law. In this examination it draws upon the recent work of Anthony Giddens as a means of illustrating the socio-political context in which human rights law must now be implemented. The article argues that an understanding of Giddens’ evolving conception of the modern state is instructive in posing questions on the appropriate response of human rights law to governance. An analytical framework comprising three possible approaches – institutional, functional or regulatory – is put forward. The article argues that the shift to what Giddens calls the ‘ensuring’ state ought to entail a corresponding shift to a ‘regulatory approach’ in the interpretation of human rights obligations.