Alison Redington

The origin of high particulate concentrations over the United Kingdom, March 2000

Abstract An episode of exceptionally high PM10 and PM2.5 levels was observed during the night of the 2–3 March 2000 throughout England and Wales. The weather was characterised by strong westerly winds and widespread rainfall associated with a low pressure system to the north of Scotland, conditions usually associated with relatively clean, unpolluted air. Possible sources included volcanic ash from an eruption on 26 February 2000 in Iceland, or dust from large sandstorms over the Sahara. A combination of atmospheric transport modelling using the Lagrangian dispersion model NAME, an analyses of satellite imagery and observational data from Mace Head has shown that the most likely origin of the episode was long range transport of dust from the Sahara region of North Africa. Further modelling studies have revealed a number of previously unidentified dust episodes, and indicate that transport of dust from the Sahara can occur several times a year. Dust episodes are of interest for a number of reasons, particulate levels can be elevated over a wide area and in some instances can significantly exceeded current air quality standards. If a natural source is identified over which there can be no control, there are implications for the setting of air quality standards.

Airborne spread of foot-and-mouth disease - model intercomparison.

Foot-and-mouth disease virus (FMDV) spreads by direct contact between animals, by animal products (milk, meat and semen), by mechanical transfer on people or fomites and by the airborne route, with the relative importance of each mechanism depending on the particular outbreak characteristics. Atmospheric dispersion models have been developed to assess airborne spread of FMDV in a number of countries, including the UK, Denmark, Australia, New Zealand, USA and Canada. These models were compared at a Workshop hosted by the Institute for Animal Health/Met Office in 2008. Each modeller was provided with data relating to the 1967 outbreak of FMD in Hampshire, UK, and asked to predict the spread of FMDV by the airborne route. A number of key issues emerged from the Workshop and subsequent modelling work: (1) in general all models predicted similar directions for livestock at risk, with much of the remaining differences strongly related to differences in the meteorological data used; (2) determination of an accurate sequence of events on the infected premises is highly important, especially if the meteorological conditions vary substantially during the virus emission period; (3) differences in assumptions made about virus release, environmental fate and susceptibility to airborne infection can substantially modify the size and location of the downwind risk area. All of the atmospheric dispersion models compared at the Workshop can be used to assess windborne spread of FMDV and provide scientific advice to those responsible for making control and eradication decisions in the event of an outbreak of disease.

Assessing hazards to aviation from sulfur dioxide emitted by explosive Icelandic eruptions

Volcanic eruptions take place in Iceland about once every 3 to 5 years. Ash emissions from these eruptions can cause significant disruption to air traffic over Europe and the North Atlantic as is evident from the 2010 eruption of Eyjafjallajokull. Sulfur dioxide (SO2) is also emitted by volcanoes, but there are no criteria to define when airspace is considered hazardous or nonhazardous. However, SO2 is a well-known ground-level pollutant that can have detrimental effects on human health. We have used the United Kingdom Met Offices NAME (Numerical Atmospheric-dispersion Modelling Environment) model to simulate SO2 mass concentrations that could occur in European and North Atlantic airspace for a range of hypothetical explosive eruptions in Iceland with a probability to occur about once every 3 to 5 years. Model performance was evaluated for the 2010 Eyjafjallajokull summit eruption against SO2 vertical column density retrievals from the Ozone Monitoring Instrument and in situ measurements from the United Kingdom Facility for Airborne Atmospheric Measurements research aircraft. We show that at no time during the 2010 Eyjafjallajokull eruption did SO2 mass concentrations at flight altitudes violate European air quality standards. In contrast, during a hypothetical short-duration explosive eruption similar to Hekla in 2000 (emitting 0.2 Tg of SO2 within 2 h, or an average SO2 release rate 250 times that of Eyjafjallajokull 2010), simulated SO2 concentrations are greater than 1063 µg/m3 for about 48 h in a small area of European and North Atlantic airspace. By calculating the occurrence of aircraft encounters with the volcanic plume of a short-duration eruption, we show that a 15 min or longer exposure of aircraft and passengers to concentrations ≥500 µg/m3 has a probability of about 0.1%. Although exposure of humans to such concentrations may lead to irritations to the eyes, nose and, throat and cause increased airway resistance even in healthy individuals, the risk is very low. However, the fact that volcanic ash and sulfur species are not always collocated and that passenger comfort could be compromised might be incentives to provide real-time information on the presence or absence of volcanic SO2. Such information could aid aviation risk management during and after volcanic eruptions.