Almarin Phillips

The Tableau Économique as a Simple Leontief Model

I. Introduction, 137. — II. Quesnays Tableau, 138. — III. The Tableau Economique as an input-output system, 140. — IV. Suggested interpretations of the Tableau Economique, 142. — V. Conclusions, 144.

Technology and Market Structure

In 1950, the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company (now PPG Industries) purchased a used C-47, the military version of the DC-3. The plane was converted to business use, with accommodations for 12 passengers and a crew of two. A caricature of a grasshopper was painted on the nose of the plane with the name, “The Glasshopper” inscribed below it. A former military pilot was hired, and PPG had an “executive aircraft” available for its use.1

What It Was Like, What Happened, and What It's Like Now: Developments in Telecommunications over Recent Decades

A survey of telecommunications over past decades. Overall prices of services have declined less rapidly since deregulation, with local rates rising, long-distance rates falling. Productivity increased strongly during period of Bell System regulated monopoly. Service quality of traditional telephone services has fallen, but many new services have been added. Innovations in customer premise equipment since deregulation far exceed those in prior years. Many major network innovations occurred during years of Bell System monopoly and network innovations have continued since. Actions by the Federal Communications Commission actions anteceded government antitrust case and are responsible for most of the changes since 1978. Most of the beneficial changes have little, if anything, to do with antitrust case and divestiture.

Due diligence and the demand for electricity: A cautionary tale

In 1983, the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) defaulted on tax-free revenue bonds issued to construct two of its five nuclear power plants. In subsequent litigation, the plaintiffs alleged that the bonds had been fraudulently issued because WPPSS and the other defendants should reasonably have known and disclosed that there was “substantial uncertainty” about the ability to meet the financial obligations created by the bonds. A model using plausible values for demand elasticities, recognized probabilities of events that would increase costs and delay construction and data used by WPPSS to construct demand forecasts for prospective bondholders suggests that such uncertainty was present at the time the bonds were issued. The values for demand elasticities and other parameters of the model were selected after a thorough review of the econometric literature on demand for electricity, beginning with the work of Fisher and Kaysen in 1962.

Changing markets and institutional inertia : A review of US telecommunications policy

It has been impossible in the USA to achieve a good match between the policies pursued with respect to telecommunications markets and the public interest. The institutional responses to new needs and opportunities have been too limited in scope, too late in coming and too insensitive to the underlying problems. This article sets out the record of telecommunications regulation since the second world war, explains why fundamental changes are on the way, and draws some lessons for the future.

The Market for Mid-Sized Business Jets After 1970

JetStar The Lockheed Aircraft Corporation faced “crisis years” after 1965.1 Although Lockheed had won the 1965 C-5 competition, it experienced massive costs overruns on the total package (fixed price) contract. The AH-56A Cheyenne program ran into similar cost overruns and was threatened with termination in 1969. In the same year, procurement of the C-5 was cut back from 115 to 81 aircraft. The company had similar problems with its missile programs. In response to a 1956 FAA request, Lockheed invested heavily in an SST design. The FAA selected the Boeing version in December 1966 despite Lockheed’s claim that the airlines preferred its concept. Lockheed then decided to use its C-5A design to re-enter the commercial transport market, a project that evolved into the widebody L-1011 TriStar. The L-1011 was ordered in quantity by several airlines, but always faced intense competition with the McDonnell Douglas DC-10.

The 1950s: Pressures Build for the Introduction of Business Jets

In 1953, a data service defined business aircraft as planes owned by “a corporation or [other] business organization . . . , powered by at least two engines, equipped to fly day, night and [on] instruments to transport business personnel, prospects, customers, suppliers and friends in connection with the execution of business duties.”1 Using that definition, a survey showed that, as of June 30, 1953, “a total of 954 twin-engined business aircraft [were] owned by 674 U.S. firms; 517 of these firms own[ed] and operate[d] one aircraft, while 157 others operate[d] fleets.” Of these planes, 46% were Beechcraft Model 18s, 20% were DC-3s, 19% were Lockheed Models 12, 14, or 18S and the remainder were assorted other types. At first glance, it appears that PPG had alternatives to buying the The Glasshopper, a C-47 converted to a DC-3.

The “Heavy Iron” Business Jets: Gulfstream, Dassault and Canadair

Grumman Aircraft Corporation was established in 1929. The company has a distinguished record in the development and sale of sophisticated military aircraft. Grumman’s first planes were the carrier-based, single-seat FF-1, F2F and F3F biplanes. The F4F Wildcat was developed and produced under a 1931 contract with the U.S. Navy. The Wildcat was followed by, among others, the F6F Hellcat (1942), the F7F Tigercat (1945), the F8F Bearcat (1945), the F9F Panther jet (1948), the F9F Cougar jet (1954) and the extremely well-known F-14 Tomcat (1972). Grumman was also responsible for the TB Avenger (1942), the AF Guardian (1950), the S-2 Tracker (1953), the OV-1 Mohawk (1959), the E-1B Tracer (1960), the A-6 Intruder (1963), the C-2A Greyhound (1966) and the EA-6B Prowler (1971). Above all else, Grumman was recognized as the producer of state-of-the-art naval aircraft.1

Cessna Opens the Lower End of the Market

Cessnas decision to enter the market in 1971 with a small, modestly-performing, low-priced business jet was a very risky one. As we have seen, a number of other companies had tried to market a low-priced business jet, and none had come close to success. The MS-760 Paris was available in the U.S. prior to any other business jet, yet it (and subsequent versions of it) found few customers.

Integration of Financial Services in the European Community: Lessons from the Experience in the United States

The plans for European integration by 1992 are ambitious ones. They include the removal of remaining internal tariff and nontariff barriers to trade for commodities and services and the extension within the Community of the nondiscriminatory treatment of each nation’s enterprises (Cecchini, 1988; Colchester, 1989; Bhatt, 1989; Pinder, 1986; Nicoll, 1985; Capotorti et al., 1986; Brewin and McAllister, 1987; Langeheine and Weinstock, 1985). Within the general plans are more specific ones for the integration and harmonization of financial services according to objectives announced at the June 1989 meeting of the heads of the EC states in Madrid. These plans relate to various aspects of securities markets — the underwriting and marketing of new issues, the securities exchanges, markets for unlisted securities, securitization of the assets of financial intermediaries and venture capital markets (Colchester, 1989; Bhatt, 1989; The Economist, (1988a, 1988b); Lopez-Charos, 1987; Tully, 1988; Winder, 1986; Gordon, 1987). The plans call as well for the harmonization of insurance regulations, including those governing ties between insurance and other financial services. And, of course, the plans relate to commercial banking or, more generally, to deposit-type financial intermediaries (Key, 1989; Padoa-Schioppa, 1988). Here the topics range from the possible creation of a European central bank (de Cecco et a1., 1989) through the harmonizing of prudential and protective regulations, to deposit guarantees and other schemes for assuring the stability of credit.