Alva Noë

Beyond the grand illusion: What change blindness really teaches us about vision

Experiments on scene perception and change blindness suggest that the visual system does not construct detailed internal models of a scene. These experiments therefore call into doubt the traditional view that vision is a process in which detailed representations of the environment must be constructed. The non-existence of such detailed representations, however, does not entail that we do not perceive the detailed environment. The “grand illusion hypothesis” that our visual world is an illusion rests on (1) a problematic “reconstructionist” conception of vision, and (2) a misconception about the character of perceptual experience.

Acting out our sensory experience

The most important clarification we bring in our reply to commentators concerns the problem of the “explanatory gap”: that is, the gulf that separates physical processes in the brain from the experienced quality of sensations. By adding two concepts (bodiliness and grabbiness) that were not stressed in the target article, we strengthen our claim and clarify why we think we have solved the explanatory gap problem, – not by dismissing qualia, but, on the contrary, by explaining why sensations have a “feel” and why “feels” feel the way they do. We additionally clarify our views on: internal representations (we claim internal representations cannot explain why sensation has a feel), on behaviorism (we are not behaviorists), on perception and action (we believe there can be perception without action), and on the brain (we believe the brain does do something important in perception).

Synchronous objects for one flat thing, reproduced

Synchronous Objects for One Flat Thing, reproduced (http://synchronousobjects.osu.edu) is an interactive screen-based work developed by The Ohio State Universitys Advanced Computing Center for the Arts and Design (ACCAD) and the Department of Dance in collaboration with renowned choreographer William Forsythe. Pivoting on Forsythes masterwork of visual complexity, One Flat Thing, Reproduced, as its research resource, the Synchronous Objects project seeks to enrich cross-disciplinary investigation and creativity by revealing deep structures of choreographic thinking through a vivid collection of information objects in the form of 3D computer animation, annotation and interactive graphics.

Is Perspectival Self‐Consciousness Non‐Conceptual?

As perceivers we are able to keep track of the ways in which our perceptual experience depends on what we do (e.g., on our movements). This capacity, which Hurley calls perspectival self-consciousness, is a special instance of our more general ability as perceivers to keep track of how things are. I argue that one upshot of this is that perspectival self-consciousness, like the ability to perceive more generally, relies on our possession of conceptual skills.

Extending our view of mind

In Supersizing the Mind, Andy Clark defends the idea that cognition depends constitutively on structures that are literally outside the body. Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? According to Clark, it is prejudice to think that the limits of the cognitive system must be those of the organism. Artifacts, symbols or tools (e.g. maps, landmarks, systems of writing, the abacus) might be no less linked with cognitive operations than what is internal. For example, the ability to perform long division might depend on pencil and paper no less than it does on the normal action of the brain.