Amalia Amaya

Formal models of coherence and legal epistemology

This paper argues that formal models of coherence are useful for constructing a legal epistemology. Two main formal approaches to coherence are examined: coherence-based models of belief revision and the theory of coherence as constraint satisfaction. It is shown that these approaches shed light on central aspects of a coherentist legal epistemology, such as the concept of coherence, the dynamics of coherentist justification in law, and the mechanisms whereby coherence may be built in the course of legal decision-making.

Coherence, Evidence, and Legal Proof

The aim of this essay is to develop a coherence theory for the justification of evidentiary judgments in law. The main claim of the coherence theory proposed in this article is that a belief about the events being litigated is justified if and only if it is a belief that an epistemically responsible fact finder might hold by virtue of its coherence in like circumstances. The article argues that this coherentist approach to evidence and legal proof has the resources to meet some of the main objections that may be addressed against attempts to analyze the justification of evidentiary judgments in law in coherentist terms. It concludes by exploring some implications of the proposed version of legal coherentism for a jurisprudence of evidence.

La Coherencia en el Derecho

This paper examines the concept of coherence and its role in legal reasoning. First, it gives an overview of the coherence theory in law, paying attention to coherence theories of the justification of both normative and factual propositions. Second, it identifies some problem-areas confronting coherence theories of legal reasoning about both disputed questions of fact and disputed questions of law. Third, with a view to solving these problems, it proposes a coherence model of legal reasoning. The main tenet of this model is that a belief about the law and the facts under dispute is justified if it is «optimally coherent», that is, if it is such that an epistemically responsible legal decision-maker would have accepted it as justified by virtue of its coherence in like circumstances. Last, this paper examines the implications of the version of legal coherentism proposed for a general theory of legal reasoning and rationality.

Coherence and Systematization in Law

This chapter examines coherentist approaches to the justification of normative judgments in law. First, it provides a survey of the main approaches to normative coherence defended in the literature on legal coherentism and discusses the principal objections that threaten to undermine the coherence theory of legal justification. One problem with coherentism, namely the problem of the coherence bias, has not, however, received enough attention in the literature. This chapter states this problem in detail and argues that a modified version of legal coherentism—namely virtue coherentism—has the resources to address this problem. The chapter then engages in a second-order debate about the relevance of coherence in justification by inquiring into the reasons why coherence is worth pursuing when reasoning in law. Finally, this chapter concludes by assessing the value and limits of coherentist reasoning in the legal domain.

Introduction to ‘Virtue and Law’ symposium

It took a while for the virtue theory penny to drop within legal theory. In the second half of the twentieth century, when virtue theory was beginning to make a long overdue return to the centre st...

The virtue of judicial humility

ABSTRACT This paper articulates an egalitarian conception of judicial humility and justifies its value on the grounds that it importantly advances the legal and political ideal of fraternity. This account of the content and value of the virtue of humility stands in sharp contrast with the dominant view of judicial humility as deference or judicial restraint. The paper concludes by discussing some ways in which the account of humility and of its value provided in the paper furthers our understanding of the judicial virtues and of the political implications of giving virtue a role in adjudication.

The Ethics of Trial Deliberation: Moral Agency in Legal Fact-Finding

Section I explicates the building blocks of Hos legal epistemology: the distinction between the internal and the external point of view, the belief account of legal fact-finding, and the claim that considerations of truth and justice are intertwined in evidence rules. Section II examines the applications of Hos normative framework to the analysis of the standard of proof, the hearsay rule, and similar facts evidence. Part III subjects Hos distinction between the internal and external point of view to close analysis in light of contemporary debates over the nature of epistemic justification. Part IV suggests that a turn towards virtue epistemology may provide a good way for extending Hos approach to evidence law. Part V sheds doubts upon whether Hos epistemology provides a justification of current evidentiary arrangements and argues that carrying out Hos internal analysis would, in fact, lead to a substantial revision of those arrangements. The normative arguments of this book lend support to a conception of the law of evidence built around the notion of moral agency which constitutes a valuable normative ideal against which current rules of evidence may be assessed.