Amit Ron

Regression Analysis and the Philosophy of Social Science

he procedure of regression analysis is conventionally considered to be an exemplar of the positivist empiricist approach to research in poli tical science. Those who use the procedure are forced to defend empiricism with the entire philosophical burden that it carries; and those who attack the empiricist philosophy of science condemn the prevalence of this statistical procedure in the field. Very few, however, challenge the connection that was establi shed between the procedure and the empiricist philosophy.

Rawls as a critical theorist Reflective equilibrium after the ‘deliberative turn’

An interpretation of John Rawls’ ‘justice as fairness’ as a deliberative critical argumentative strategy for evaluating existing institutions is offered and its plausibility is discussed. I argue that ‘justice as fairness’ aims at synthesizing the moral values claimed byexisting social institutions into a coherent model of a well-ordered society in order to demand that these institutions stand up tothe values that they promise. Understood in such a way, ‘justice as fairness’ provides a set of idealizing ‘mirrors’ through which power dynamics in society can be viewed but does not function as a model for an ideal society.

The Hermeneutics of the Causal Powers of Meaningful Objects

Abstract Much of the interest of critical realists in the hermeneutic character of social inquiry has been shaped by debates with critics. Critical realists insist that the meaningful character of societies does not exclude the possibility of treating them as objects that have causal powers and that these objects are more than the sum-total of their meanings. In what follows, I want to go beyond this debate. Working within critical realist ontology, the question I want to ask is what kind of hermeneutics is required for the study of the causal powers of meaningful objects. If hypotheses about the causal powers of such objects can be confirmed only in dialogues, then what kind of dialogues and with whom are necessary for the understanding of causal powers? The question of the interpretation of causal objects is not merely a methodological one. Social structures are ontologically different from natural ones, and the nature of our understanding of meaningful objects is in part dependent on the way we come to apprehend them in thought. I argue that the approach to the understanding of the causal power of meaningful objects that has emerged in the debate between critical realists and their critics tends to view the study of causal powers as a dialogue between experts in the service of a more democratic society. Against this view, I suggest an understanding of the study of causal powers as a dialogue between critical social science and the public, a dialogue that takes place in the public sphere.

Modern Natural Law Meets the Market: The Case of Adam Smith

Philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries who worked within the tradition of modern natural law became interested in political economy in part as they attempted to reconcile two conflicting images of economic activity. On the one hand, from the legal point of view economic activity was understood as a morally neutral and benign activity that could be regulated by simple and clear rules of justice. On the other hand, it was seen as a realm of political struggle, manipulation, deceit and the exercise of hidden forms of domination. This article examines the legal and moral contexts of Adam Smiths excursion into political economy by interpreting the roles played by these two images of the market in the theory of value articulated in book I of The Wealth of Nations.

The “Market” and the “Forum” in Hobbes's Political Philosophy

In the last decade, the deliberative model of democracy has been offered to counter the prevalent conservative economistic tendencies of democratic theorizing. But the ideas of deliberation and rational persuasion are not newcomers on the stage of political philosophy, for they were central to the way classical rhetoricians understood politics. Against this background, this article examines the role economic and deliberative models of politics play in Hobbess political philosophy. It argues that Hobbes chose to analogize these two models rather than to treat them as competing views of politics because he saw both the economy and deliberation as sites of manipulation and not as “consensus forming mechanisms.”

Narratives of participatory governance: Social science and democracy in mark bevirʼs a theory of governance

Mark Bevirʼs A Theory of Governance proposes a Copernican revolution in the way we understand the role of social science in public administration. Conventional accounts assign social science the role of instructing public administrators how to steer its machinery towards the public interest, based on social scienceʼs alleged ability to explain how people act and what they need. Bevir offers a vision of public administration in which ordinary people take a leading role by engaging in dialogues in which they articulate their needs. In this vision, the role of social science is to facilitate those public dialogues. This essay offers a sympathetic critical evaluation of Bevirʼs exploration of what it means to understand social science as a facilitator.