Amoz Kats

More on Hotelling's stability in competition

Abstract It is well known that Hotellings model of spatial competition has no location-price equilibrium in pure strategies. The present paper studies that model where the linear space is replaced by a one-dimensional bounded space without a boundary, i.e. a circle. It is shown that the modified model does have a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies and that the ‘equal distance’ location pattern is an equilibrium.

Spatial Oligopolies With Uniform Delivered Pricing

Space allows firms to implement a large variety of price policies, depending on the way transportation costs are passed on to customers. Somewhat surprisingly, the bulk of the work on spatial price theory has been focused on the study of mill pricing (see Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1986, for a recent survey). It is probable that the main reason for this emphasis lies in the close connection between spatial competition with mill prices and the model of product differentiation a la Hotelling-Lancaster (see, for example, Eaton and Lipsey, 1989, for further details).

Location-price equilibria in a spatial model of discriminatory pricing

Abstract A location-price equilibrium is derived for a market with a constraint on the number of different prices each firm can charge. The sequence of these equilibria is shown to converge to the equilibrium in a market with perfect price discrimination.

Probabilistic voting and platform selection in multi-party elections

The literature on stochastic voting to date has focused almost exclusively on models with only two candidates (or parties). This paper studies multiparty competition with stochastic voting. We look at two different models in which candidates aim to maximize their expected vote, as well as a model where the objective of candidates is rank minimization. The equilibria of these models are derived and characterized. We show that the properties of the equilibria are quite different from those derived in deterministic models. Furthermore, the analysis shows that deterministic voting models are not robust since the introduction of even a minute level of uncertainty leads to a drastic change in predictions. Consequently, we argue that the deterministic model provides a misleading benchmark. Stochastic models provide a much richer framework, and the nature of the uncertainty in voter choice is a key determinant of the qualtitative properties of the equilibria.

Coalition production economies with divisible and indivisible inputs : Asymptotic results

Abstract This paper investigates the asymptotic characteristics of the relations between the Shapley value and the core of replicated production economies with divisible and indivisible inputs.

Non-cooperative monopolistic games and monopolistic market games

A class of non-cooperative games is discussed in which one player (“the monopolist”) by choosing his strategy restricts the other players to subsets of their strategy sets. Examples of such games in various fields are given. In particular it is shown that some very important economic situations fall within this class of games. A solution concept is defined and sufficient conditions for its existence are derived.The question of the advantages a player derives from being a monopolist is raised and conditions are derived for him to benefit from being a monopolist.

Can a party represent its constituency

A theorem from number theory is utilized to derive conditions for existence, and to characterize, a list of candidates that a party forms for a proportional-representation election, so that this list would truly represent the constituency of the party.