Amparo María Mármol Conde

Agents with Other-Regarding Preferences in the Commons

We present a unified approach to study the well-known problem of the use of a common-pool resource when the agents show other-regarding preferences. It is generally accepted nowadays that human behavior is influenced by social and psychological considerations which may lead the individuals to sacrifice monetary outcomes in the course of maximizing utility. This can have substantial economic consequences even for those who only pursue to improve their own benefit. The incorporation of preferences that accommodate this behavior into the problem leads us to model this type of situation as games with vector-valued utilities. Several types of agent are characterized depending on the importance that they assign to the components of their utility functions. We obtain the set of equilibria of the vector-valued game of the commons with two particular types of agent, namely, pro-social and pro-self agents. Some refinements of these equilibria are obtained by considering an additional decision rule that represents a conservative attitude of the agents. The most relevant result is that regardless of the behavior of the rest of the agents, only a pro-social agent is required to avoid the tragedy of the commons.

Asignación de recursos Max-Min: propiedades y algoritmos

ResumenEste trabajo trata el problema de asignación de recursos cuando el objetivo es maximizar la mínima recompensa y las funciones recompensa son continuas y estrictamente crecientes. Se estudian diferentes propiedades que conducen a algoritmos que permiten de forma eficiente la resolución de una gran variedad de problemas de esta naturaleza, tanto con variables continuas como discretas.SummaryThis paper treats the resource-allocation problem when the objective is to maximize the minimum trade-off functions.We study several properties that lead to efficient algorithms to solve many problems of this type. Continuous and discrete cases and even the case where variables can be both continuous and integer can be solved this way.

Equilibria with Vector-Valued Utilities and Preference Information. The Analysis of a Mixed Duopoly

This paper deals with the equilibria of games when the agents have multiple objectives and therefore, their utilities cannot be represented by a single value, but by a vector containing the various dimensions of the utility. Our approach is based on the incorporation into the model of information about the preferences of the agents, together with additional decision rules. This allows us to identify the equilibria according to this preferential information. The potential application of the theoretical results is shown with an analysis of a mixed oligopoly in which the agents value additional objectives other than their own benefit. These objectives are related to social welfare and to the profit of the industry. The flexibility of our approach provides a general theoretical framework to analyze a wide range of strategic economic models.

Equilibria with Vector-Valued Utilities and Preference Information

This paper deals with the equilibria of games when the agents have multiple objectives and therefore, their utilities cannot be represented by a single value, but by a vector containing the various dimensions of the utility. Our approach is based on the incorporation into the model of information about the preferences of the agents, together with additional decision rules. This allows us to identify the equilibria according to this preferential information. The flexibility of our approach provides a general theoretical framework to analyze a wide range of strategic economic models.