Amparo Sanchis

Privatisation and X-Inefficiency: A Bargaining Approach

The usual analysis of privatization and X-inefficiency uses agency theory to model managerial effort. We model worker effort as determined by a bargain between firms and workers. Workers dislike effort because it lowers utility. Firms prefer high effort because it raises productivity. Public-sector firms are assumed to be social welfare maximizers and compared to private-sector firms, therefore, they bargain lower effort levels since they have the interests of consumers and workers at heart. Our model predicts that under certain conditions privatization should raise effort and so lower X-inefficiency, and that wages may increase or decrease.

The Role of Sunk Costs in the Decision to Invest in R&D

We present a dynamic empirical model of a firms R&D decisions that is consistent with the existence of sunk R&D costs, taking into account that these costs may differ between small and large firms, and among different technological regimes. We estimate a multivariate dynamic discrete choice model using firm-level data of Spanish manufacturing for 1990–2000. Conditional on firm heterogeneity and serially correlated unobservable factors, we find that R&D history matters. This true state dependence allows inferring the existence of sunk R&D costs associated with performing R&D. Sunk R&D costs are found to be higher for large, high-tech firms.

A bargaining model of Farrell inefficiency

An enormous number of empirical papers have estimated technical efficiency, the distance of firms inside a frontier, following the model of Farrell (1957). We propose a theory that explains the distance these empirical papers seek to measure. The theory is based on the idea that workers can bargain low ‘effort’ (high crew sizes etc.) if they and the firm have some monopoly power. We provide simple theoretical expressions for the empirical measures of technical and allocative efficiency and compare them to those in the statistical literature. We consider the relation between competition and efficiency and show how the model extends readily to address public sector inefficiency, increasing returns and manager/firm agency problems.

Patents, competition, and firms' innovation incentives

This paper presents fresh evidence on the interaction between industrial property rights (patents) and competition, and their joint effect on firms’ innovation. We use panel data of Spanish manufacturing firms for 1990–2006, as well as external information on European Patent Office and US Patent Office patent counts. We construct a new synthetic measure of competition and estimate the impact of patents on this measure at the industry level. Then, the effect of industry-wide competition and patenting on firms’ innovation is estimated at the firm level. Our results suggest that patents reduce the level of competition in the industry, whereas the effect of competition on innovation varies with the type of innovation indicator. Thus, by lowering competition, patents in an industry exert an indirect effect on innovation besides their direct effect. In addition, interaction effects between patents and competition indicate that patents soften the impact of competition changes on firms’ innovation.

The impact of the Great Recession on TFP convergence among EU countries

ABSTRACT This article provides evidence on the effect of the Great Recession on productivity convergence among European Union (EU) economies. We use firm data, aggregated at the country-year level, to analyse the evolution of beta-convergence on total factor productivity (TFP) for 2003–2014. We obtain a positive impact of the recession on TFP (unconditional and conditional) beta-convergence across EU economies. These results support the existence of a catching-up process within the EU during the recent financial crisis. Other macroeconomic and institutional characteristics are important in fostering TFP growth, namely R&D intensity and quality of governance.

Foreign capital, credit constraints and continuity of firms’ R&D

ABSTRACT In this article, we investigate the role of foreign capital participation as a means for firms to overcome the obstacle posed by credit constraints to sustain R&D investments. Using data for Spanish manufacturing firms in the period 1990–2006, we show that firms with foreign capital are significantly less likely to stop already initiated R&D projects and also more likely to sustain R&D investment when facing credit constraints. Our results are robust to positive selection into foreign capital participation, which we control through a set of variables chosen from a propensity score estimation, and to firms’ fixed-effects.