Amrisha Vaish

Origins of Human Cooperation and Morality

From an evolutionary perspective, morality is a form of cooperation. Cooperation requires individuals either to suppress their own self-interest or to equate it with that of others. We review recent research on the origins of human morality, both phylogenetic (research with apes) and ontogenetic (research with children). For both time frames we propose a two-step sequence: first a second-personal morality in which individuals are sympathetic or fair to particular others, and second an agent-neutral morality in which individuals follow and enforce group-wide social norms. Human morality arose evolutionarily as a set of skills and motives for cooperating with others, and the ontogeny of these skills and motives unfolds in part naturally and in part as a result of sociocultural contexts and interactions.

Young Children Are Intrinsically Motivated to See Others Helped

Young children help other people, but it is not clear why. In the current study, we found that 2-year-old children’s sympathetic arousal, as measured by relative changes in pupil dilation, is similar when they themselves help a person and when they see that person being helped by a third party (and sympathetic arousal in both cases is different from that when the person is not being helped at all). These results demonstrate that the intrinsic motivation for young children’s helping behavior does not require that they perform the behavior themselves and thus “get credit” for it, but rather requires only that the other person be helped. Thus, from an early age, humans seem to have genuine concern for the welfare of others.

Three-year-old children intervene in third-party moral transgressions

We investigated childrens moral behaviour in situations in which a third party was harmed (the test case for possession of agent-neutral moral norms). A 3-year-old and two puppets each created a picture or clay sculpture, after which one puppet left the room. In the Harm condition, the remaining (actor) puppet then destroyed the absent (recipient) puppets picture or sculpture. In a Control condition, the actor acted similarly but in a way that did not harm the recipient. Children protested during the actors actions, and, upon the recipients return, tattled on the actor and behaved prosocially towards the recipient more in the Harm than in the Control condition. This is the first study to show that children as young as 3 years of age actively intervene in third-party moral transgressions.

Infants use attention but not emotions to predict others’ actions

Phillips et al. (2002) suggest that by 12-14 months, infants can use a persons emotional and attentional cues to predict that persons actions. However, this work was conducted using only positive emotions, which is problematic because attention and positive emotions lead to the same prediction about a persons actions, thus leaving unclear whether infants made predictions based upon attention and emotion or attention alone. To get around this problem, we used both positive and negative emotions in a looking-time paradigm to investigate whether 14-month-old infants can use emotional cues to predict a persons actions. The findings suggest that infants used attentional but not emotional cues as predictors. We argue that while 14-month-olds can use another persons emotion cues to modify their own behavior (as in social referencing situations), they do not yet use them robustly to predict the others behavior.

Young children sympathize less in response to unjustified emotional distress.

Three-year-old children saw an adult displaying the exact same distress in 3 different conditions: (a) the adults distress was appropriate to a genuine harm, (b) the adults distress was an overreaction to a minor inconvenience, and (c) there was no apparent cause for the adults distress. Children who witnessed the adult being appropriately upset showed concern for him, intervened on his behalf, and checked on him when he later expressed distress out of their view. Children who did not know the cause for the adults distress responded similarly. In contrast, children who witnessed the adult overreacting to an inconvenience showed lower rates of intervening and checking. The degree of childrens concern across conditions was correlated with the latency of their helping behavior toward the adult later. These results suggest that from an early age, young childrens sympathy and prosocial behavior are not automatic responses to emotional displays but, rather, involve taking into account whether the displayed distress is justified.

The emergence of human prosociality: aligning with others through feelings, concerns, and norms

The fact that humans cooperate with nonkin is something we take for granted, but this is an anomaly in the animal kingdom. Our species’ ability to behave prosocially may be based on human-unique psychological mechanisms. We argue here that these mechanisms include the ability to care about the welfare of others (other-regarding concerns), to “feel into” others (empathy), and to understand, adhere to, and enforce social norms (normativity). We consider how these motivational, emotional, and normative substrates of prosociality develop in childhood and emerged in our evolutionary history. Moreover, we suggest that these three mechanisms all serve the critical function of aligning individuals with others: Empathy and other-regarding concerns align individuals with one another, and norms align individuals with their group. Such alignment allows us to engage in the kind of large-scale cooperation seen uniquely in humans.

Direct and indirect reputation formation in nonhuman great apes (Pan paniscus, Pan troglodytes, Gorilla gorilla, Pongo pygmaeus) and human children (Homo sapiens).

Humans make decisions about when and with whom to cooperate based on their reputations. People either learn about others by direct interaction or by observing third-party interactions or gossip. An important question is whether other animal species, especially our closest living relatives, the nonhuman great apes, also form reputations of others. In Study 1, chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans, and 2.5-year-old human children experienced a nice experimenter who tried to give food/toys to the subject and a mean experimenter who interrupted the food/toy giving. In studies 2 and 3, nonhuman great apes and human children could only passively observe a similar interaction, in which a nice experimenter and a mean experimenter interacted with a third party. Orangutans and 2.5-year-old human children preferred to approach the nice experimenter rather than the mean one after having directly experienced their respective behaviors. Orangutans, chimpanzees, and 2.5-year-old human children also took into account experimenter actions toward third parties in forming reputations. These studies show that the human ability to form direct and indirect reputation judgment is already present in young children and shared with at least some of the other great apes.

Does Sympathy Motivate Prosocial Behaviour in Great Apes

Prosocial behaviours such as helping, comforting, or sharing are central to human social life. Because they emerge early in ontogeny, it has been proposed that humans are prosocial by nature and that from early on empathy and sympathy motivate such behaviours. The emerging question is whether humans share these abilities to feel with and for someone with our closest relatives, the great apes. Although several studies demonstrated that great apes help others, little is known about their underlying motivations. This study addresses this issue and investigates whether four species of great apes (Pongo pygmaeus, Gorilla gorilla, Pan troglodytes, Pan paniscus) help a conspecific more after observing the conspecific being harmed (a human experimenter steals the conspecific’s food) compared to a condition where no harming occurred. Results showed that in regard to the occurrence of prosocial behaviours, only orangutans, but not the African great apes, help others when help is needed, contrasting prior findings on chimpanzees. However, with the exception of one population of orangutans that helped significantly more after a conspecific was harmed than when no harm occurred, prosocial behaviour in great apes was not motivated by concern for others.

Novel paradigms to measure variability of behavior in early childhood: posture, gaze, and pupil dilation

A central challenge of investigating the underlying mechanisms of and the individual differences in young children’s behavior is the measurement of the internal physiological mechanism and the involved expressive emotions. Here, we illustrate two paradigms that assess concurrent indicators of both children’s social perception as well as their emotional expression. In one set of studies, children view situations while their eye movements are mapped onto a live scene. In these studies, children’s internal arousal is measured via changes in their pupil dilation by using eye tracking technology. In another set of studies, we measured children’s emotional expression via changes in their upper-body posture by using depth sensor imaging technology. Together, these paradigms can provide new insights into the internal mechanism and outward emotional expression involved in young children’s behavior.

Children's altruistic behavior in context: The role of emotional responsiveness and culture

Altruistic behavior in humans is thought to have deep biological roots. Nonetheless, there is also evidence for considerable variation in altruistic behaviors among individuals and across cultures. Variability in altruistic behavior in adults has recently been related to individual differences in emotional responsiveness to fear in others. The current study examined the relation between emotional responsiveness (using eye-tracking) and altruistic behavior (using the Dictator Game) in 4 to 5-year-old children (N = 96) across cultures (India and Germany). The results revealed that increased altruistic behavior was associated with a greater responsiveness to fear faces (faster fixation), but not happy faces, in both cultures. This suggests that altruistic behavior is linked to our responsiveness to others in distress across cultures. Additionally, only among Indian children greater altruistic behavior was associated with greater sensitivity to context when responding to fearful faces. These findings further our understanding of the origins of altruism in humans by highlighting the importance of emotional processes and cultural context in the development of altruism.