An Chen

Secret Societies and Organized Crime in Contemporary China

The emergence of criminal secret societies in post-Mao China has closely correlated with the criminal subcultures, massive unemployment, impoverishment, economic inequality, relative deprivation, and political corruption that have arisen from the reform process. Although perceived as the roots of organized crime worldwide, these variables have generated crime incentives—mainly among disadvantaged and marginalized social groups—far stronger in China than in most of Western societies. The factors underlying organized crime in China are not simply the by-products of economic liberalization, but rather related to the structural problems caused by flawed reform policies and Chinas particular political context. These problems account to a large extent for the double nature of many criminal organizations as both anti-social and anti-state forces. The regimes crackdown on organized crime may hamper efforts for greater socio-political pluralism. But in the long run, it may strengthen the rule of law and lead to the improvement of relevant reform policies.

The New Inequality

Capitalism has given rise to significant social stratification and rising class conflict in China. Will this push the country toward a Westerntype democracy, at least in the near future? My answer is no. One major reason is that the development of capitalism and class politics in China is not likely to produce powerful prodemocracy social pressure or shape a pattern of class alliances in favor of democratization. Many students of democratic transitions classify them according to two broad models. The first, which I will call the structural model, stresses the importance of broad socioeconomic conditions that favor democratization, or at least a shift away from full-blown authoritarianism. The second category is the “pact-based” or “negotiated” transition model, which focuses on the strategic choices and interactions of political elites in causing “authoritarian ruptures” and “democratic openings.” The latter model, which does not rule out structural pressures for democratic change, has been the most popular among scholars of post1974 “third-wave” transitions. Yet this model seems hardly applicable to China. In most cases of negotiated transition, there was a tradition of civil society and organized political opposition that made it possible for elites (incumbents and opposition leaders alike) to play a bargaining game. But China’s departure from authoritarianism, if it occurs, will not happen in such a context. In order to grasp the possible trajectories of a Chinese transition, then, we must turn to the structural model. This model comes in several variants, a full account of which need not detain us here. Suffice it to say that the most significant in its application to China is, in my view, the one that I call the classical structural An Chen, associate professor of political science at the National University of Singapore, was previously a research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He received his doctorate from Yale University. He is the author of Restructuring Political Power in China: Alliances and Opposition, 1978–1998 (1999).

Rising-Class Politics and its Impact on China's Path to Democracy

Chinas market reform over the last two decades or more have brought about a significant degree of societal stratification and the rise of class politics. The diversification of class interests forces the party-state leadership to take sides in the emerging class warfare and to show a manifest class orientation in government policy making. Mutual dependence and shared interests between the communist state and the entrepreneurial class (and other middle classes) have led to the formation of a de facto anti-democratic alliance. Meanwhile, the rapid expansion of the underclass, widespread resentment against socio-economic polarization, and the lack of institutionalized channels for articulating and advancing class interests have combined to create a potentially explosive situation that, to both the regime and its allies, has considerably increased the risks and costs of democratization. But the use of the coercive power of the state to maintain social stability has aggravated state-society tension and could push confrontation in a revolutionary direction.

The politics of the shareholding collective economy in China's rural villages

Since the early 2000s, the collective economy, assets or property rights have gone through shareholding reform in an increasing number of Chinas rural villages. There are two main types of the shareholding economy. One type is the Cooperative of Shareholding Economy (CSE) that quantifies the total value of the villages collective assets and turns them into stocks to be distributed among all the villagers. Another type is the Shareholding Land Cooperative (SLC), which peasants spontaneously organized in some regions and voluntarily joined with their land-use contracts. Both types aim to turn ordinary villagers into the shareholders and thereby the genuine owners of the collective economy or assets. The SLC serves another purpose, which is to achieve economies of scale for agricultural production through reconcentration of village land. While the effects of the shareholding reform in empowering peasants are varied and limited, it does have the potential to make village governance more democratic.

The transformation of governance in rural China : market, finance, and political authority

1. Introduction 2. The changing foundations of Communist rule in Chinas rural society 3. The 1994 tax reform and rural fiscal crises 4. The township in the era of reform 5. The mechanisms of political power in villages 6. Village finance: its deterioration and consequences 7. The abolition of agricultural taxes and village governance 8. Transformed peasant society and realignment in rural politics 9. Entrepreneur cadres as new rural ruling elites 10. Prospects for Chinas rural governance Appendices Bibliography Index.

The Failure of Organizational Control: Changing Party Power in the Chinese Countryside

As frequent, violent, and organized peasant protests show, China’s reform regime has lost its once all-powerful control in the countryside. The sharp decline of village cadres’ positional authority in allocating economic resources, which began in post-Mao decollectivization, holds the key to explaining the change. Since the late 1990s, the collapse of village enterprises and the erosion of power over land have cost village cadres their remaining economic levers to engage the villagers as well as their incentives to work for the party-state. The loss of the regime’s grip on village cadres and the loss of command by village cadres on peasants have almost synchronized, causing the traditional structure of organizational control to crumble in vast rural areas. In the new, prevailing patterns of village governance, party power is becoming increasingly irrelevant.

How Has the Abolition of Agricultural Taxes Transformed Village Governance in China? Evidence from Agricultural Regions

The abolition of agricultural taxes (AAT) (2005–2006) significantly changed the workload, finance, authority and functions of village governments. In agricultural regions, village cadres had their agendas reset, with the top priority switching to the search for new revenues through “attracting investment” (zhaoshang yinzi). This new agenda fits perfectly with the demands of township governments. Facing an even worse fiscal crisis, township governments attempted to cover up their deficits using village revenues. The shared stake in increasing revenue has resulted in the convergence of the functions of township and village authorities. However, the change in the function of village governments has increased the disengagement between cadres and villagers.