Ana Arjona

Rebel governance in civil war

This is the first book to examine and compare how rebels govern civilians during civil wars in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Europe. Drawing from a variety of disciplinary traditions, including political science, sociology, and anthropology, the book provides in-depth case studies of specific conflicts as well as comparative studies of multiple conflicts. Among other themes, the book examines why and how some rebels establish both structures and practices of rule; the role of ideology, cultural, and material factors affecting rebel governance strategies; the impact of governance on the rebel–civilian relationship; civilian responses to rebel rule; the comparison between modes of state and non-state governance to rebel attempts to establish political order; the political economy of rebel governance; and the decline and demise of rebel governance attempts.

Wartime Institutions: A Research Agenda

Theories of civil war usually theorize the choices of civilians and combatants without considering the institutional context in which they interact. Despite common depictions of war as chaotic and anarchic, order often emerges locally. Institutions vary greatly over time and space and, as in peacetime, shape behavior. In this article, I propose a research agenda on local wartime institutions. To this end, I present original evidence on conflict areas in Colombia to illustrate the scope of variation, propose the concept of wartime social order and a typology, and discuss several ways in which research on wartime institutions can contribute to our study of civil war both at the micro and macro levels.

Recruitment into Armed Groups in Colombia: A Survey of Demobilized Fighters

Research on civil wars has recently shifted from an almost exclusive emphasis on highly aggregate, crossnational research designs to more disaggregated, subnational research designs (Kalyvas 2008).1 Most of the recent crop has tended to disaggregate on the basis of geographic locations or events, but a few researchers have turned their attention to individuals (e.g. Blattman and Annan 2006; Guichaoua 2010; Humphreys and Weinstein 2004, 2007, 2008; Mvukiyehe and Samii 2008; Mvukiyehe et al. 2007; Pugel 2006; Samii et al. 2009; Viterna 2006).

Performing the Nation-State: Rebel Governance and Symbolic Processes

Rebel groups frequently deploy resources as symbolic expressions of power. What purposes do they serve, particularly in regards to the civilian–rebel relationship? Contrary to analyses that treat such actions as merely rhetorical, I argue that symbolic processes can serve both instrumental and normative purposes for an insurgent government. Specifically, symbolic processes reduce the need for a rebellion to use force to ensure compliance. In addition, they may increase civilian identification with the rebel government, producing several distinct benefits. This chapter illustrates these arguments, drawing on cases from around the world. Insurrection is an art, and like all arts has its own laws.

Civilian Cooperation and Non-Cooperation with Non-State Armed Groups: The Centrality of Obedience and Resistance

Abstract Terms like ‘support’ and ‘collaboration’ are often used interchangeably to denote a loose set of acts or attitudes that benefit non-state armed groups (NSAGs). However, these terms are seldom defined, and the alternatives available to civilians are rarely identified. Moreover, existing approaches overlook that the interaction between civilians and NSAGs is often one between ruler and ruled, which makes obedience and resistance central. This paper proposes to conceptualize the choices available to civilians as forms of cooperation and non-cooperation, offers a typology, and discusses the implications for theory building on civilian and NSAG behavior, and on the functioning of armed social orders.

A Theory of Social Order in Civil War

War zones are usually portrayed as chaotic and anarchic. In irregular civil wars, however, they are often ordered. Furthermore, different forms of order often coexist in areas controlled by the same non-state armed group, where the behavior of both civilians and combatants vary substantially. What explains this variation? In this paper I present a theory of the creation of order in war zones that analyzes the behavior of non-state armed groups, the responses of local populations, and the effect of their interaction on wartime institutions. My central argument is that disorder emerges when armed groups have short time horizons, which usually happens when they fight for control with other warring sides or are undisciplined; under these conditions, they are unlikely to establish a social contract with the local population. When armed groups have a long time horizon, a social contract is established, giving place to a new order. In this new order, armed groups may intervene minimally or broadly in civilian affairs; their choice, I argue, depends on the likelihood of organized civilian resistance, which is, in turn, a function of the quality of pre-existing local institutions, especially those dealing with adjudication of disputes. I also present extensions of the theory that account for variation in the strategic value of territory, variation in local capacity for collective action, and armed groups’ information about local institutions.