Ananda R. Ganguly

The Riskiness of Large Audit Firm Client Portfolios and Changes in Audit Liability Regimes: Evidence from the U.S. Audit Market

We investigate whether the financial riskiness of large US audit firm clienteles varied with the changing audit litigation liability environment during the period 1975-1999. Partitioning the period of study into four distinct periods [a benchmark period (1975-1984), a period of increasing concerns about litigation liability (1985-1989), a period of lobbying for reform (1990-1994) and a post-relief period (1995-1999)], we find some evidence of risk decreases during 1985-1989, strong evidence of risk decreases during 1990-1994 and strong evidence of risk increases during 1995-1999. However, we also find that over the period of our study, a time during which Big Six market shares grew appreciably, the proportion of litigious-industry clients in Big Six client portfolios grew at about the same rate as the proportion of such clients in the population. Moreover, the Big Six share of the financially riskiest clients in the economy did not grow as fast as overall Big Six market share. In sum, while our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the riskiness of Big Six client portfolios responded to changes in the audit litigation liability environment, we find no systematic evidence of a race to the bottom or bottom fishing by these firms in a bid to increase their market shares.

The Effects of Biases in Probability Judgments on Market Prices

Experimental Markets were used to examine whether individual probability judgment biases affect market prices. This issue is important to accountants because users of accounting information (especially investors) face competitive market environments. The expectation was that it would be more difficult for prices to be unbiased in markets where biased traders had the highest expected payoffs than in markets where unbiased traders had the highest expected payoffs. This expectation arose from the observation that competitive forces would produce biased prices when biased traders had the highest expected payoffs unless either (1) biased traders learned to be unbiased as a result of market experience, or (2) biased traders were inactive, thus allowing unbiased traders to set prices. Consistent with expectations, prices were biased in a market where biased traders had the highest expected payoffs, with prices moving toward unbiased prices but remaining more biased than biased overall. The results of this study suggest that individual judgment biases can have a substantial effect on market prices, and, consequently, demonstrations of individual investor judgment biases should be of concern to accountants.

Do Asset Market Prices Reflect Traders' Judgment Biases?*

The existence of base rate fallacy (BRF) bias is explored employing: (i) a context treatment with a narrative story applied to asset markets and (ii) an isomorphic abstract setting using balls-and-bingo cages. Probability estimates reflect a BRF bias in both treatments, but is stronger with context. Prices track highest expected dividend values (HEDVs) with context, resulting in strongly biased prices relative to the Bayesian norm when biased traders have HEDVs. In the abstract treatment prices do not track HEDVs nearly as closely, resulting in prices closer to the BRF bias only when most traders hold biased beliefs.

The Riskiness of Large Audit Firm Client Portfolios and Changes in Audit Liability Regimes: Evidence from the U.S. Audit Market Discussion of "The Riskiness of Large Audit Firm Client Portfolios and Changes in Audit Liability Regimes: Evidence from the U.S. Audit Market"

We investigate whether the financial riskiness of large US audit firm clienteles varied with the changing audit litigation liability environment during the period 1975-1999. Partitioning the period of study into four distinct periods [a benchmark period (1975-1984), a period of increasing concerns about litigation liability (1985-1989), a period of lobbying for reform (1990-1994) and a post-relief period (1995-1999)], we find some evidence of risk decreases during 1985-1989, strong evidence of risk decreases during 1990-1994 and strong evidence of risk increases during 1995-1999. However, we also find that over the period of our study, a time during which Big Six market shares grew appreciably, the proportion of litigious-industry clients in Big Six client portfolios grew at about the same rate as the proportion of such clients in the population. Moreover, the Big Six share of the financially riskiest clients in the economy did not grow as fast as overall Big Six market share. In sum, while our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the riskiness of Big Six client portfolios responded to changes in the audit litigation liability environment, we find no systematic evidence of a race to the bottom or bottom fishing by these firms in a bid to increase their market shares.

Is Neuroaccounting Waiting in the Wings? An Essay

This paper discusses a recently published handbook on neuroeconomics (Glimcher et al., 2009H) and extends the discussion to reasons why this newly emerging discipline should be of interest to behavioral accounting researchers. We evaluate the achieved and potential contribution of neuroeconomics to the study of human economic behavior, and examine what behavioral accounting researchers can learn from neuroeconomics and whether we should expect to see a similar sub-field emerge within behavioral accounting in the near future. We conclude that a separate sub-field within behavioral accounting is not likely in the near future due mostly to practical reasons. However, the behavioral accounting researcher would do well to follow research in this discipline closely, and behavioral accountants in the near future are likely to collaborate with neuroscientists and neuroeconomists on questions of mutual interest.

Assurer Reputation for Competence in a Multiservice Context

We experimentally examine determinants of the transferability and durability of an assurers flagship-service reputation for competence in a multi-service context. Economic and psychology theories agree that transferability will increase when a new service and a flagship service require relatively similar, as opposed to relatively dissimilar, competencies. These theories disagree, however, regarding the durability of an assurers flagship-service reputation following a performance failure in a new service. Economic theory requires some reciprocity for transferability and durability, and, accordingly, predicts that a new-service failure will inflict more damage on a flagship-service reputation when the new and flagship services require relatively similar, as opposed to relatively dissimilar, competencies. Psychology theory, in contrast, predicts that a new-service failure will tend not to damage the flagship-service reputation, even when the new and flagship services require relatively similar competencies. Thus, unlike economic theory, psychology theory predicts that relatively similar competencies between a new and a flagship service can improve the transferability of an assurers flagship-service reputation for competence without reciprocally threatening its durability. Experimental findings indicate that reputation transferability increases when the new and flagship services require relatively similar, as opposed to relatively dissimilar, competencies. They also indicate that a new-service failure damages the flagship-service reputation only when, and to a greater degree when, the new and flagship services require relatively dissimilar, as opposed to relatively similar, competencies. Thus, empirically, greater similarity in the competencies required by a new and flagship service simultaneously enhances the transferability and durability of the assurers flagship-service reputation. These empirical findings are better explained by psychology theory than by economic theory.

Disclosure-Derived Financial Statement Adjustments in Equity Valuation

In this paper, we assess the equity value relevance of disclosure-derived financial statement adjustments. In price levels and returns tests, we find that reported financial numbers have relatively superior explanatory power over adjusted numbers. Only when adjustments are included along with reported numbers in pricing regressions do adjustments retain significant explanatory power. Our results suggest that for summary valuation inputs like operating profitability, assets, and liabilities, analysts should not substitute adjusted numbers for reported numbers; rather, the information in a subset of adjustments should be used along with reported numbers to produce more accurate valuations.