Anastasia Tataryn

Re-conceptualizing Labor Law in an Era of Migration and Precarity:

The terms “economic” and “irregular” migrant support a particular construction of the subject of labor law, whereby the exclusion of some from a formal employment relationship renders them necessary precarious laborers. The experience of precarious work is not an experience limited to migrant workers. However, the relationship between labor regulation and the most precarious of workers is one that has been gaining critical attention. Building on existing studies of migration, precarity and labor, I question the boundaries and frame of labor law with regard to precarious workers through Jean-Luc Nancy’s confronted community. Re-thinking the legal citizen-subject of labor law is necessary before remedies to address the exploitation of workers in precarious situations can be successful.

Book review: Law & Society Redefined By George Pavlich. Oxford University Press, 2011. 256 pp.

The book’s defense of human dignity against critics and opponents is often implicit, and when explicit it is often marked by tones of summary and finality. According to Kateb, the main critics of human dignity who demand reply are utilitarians (who would balance human dignity against the demands of prosperity and happiness), virtue ethicists (for whom dignity is derivative of personal character acquired by living the correct kind of life), and radical ecologists (who criticize or reject the privileging of humanity over other parts of nature). More often than responding to critics of human dignity with direct counterarguments, Kateb responds by way of elaborate reminders of what utilitarian and virtue ethics critics of human dignity are in fact arguing for, the kinds of exceptions they are willing to make, the ways in which individual rights and integrity would be open to both circumstantial and systematic compromise. Ecological critics are met with the most direct reply by way of an elaboration of human stature which, if not conclusive, goes beyond a recapitulation of the priority of individual rights. The larger project of defending individual dignity and rights on existential rather than moral grounds is undoubtedly refreshing in its perspective and thoughtful in its discussion, though the distinction of existential grounds from moral grounds would likely be clearer and more powerful if the former were described in terms that did not have such a long and varied pedigree in moral philosophy (such as autonomy and authenticity). Was Kateb right twenty years ago in suggesting that an elaborate apology for human dignity jeopardizes the concept it defends? It would seem that he was indeed correct that an apology weakens the conceptual façade of human dignity and multiplies the points at which criticism may be focused. However, defending a concept by way of a reverent silence creates only the illusion of weight and validity. Lengthy discussion tends to expose weak arguments and leaps of faith, but the concept of human dignity is likely better served by breaking from a stance of reverence and engaging with critics directly. Human Dignity is only a gesture in this direction, but an important gesture which adds to the depth of Kateb’s project and to the concept of human dignity itself. At the descriptive level, the book is a genuine and distinctive contribution to political and legal thinking about dignity as well as rights, due in large measure to the force and richness of Kateb’s prose and the imagination that drives his exposition. If there is a shortcoming in the book it is that the analysis and defense of human dignity are often pitched in terms that are likely to resonate only with an already sympathetic audience, convinced of the cause of individual rights and the weight of human dignity. Thus in laboring to defend human dignity against its critics, both avowed and circumstantial, he may have risked exposure without cultivating very substantial engagement.