Anca Gheaus

Basic Income, Gender Justice and the Costs of Gender‐Symmetrical Lifestyles

I argue that, in the currently gender-unjust societies a basic income would not advance feminist goals. To assess the impact of a social policy on gender justice I propose the following criterion: a society is gender-just when the costs of engaging in a lifestyle characterized by gender-symmetry (in both the domestic and public spheres) are, for both men and women, smaller or equal to the costs of engaging in a gender-asymmetrical lifestyle. For a significant number of women, a basic income would increase the costs of leading gender-symmetrical lifestyles because it would make it easier for both women and men to pursue gender-unjust preferences. I argue that preference satisfaction is distinct from justice. I conclude by showing why a basic income would lead to further privatisation of caregiving, and I outline the negative effects this would have on women.

The ‘Intrinsic Goods of Childhood’ and the Just Society

I distinguish between three different ideas that have been recently discussed under the heading of ‘the intrinsic goods of childhood’: that childhood is itself intrinsically valuable, that certain goods are valuable only for children, and that children are being owed other goods than adults. I then briefly defend the claim the childhood is intrinsically good. Most of the chapter is dedicated to the analysis, and rejection, of the claim that certain goods are valuable only for children. This has implications about how a just society should trade off economic productivity on the one hand and goods such as play and unstructured time on the other hand.

Is the Family Uniquely Valuable

Family relationships are often believed to have a unique value; this is reflected both in the special expectations that family members have from each other and in the various ways in which states protect family relationships. Commitment appears to set apart family relationships from other close relationships; however, commitment is in fact present in other close relationships. I conclude that family relationships do not have any special value; love does. In the case of families with children, however, a high degree of commitment between adults may be useful or even necessary for advancing childrens wellbeing. This could be a reason to give special protection to relationships between co-parents.

The parental love argument against ‘designing’ babies : the harm in knowing that one has been selected or enhanced

The parental love argument against ‘designing’ babies : the harm in knowing that one has been selected or enhanced

The Challenge of Care to Idealizing Theories of Distributive Justice

The ideal of distributive justice as a means of ensuring fair distribution of social opportunities is a cornerstone of contemporary feminist theory. Feminists from various disciplines have developed arguments to support the redistribution of the work of care through institutional mechanisms. I discuss the limits of such distribution under the conditions of theories that do not idealize human agents as independent beings. People’s reliance on care, understood as a response to needs, is pervasive and infuses almost all human interaction. I argue that the effect of care on shaping the social opportunities of all individuals is huge, although often invisible. Much of the optimism of theories of distributive justice comes from ignoring or downplaying the way in which care influences most factors of social success. Jonathan Wolff distinguished between three types of resources whose fair distribution is important: internal, external and structural. Care, I argue, does not fit well in any of these types. Inseparably interwoven with relational realities, care cuts across these categories and thus poses a challenge to the feasibility of equal chances. I focus on the under-analyzed issue of bad care and show how difficult it is to dismantle legacies of bad care. Their effect on even close-to-ideal social arrangements is too significant to be disregarded, yet very difficult to tackle through institutional mechanisms. A commitment to certain elements of individual ethics – as opposed to merely political institutions – is required in order to bridge the gap between ideal theories of justice and feasible practical aims.

What abolishing the family would not do

Abstract Because families disrupt fair patterns of distribution and, in particular, equality of opportunity, egalitarians believe that the institution of the family needs to be defended at the bar of justice. In their recent book, Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift have argued that the moral gains of preserving the family outweigh its moral costs. Yet, I claim that the egalitarian case for abolishing the family has been over-stated due to a failure to consider how alternatives to the family would also disturb fair distributions and, in particular, equality of opportunity. Absent the family, children would continue to be exposed to care-givers of different levels of ability, investment in childrearing and beneficial partiality. In addition, social mechanisms other than the family would lead to the accumulation of economic inequalities. Any kind of upbringing will fail to realise equality for reasons that go deeper than the family: our partiality and unequal abilities to nurture.

Biological parenthood: gestational, not genetic

ABSTRACT Common-sense morality and legislations around the world ascribe normative relevance to biological connections between parents and children. Procreators who meet a modest standard of parental competence are believed to have a right to rear the children whom they brought into the world. I explore various attempts to justify this belief, and find most of these attempts lacking. I distinguish between two kinds of biological connection between parents and children: the genetic link and the gestational link. I argue that the second can better justify a right to rear.

Die Güter der Arbeit (jenseits des Geldes!) 1

John Rawls wurde dafur beruhmt, dass er Gerechtigkeit als die faire Verteilung der Nutzen und Lasten sozialer Kooperation beschrieb. In modernen Gesellschaft en ist eine der zentralen Formen sozialer Kooperation die bezahlte Arbeit. Die meisten von uns mussen arbeiten, um ihren Lebensunterhalt zu verdienen, und dies nimmt viel Zeit in Anspruch. Der unvermeidbare und zeitintensive Charakter von Arbeit impliziert, dass die Struktur von Arbeitsmarkten in mehreren Hinsichten gerechtigkeitsrelevant ist: Die meisten Menschen konnen bezahlte Arbeit nicht vermeiden, deswegen muss sichergestellt werden, dass sie nicht ihre Moglichkeit unterminiert, ein angemessenes Leben zu fuhren.

Introduction: Special Issue on the Ethics of Incentives in Healthcare

This special issue is the result of a conference organised by Verina Wild and Anca Gheaus, at the Ludwig-Maximilians University of Munich in December 2014. The conference addressed normative issues raised by the use of incentive mechanisms to promote better health, and included papers by most contributors to this special issue. So far, the normative discussion on health incentives focussed on questions of autonomy, paternalism, motivation and responsibility. This resulting special issue responds to a need to expand the normative analysis of such measures to other issues of justice, which have so far been largely ignored. Recent policies and programmes in health prevention tend to appeal to, and encourage, individual responsibility with respect to lifestyle choices. One way of advancing this goal is via schemes that provide individuals with incentives to live healthy lives. For example, individuals may be offered discounted health insurance rates if they adopt healthy lifestyles or be given vouchers to purchase healthy food or to use fitness centres. Such programmes often use so-called ‘nudging’ mechanisms, meant to motivate people without coercively interfering with their private choices and to improve health outcomes without overregulating the market for products that are detrimental to health. They also raise many normative questions. Health incentive programmes put pressure on us to rethink how to balance reasons of freedom, solidarity and justice in the design of public health policies. Angus Dawsons article is a criticism to the …

Love and Justice: a Paradox?

Abstract Three claims about love and justice cannot be simultaneously true and therefore entail a paradox: (1) Love is a matter of justice. (2) There cannot be a duty to love. (3) All matters of justice are matters of duty. The first claim is more controversial. To defend it, I show why the extent to which we enjoy the good of love is relevant to distributive justice. To defend (2) I explain the empirical, conceptual and axiological arguments in its favour. Although (3) is the most generally endorsed claim of the three, I conclude we should reject it in order to avoid the paradox.