Andre Kukla

Does every theory have empirically equivalent rivals

The instrumentalist argument from the underdetermination of theories by data runs as follows: (1) every theory has empirically equivalent rivals; (2) the only warrant for believing one theory over another is its possession of a greater measure of empirical virtue; (3) therefore belief in any theory is arbitrary. In this paper, I examine the status of the first premise. Several arguments against the universal availability of empirically equivalent theoretical rivals are criticized, and four algorithms for producing empirically equivalent rivals are defended. I conclude that the case for the first premise of the argument from underdetermination is very strong. The disposition of the argument itself depends on the fate of the second premise.

Theoreticity, Underdetermination, and the Disregard for Bizarre Scientific Hypotheses

The problem of scientific disregard is the problem of accounting for why some putative theories that appear to be well-supported by empirical evidence nevertheless play no role in the scientific enterprise. Laudan and Leplin suggest (and Hoefer and Rosenberg concur) that at least some of these putative theories fail to be genuine theoretical rivals because they lack some non-empirical property of theoreticity. This solution also supports their repudiation of the thesis of underdetermination. I argue that the attempt to provide criteria of theoreticity fails, that there is a Bayesian solution to the problem of scientific disregard that fares better, and that this successful solution supports a distinctively Bayesian version of the underdetermination thesis.

Forster and Sober on the Curve-Fitting Problem

Forster and Sober present a solution to the curve-fitting problem based on Akaikes Theorem. Their analysis shows that the curve with the best epistemic credentials need not always be the curve that most closely fits the data. However, their solution does not, without further argument, avoid the two difficulties that are traditionally associated with the curve-fitting problem: (1) that there are infinitely many equally good candidate-curves relative to any given set of data, and (2) that these best candidates include curves with indefinitely many bumps.

Non-empirical theoretical virtues and the argument from underdetermination

The antirealist argument from the underdetermination of theories by data relies on the premise that the empirical content of a theory is the only determinant of its belief-worthiness (premise NN). Several authors have claimed that the antirealist cannot endorse NN, on pain of internal inconsistency. I concede this point. Nevertheless, this refutation of the underdetermination argument fails because there are weaker substitutes for NN that will serve just as well as a premise to the argument. On the other hand, antirealists have not made a convincing casefor NN (or its weaker substitutes) either. In particular, I criticize van Fraassens recent claim that all ampliative rules in epistemology must be rejected on the grounds that they lead to incoherence. The status of the underdetermination argument remains unsettled.

Antirealist Explanations of the Success of Science

Scientific realists have argued that the truth(likeness) of our theories provides the only explanation for the success of science. I consider alternative explanations proposed by antirealists. I endorse Leplins contention that neither van Fraassens Darwinist explanation nor Laudans methodological explanation provides the sort of explanatory alternative which is called for in this debate. Fines suggestion--that the empirical adequacy of our theories already explains their success--is more promising for antirealists. Leplin claims that this putative explanation collapses into realism on one reading and into vacuity on another reading. But his analysis conflates three doctrines into two, and one of the three avoids both realism and vacuity.

Criteria of Rationality and the Problem of Logical Sloth

Rationality demands at least that we eliminate incoherencies among our beliefs when we are apprised of them. This minimal requirement gives us no grounds for condemning a refusal to look for incoherencies, or indeed to deliberate altogether. Several stronger conditions on rationality are explored and rejected. There are presently no good arguments against logical sloth.

AMPLIFICATION AND SIMPLIFICATION AS MODES OF THEORETICAL ANALYSIS IN PSYCHOLOGY

Abstract Some theoretical projects are autonomous, in the sense that they can successfully be pursued without attending to the results of empirical research. Amplification and simplification are the most important of these. An amplification is a logical discovery about a theory which forces us to alter its probability. An example would be a discovery that the postulates of a theory lead to an unexpected inconsistency. A simplification is the invention of a new theory which has the same empirical consequences as an existing theory, but which is more probable than its predecessor. An example would be an “Ockhams razor” argument to the effect that certain postulated theoretical entities can be eliminated without altering the theorys observational consequences. Several subvarieties of amplification and simplification are distinguished, and examples are provided from the literature of theoretical psychology.

Medium AI and experimental science

Abstract It has been claimed that a great deal of AI research is an attempt to discover the empirical laws describing a new type of entity in the world—the artificial computing system. I call this enterprise ‘medium AI’, since it is in some respects stronger than Searles ‘weak AI’, and in other respects weaker than ‘strong AI’. Bruce Buchanan, among others, conceives of medium AI as an empirical science entirely on a par with psychology or chemistry. I argue that medium AI is not an empirical science at all. Depending on how artificial computing systems are categorized, it is either an a priori science like mathematics, or a branch of engineering.

On the Coherence of Instrumentalism

According to a certain type of instrumentalist, we may have good reasons for accepting scientific theories, but never for believing more than their empirical consequences. Horwich (1991) considers several attempts to capture a difference between acceptance and belief, and claims that none of them succeed. He concludes that instrumentalism has not been shown to be a coherent position. However, in the course of his discussion, Horwich himself deploys a conceptual apparatus which is sufficient for formulating the instrumentalist doctrine in a coherent manner. The worst accusation that can be laid against instrumentalists is that they have violated common linguistic usage.

The One World, One Science Argument

The one world, one science argument (so named by Rescher) is advanced by Carl Sagan and others to support the thesis that we will be able to learn to converse with intelligent extraterrestrials if and when we encounter them. The prima facie obstacle to extraterrestrial communication is that the aliens’ culture and geography are bound to be so different from ours that we would find it extremely difficult, if not practically impossible, to find a common topic on which we can both converse. Sagans rebuttal is that we will share mathematics and the laws of physics, these being the same for all intelligent beings regardless of local cultural and geographical variations. I show that this argument fails even if its contentious assumptions about science and the world are granted—that is to say, it fails on uncontentious grounds. 1. OWOS2. OWOS and Social Constructivism3. OWOS and Conceptual Relativism4. OWOS and the Selection Problem5. The Fundamental Laws Solution6. The Mathematics Solution7. The Radio Solution8. The Common Conditions Solution9. The Intractability of the Selection Problem10. The Superfluity of OWOS OWOS OWOS and Social Constructivism OWOS and Conceptual Relativism OWOS and the Selection Problem The Fundamental Laws Solution The Mathematics Solution The Radio Solution The Common Conditions Solution The Intractability of the Selection Problem The Superfluity of OWOS