Andrea Benvenuti

Tradition, myth and the dilemma of Australian foreign policy

For a middle power with a relatively short history of framing a self determined foreign policy, Australia has actively sought to engage with both its immediate region and the wider world. Elite agreement on this external orientation, however, has by no means entailed consensus on what this orientation might involve in terms of policy. Consequently, two, often conflicting, traditions and their associated myths have informed Australian foreign policy-making. The most enduring tradition shaping foreign policy views Australia as a somewhat isolated bastion of Western civilisation. In this mode Australias myth is pragmatic, but uncertain and sees Asia as both an opportunity and a potential threat which requires the support and counsel of culturally similar external powers engaged in the region to ensure stability. Against this, an alternative and historically later tradition crafted a foreign policy that advanced Australian independence through engagement with a seemingly monolithic and increasingly prosperous Asia. This paper explores the evolution and limitations of these foreign policy traditions and the myths that sustain them. It further considers what features of these traditions continue to have resonance in a region that has become more fluid and heterogeneous than it was during the Cold War and which requires a foreign policy flexibility that can address this complex and strategically uncertain environment.

EU-Australia Relations

This chapter examines the development of the EU-Australia relationship from a focus on one country (the UK) and policy (agriculture) to a broadening of engagement. Engagement has long been characterised by conflict and mutual misunderstandings, underpinned by a sense of distance. For some decades, neither interlocutor featured significantly on the other’s radar screen. Increasingly, however, there has been a rapprochement based on common concerns and a shared interest in cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. The chapter examines how and why the relationship has moved from a bilateral state-to-state engagement in the early debates to an increasingly regionalised and multilater-alised common agenda. It commences with an overview of the single-country emphasis of Australia in its dealings with the EU and the single-policy focus on the Common Agricultural Policy. It then examines the development of agreements and dialogues as the EU broadened its policy scope and reach and as Australia increasingly perceived advantages in engaging in a multidimensional relationship with the EU, its institutions and member states.

Myth and Misrepresentation in Australian Foreign Policy: Menzies and Engagement with Asia

The prevailing orthodoxy in the academic literature devoted to the history of Australias post-1945 international relations posits that a mixture of suspicion and condescension permeated the attitude of the governments headed by Robert Menzies (1949–1966) toward the Asia-Pacific region. Menziess regional policies, according to this view, not only prevented Australia from engaging meaningfully with its Asian neighbors but also ended up antagonizing them. This article rejects the conventional view and instead shows that the prevailing left-Labor assessments of Menziess regional policy are fundamentally marred by an anachronistic disregard of the diplomatic dynamics, political challenges, and economic realities of Cold War Asia.

The Five Power Defence Arrangements and the reappraisal of the British and Australian policy interests in Southeast Asia, 1970–75

Working from recently declassified Australian and British government files, this paper examines the archival evidence on policy thinking in London and Canberra towards the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) during the period 1970–75. The article argues that one of the main reasons for the Heath governments decision to deploy a token military force in Southeast Asia as part of a multilateral defence arrangement with Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore was the desire to uphold these Commonwealth connections. By contrast, Canberra was beginning to question the value of such arrangements in a rapidly changing Southeast Asian strategic environment.

Engaging Southeast Asia?: Labor's Regional Mythology and Australia's Military Withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia, 1972–1973

This article draws on previously classified Australian and British archival material to reevaluate Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlams foreign policy. The article focuses on the Whitlam governments decision in 1973 to withdraw Australian forces from Malaysia and Singaporea decision that constitutes a neglected but defining episode in the evolution of Australian postwar diplomacy. An analysis of this decision reveals the limits of Whitlams attempt to redefine the conduct of Australian foreign policy from 1972 to 1975, a policy he saw as too heavily influenced by the Cold War. Focusing on Whitlams approach to the Five Power Defence Arrangement, this article contends that far from being an adroit and skillful architect of Australian engagement with Asia, Whitlam irritated Australias regional allies and complicated Australias relations with its immediate neighbors. Australias subsequent adjustment to its neighborhood was not the success story implied in the general histories of Australian diplomacy. Whitlams policy toward Southeast Asia, far from being a watershed in foreign relations, as often assumed, left Australia increasingly isolated from its region and more reliant on its chief Cold War ally, the United States.

Australian reactions to Britain's declining presence in Southeast Asia, 1955–63

This article examines Australias long-held doubts about Britains willingness and ability to maintain a significant military presence in Southeast Asia, where Australias main strategic interests lay. The article argues that Australian concerns long predated the Wilson governments attempt to disengage from east of Suez in the mid-1960s. In doing so, it shows that the Menzies government had since the mid-1950s become increasingly concerned about Britains resolve and capacity to station substantial forces in the region. In illustrating the extent to which policy-makers in Canberra became suspicious of British long-term strategic aims in Southeast Asia, this article reveals some interesting aspects of the changing nature of Anglo-Australian relations in the post-war period.

The British Military Withdrawal from Southeast Asia and its Impact on Australia's Cold War Strategic Interests

The impact of Britains withdrawal on Western strategic interests in Cold War Asia constitutes the focus of this article. In particular, the article provides an analysis of the problems and the challenges which confronted Australia in its response to the Wilson governments controversial decision to pull out of Southeast Asia. While the US reaction to Britains disengagement has been examined in some detail, Australian and New Zealand responses to changes in British policy in Cold War Asia have been largely overlooked. This article therefore aims to redress this situation by examining the consequences of withdrawal for Australia, a country strongly committed to the Wests containment strategy in Cold War Asia.

Australia’s relations with the European Community in a historical perspective: an elusive partnership

ABSTRACT In 2015, Australia and the European Union successfully negotiated a Framework Agreement. This agreement is an essential step in establishing a stronger Australia–European Union partnership and achieving closer bilateral cooperation. For years, negotiating such an agreement had proved impossible. In the 1970s, successive Australian governments showed interest in enhanced collaboration with the European Community, but the political climate for closer relations was far from encouraging. This article explains why this was the case. In doing so, it also explores how the Whitlam and Fraser governments envisaged, framed and developed Australia’s ties with the European Community in the 1970s, and asks whether a more positive approach on their part could have led to a stronger relationship. Based on recently declassified government files, this article shows that although both Whitlam and Fraser fully grasped the importance of the European Community as an emerging international actor and were willing to deepen Australia’s ties with it, significant constraints existed against enhanced bilateral cooperation. With the Common Agricultural Policy still a considerable challenge to Australian economic interests and with the European Community focused mainly on the management of its internal market, broader political considerations were inevitably relegated to the margins of Australia–European Community consultations.

Menzies' Asia policy and the anachronistic fallacy

A powerful orthodoxy exists in the academic literature devoted to the history of Australias post-1945 international relations. It maintains that suspicion and condescension permeated the attitude of the Menzies government (1949–66) towards Asia. Accordingly, Menzies’ regional policies not only prevented Australia from engaging meaningfully with its Asian neighbours, but they also ended up antagonising them. This article critiques this view and instead contends that the assumptions that inform the contemporary construction of Menzies’ regional policy are overdetermined by an anachronistic disregard for the diplomatic dynamics, political challenges and economic realities of cold war Asia.

Between myth and reality: the euro crisis and the downfall of Silvio Berlusconi

Abstract In mid-November 2011, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi tendered his formal resignation to President Giorgio Napolitano. It was a humiliating ‘political exit’ for the controversial Italian leader who had been the dominant figure in Italian politics since the mid-1990s. With Italy in the throes of an unprecedented financial crisis, Berlusconi’s squabbling centre-right coalition had appeared increasingly incapable of dealing with the economic emergency engulfing the country. To restore credibility, Napolitano appointed Mario Monti who quickly put together an emergency government. Since then, the downfall of Italy’s longest-serving post-war prime minister has generated a good deal of controversy. Allegations that Berlusconi was pushed out of power by a cabal of domestic and international detractors have been rife both inside and outside Italy. But how plausible are these claims? Was Berlusconi brought down by a conspiracy orchestrated by Napolitano and instigated by Italy’s EU partners? This article will address these questions and, to do so, it will chart the dramatic events that led to his downfall and examine the international and domestic contexts in which these events took place.